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INTRODUCTION
This article examines the recent trend proposing that Islam and
Islamic culture mandate a distinctive approach to human rights. It offers
critical assessments of selected civil and political rights in two recent
products of this trend: (1) the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights
in Islam, issued by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
endorsed by Iran and Saudi Arabia; and (2) the rights provisions in the
Saudi Arabian Basic Law promulgated in 1992. These legislative initia-
tives will be examined in conjunction with constructs' of an Islamic
culture necessarily at odds with international human rights norms. These
constructs have been put forward not only by Westerners influenced by
Orientalist stereotypes or attracted to a cultural relativist approach to
rights questions, but also by spokespersons for Muslim countries such as
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have been in the
forefront of the campaign to persuade international opinion that Islam
mandates a distinctive approach to rights issues. The constructs of
Islamic rights that have been offered by Muslims who reject the
universality of civil and political rights - set forth in the International
1. Constructs are hypothetical categories with "heuristic or interpretive value even though
they do not purport to describe accurately any observable reality." They include: "Ideal or
constructed types that combine selected variables in order to focus attention upon common
elements in diverse concrete situations or to provide an heuristic device for examining
relationships among the selected variables." A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 123
(Julius Gould & William Kolb eds., 1964).The dictionary warns against misusing constructs:
"When employed self-consciously and critically, constructs constitute a legitimate and
frequently invaluable device for analysing and explaining human behavior. When used
without a clear identification and awareness of their nature as hypothetical categories, they
may be reified and confused with 'reality,' i.e. observable phenomena." Id. The authors of the
constructs of "Islam," "Islamic culture," and "Islamic civilization" that are criticized in this
article seem not to have heeded this warning, treating their constructs as if they corresponded
to real world categories.
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Bill of Human Rights - will be contrasted with the views of Muslims
who advocate the universality of human rights and who are inclined to
view governmental rights policies as deriving from political, and not
cultural, considerations. An examination going beyond the official
rhetoric about Islamic human rights reveals that there is no real con-
sensus on the part of Muslims that their religion mandates a culturally
distinctive approach to rights or that it precludes the adoption of interna-
tional human rights norms. In fact, the relationship of Islamic culture to
the positions that Muslims inside and outside governments are currently
articulating on human rights is neither a simple nor a direct one, and the
range of Muslims' attitudes on human rights defies Orientalist
stereotypes and facile generalizations about a supposedly monolithic
Islamic culture.
Part I of this article summarizes the recent debate over universal
versus culture-bound human rights, provides a brief review of the role of
human rights in the Islamic legal tradition, examines how Islamic ele-
ments have been combined with international human rights principles,
and discusses the recent trend to promulgate Islamic human rights
schemes. Part II analyzes and compares two recent legislative initiatives
espousing supposedly Islamic approaches to human rights - the 1990
Cairo Declaration and the 1992 Saudi Arabian Basic Law. Part III
examines the perspectives of some Muslim human rights dissidents, con-
trasting their views with official pronouncements by Muslim govern-
ments at the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference. An analysis il-
lustrates how Western Orientalist and cultural relativist views of the
impact of Islamic culture on human rights correlate with these govern-
mental positions and disregard dissenting Muslim opinions, relying
instead on stereotypes of a monolithic Islamic culture that is inimical to
modern human rights. Finally, Part III.D examines the way religious and
cultural pretexts for Iranian and Saudi policies maintain the subjugation
of women and obscure the real political conflicts over women's role in
society.
I. CONSTRUCTS OF ISLAMIC PARTICULARISM ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Conflicts Over Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures?
A prestigious Western scholar has recently added his voice to the
ongoing debate about whether human rights are distinctively Western and
fundamentally discordant with Islamic culture. In an article in Foreign
Affairs, Samuel P. Huntington (head of the Olin Institute for Strategic
Studies at Harvard University) links the international debate over whether
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human rights are Western, and thus unsuitable for nonWestern cultures,
to a broader cultural conflict.2 He claims that in the current phase of world
politics, "the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."3 He further
argues that Western concepts "differ fundamentally from those prevalent
in other civilizations." Among these "Western concepts," he includes:
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality,
liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of
Church and State, which he asserts "often have little resonance" in
nonWestern cultures.4 Because of the centrality that Huntington accords
to religion as a determinant of culture in Muslim countries, he posits an
"Islamic" civilization opposed to the geographically-designated "West,"
noting that conflicts "between Western and Islamic civilizations" have
gone on for 1,300 years.5
"Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy
issues" such as human rights, according to Huntington. 6 Moreover, he
contends that these cultural differences have consequences for foreign
relations; after the end of the Cold War, the West confronted
nonWestern cultures as the new adversary. 7 Huntington quotes
approvingly from an Indian Muslim author who maintains that the
West's next confrontation will come from "the Islamic nations from the
Maghreb to Pakistan,"8 and cites the eminent Orientalist Bernard Lewis,
who predicts a clash arising between the West and Islam as a reaction
by "an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular
present, and the world-wide expansion of both." 9
According to Huntington's thesis, the promotion of the universality
of human rights by the West is counterproductive; it merely provokes
civilizational clashes and backlash movements in nonWestern cultures:
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22.
The article generated sufficient controversy and attention to prompt the same journal to publish
several comments on Huntington's thesis. Responses to Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of
Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 2. Huntington offered a rebuttal in If Not
Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World, FOREIGN Apr., Nov.-Dec. 1993,
at 186.
3. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, supra note 2, at 22.
4. Id. at 40.
5. Id. at 31.
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id. at 41. Another recent analysis of the post-Cold War era predicting international
conflicts along religious lines can. be found in MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR?
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE (1993).
8. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, supra note 2, at 32.
9. Id. For Lewis' most recent book on this theme, see BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM AND THE
WEST (1993).
[Vol. 15:307
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Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction
against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of in-
digenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fun-
damentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures.
The very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a
Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian
Societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from
another.'°
Many points in these assertions are debatable, but Huntington's
claim that Western propagation of the universality of human rights is a
.causal factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism" is one aspect of the
article that can be easily discounted. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism
is a complex phenomenon and one that cannot plausibly be linked to
Western promotion of human rights, not the least because the chronol-
ogy is wrong. 2 Islamic fundamentalism, long present in the Middle
East, was on the upsurge after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war - well before
the Carter Administration (1977-81) adopted human rights concerns as
prime components of U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. initiatives to
promote human rights became controversial.' 3 Moreover, since Islamic
10. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, supra note 2, at 40-41.
11. In another article on this same theme, Huntington reiterates his thesis that the
propagation of Western values, like the universality of human rights, helps to stimulate
"reactions such as the religious fundamentalism taking hold in many Islamic societies."
Samuel P. Huntington, The Islamic-Confucian Connection, NEW PERSP. Q., Summer 1993, at
19.
12. The word "fundamentalism" is used in different senses by different authors. It is used
here according to the definition put forward in the article by Martin Marty, Fundamentalism
as a Social Phenomenon, 42 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 15 (1988). According to Marty,
fundamentalism is, among other things, reactive and reactionary, separatist, exclusivist and
oppositional, absolutist, authoritarian, and antipermissive, and it involves selective retrieval of
elements of a religious tradition.
For analyses of Islamic fundamentalism, none of which ascribe its growth to the Western
promotion of human eights, see THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD (Ali
Dessouki ed., 1982); FROM NATIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM (Said Arjomand ed.,
1984); RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Michael Curtis ed., 1981); OLIvIER
Roy, ISLAM AND RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN (1990); BASSAM TIBI, THE CRISIS OF MODERN
ISLAM: A PREINDUSTRIAL CULTURE IN THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1988); THE
POLrICS OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: DIVERSITY AND UNITY (Shireen Hunter ed., 1988); HENRY
MUNSON, JR., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1988). Two Egyptians, in a
pseudonymous article published in the same issue of New Perspectives Quarterly in which
Huntington's piece on the Confucian-Islamic connection appeared, offered a more realistic
assessment of the causes of fundamentalism, arguing that it was a response to internal crises
in Muslim societies frustrated by problems of development and unsettled by an incomplete
transition to modernity. Mahmoud Hussein [pseud.], The Stranded Individual of the South,
NEW PERSP. Q., Summer 1993, at 41.
13. There had been various congressional initiatives designed to advance human rights
abroad before the Carter Administration, among the most important of which was the 1974
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fundamentalist movements had achieved power in only a few Muslim
countries, the Western propagation of human rights ideals, such as it
was, was mainly directed against Middle Eastern regimes that were op-
posed to fundamentalism and condemned by fundamentalists. Funda-
mentalists' grievances against the West were often in the nature of
complaints that the West was failing to hold the existing regimes ac-
countable under international human rights standards.
14
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, linking the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade to liberalized Jewish
emigration. However, it was not until the Carter Administration that the executive branch
began energetically - if erratically - to promote human rights in U.S. foreign policy. See,
e.g., A. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND JIMMY CARTER ERAS (1979).
14. For example, powerful Islamic fundamentalist movements surged under regimes like
Sadat's and Mubarak's in Egypt and King Fahd's in Saudi Arabia. For reasons of political
expediency, U.S. criticisms of the human rights abuses committed by these regimes were
muted. The important nongovernmental organization (NGO) Middle East Watch chided the
United States for its passivity and failure to hold Mubarak accountable for human rights
abuses. See U.S. Leaders Should Grill Mubarak on Rights Abuses: Watchdog, Agence France
Presse, Oct. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD file. For a discussion of
the dilemma for U.S. policy makers that Egypt's repression of fundamentalists poses, see
Stanley Reed, The Battle for Egypt, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1993, at 94. Fundamentalist forces
opposed to monarchies like Saudi Arabia's that are supported by the United States have noted
the disparity between actual U.S. policies and U.S. professions of belief in democracy and
human rights. See Peter Ford, Can an Islamic Government Foster Democratic Rights?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 28, 1992, at 10. Thus, U.S. policy in countries like Egypt and
Saudi Arabia gives fundamentalists little in the way of "human rights imperialism" to react
against. It does, however, confirm their impressions that the United States does not apply its
human rights policy rigorously to friendly governments. The lack of strong Western protests
when Algeria's military regime interrupted the democratization process in January 1992 in an
effort to forestall the imminent electoral victory by the fundamentalist FIS party, did nothing
to discredit Muslims who charged that the West was not concerned about human rights
violations where fundamentalists were affected. See, e.g., Iran Reports Anti-U.S. Rally in
Mecca, Reuter Library Report, June 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD
file (Iranian religious leader asserting that the United States is against human rights).
Even in the case of the rare regime that is fundamentalist, U.S. concern for human rights
is erratic at best. Iran's fundamentalist regime is the only one towards which the United States
has been consistently hostile and whose rights violations it has regularly excoriated. In con-
trast, the United States has been quite subdued in condemning the rights abuses committed by
friendlier regimes pursuing fundamentalist policies, such as the Nimeiri regime in the Sudan
during 1983-85 and the Zia regime in Pakistan during 1977-88. Only after the fundamentalist
Bashir regime seized power in the Sudan in 1989 and U.S.-Sudanese ties soured because of
the Sudan's alleged support for terrorism and groups inimical to U.S. interests, did the
Sudanese government's poor rights record prompt strong U.S. condemnation, leading to a
severe worsening in U.S.-Sudanese relations and an angry response by the Sudanese dictator.
See AI-Bashir Cites Reasons for U.S. "Hostility," Middle East Intelligence Report, Jan. 18,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD file.
Moreover, in the 1980s, the United States funded the war waged by the Afghan resis-
tance against the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. The resistance groups included Islamic
fundamentalist groups, like Gulbedin Hekmatyar's, which played a prominent role in the war.
The United States displayed little concern for the impact a fundamentalist victory would have
on human rights. For a critical appraisal of the inconsistency of U.S. policy in dealing with
Islamic fundamentalism and the Algerian and Afghan situations, see Robert Fisk, Too Hot for
Democracy? Robert Fisk asks how long hangman dictators will hold sway in the Arab world,
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 14, 1994, at 21. For a general review of problems facing the United
[Vol. 15:307
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Similarly, Huntington's failure to distinguish between Muslim
reactions to human rights ideals as such and their hostile reactions to the
double standards employed by Western governments in their approach to
human rights issues rests on a grievous misperception. In actuality, as
this article will seek to demonstrate, many Muslims have responded
positively to human rights ideals. Many Muslims do, however, resent
the West's rhetorical endorsement of universality where it is accom-
panied by a double standard in the actual application of rights principles.
To Muslims, this suggests that the West is biased against Islam and
more inclined to charge Muslims than others with rights violations,
while at the same time the West minimizes or disregards the sufferings
of Muslims deprived of their rights.' 5 Instances where Muslims have
perceived bias include the West's condemnations of the human rights
violations perpetrated by the Islamic Republic of Iran after long tolerat-
ing the abuses committed by the proWestem regime of the Shah, and
the West's indifference toward abuses inflicted on Muslims in Bosnia
and in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. These situations are
contrasted with the alacrity of Western military intervention to force
States in promoting democratization in the Middle East in the face of the growing power of
fundamentalist movements, see Alan Eisner, U.S. Ponders How to Push Democracy in Mid-
east, Reuter Library Report, Mar. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD
file.
15. Thus, for example, Frej Fennich, the executive director of the Arab Institute for
Human Rights in Tunis, criticized the U.S. position at the 1993 Vienna Human Rights
Conference, not because he challenged the universality of human rights, but because he saw
the United States using a double standard, one that effectively disregarded the rights abuses
afflicting Bosnian Muslims, Palestinians, and Iraqis - as if violations of their human rights
were less serious than ones affecting Westerners. These comments were made during an
interview with the author in Tunis on June 30, 1993, after Fennich's return from the Vienna
Conference.
Western double standards were decried and exploited by antiWestern forces, thus
causing governments friendly to the West to be concerned about the antiWestern backlash that
they were creating. See, e.g., Baghdad Raid Said Sign of U.S. Arrogance, Hypocrisy, Middle
East Intelligence Report, June 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File;
Bosnian and Iranian Foreign Ministers Denounce Plan to Partition Bosnia, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, June 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File; Fear
the Attack on Iraq Will Distract Summit, International Press Service, June 28, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File; ICO Secretary-General Addresses Economic and
Commercial Meeting, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 6, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File; Iran; Rafsanjani's New Year Message: Development
Achievements; Opposing "Adventurism," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File; Iraq: North African Countries Condemn
U.S.-Led Attacks, International Press Service, Jan. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, MDEAFR File; Tom Hundley, Little Arab Support for Hussein, CHt. TRIB., Jan. 15,
1993, at 17; Other Reaction to Actions by Allies; Jordanian Crown Prince on "Double
Standards"; Says Raid in Line with Resolutions, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan.
17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAFR File; West Said Using Human Rights
to Hide Own Conduct, Middle East Intelligence Report, Mar. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, MDEAFR File.
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Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, accompanied by Western condemnations
of Iraqi rights abuses. Perceptions that the West employs a double
standard on human rights do play into the hands of Islamic fun-
damentalists.' 6 The latter are philosophically opposed to rights and are
ready to exploit cases like the sufferings of the Muslims of Bosnia or
the Iraqi population under the impact of Western sanctions to fuel
antipathy toward the West and to convince Muslims that Western ap-
peals to human rights are cynical ploys motivated by calculations of
political advantage.
Curiously, Huntington notes Muslim criticism of Western double
standards on Israel, Iraq, and Bosnia, but does not acknowledge that
they could be a factor in increasing antiWestern sentiment among Mus-
lims. Instead, he casually dismisses the significance of the double stan-
dards, asserting that "[a] world of clashing civilizations is inevitably a
world of double standards," where the West naturally applies different
standards to "kin-countries" than to others. 7 It therefore seems that
Huntington accepts the use of double standards in human rights policies
as a natural ploy in the game of global politics - a position sharply at
odds with international law on human rights, which aims at one univer-
sal standard.' Huntington may not grasp that any human rights policy
worthy of the name must be one that is grounded on universality, which
in turn precludes the allowance of favoritism and selectivity, whether in
the promotion of human rights or in criticisms of human rights viola-
tions.
Although some factual claims in Huntington's article are obviously
ill-founded, when it comes to his vision of cultural clashes resulting
16. See, e.g., John F. Burns, In the War for Bosnia, the Only Winner is Despair, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at At, A10.
17. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, supra note 2, at 36.
18. Thus, for example, the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
proclaims itself as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the
end that every individual and every organ of society ... shall strive ... to promote respect,
for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance." Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]. The Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
speaks of "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family," stating that "these rights derive from the inherent dignity of
the human person" and that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political
freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights," and recalls "the obligation of
States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and freedoms." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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from the West pressing the universality of human rights, it might seem
that he has better grounds. After all, one does have angry responses by
various Middle Eastern governments to the Western propagation of
human rights and to Western criticisms of human rights violations, like
the reactions of officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Their remarks seem, at least superficially, to back Huntington's
contention that a civilizational cleavage divides the West from Islam on
rights questions. Although this article will indicate why such pronounce-
ments should be treated skeptically, a sampling should be reviewed to
understand the reasons governments give for objecting to Western
criticisms.
In 1983, Iran's U.N. Ambassador, Sa'id Raja'i Khorasani, offered an
exceptionally forceful repudiation of the universality of international
human rights norms. Speaking as a representative of a self-professed
Islamic State,' 9 he stated that, because of its Islamic values, Iran would
have no qualms about violating such norms. He proclaimed, according
to the paraphrased record of his speech, that:
conventions, declarations and resolutions or decisions of interna-
tional organizations, which were contrary to Islam, had no validity
in the Islamic Republic of Iran .... The 'Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which represented secular understanding of the
Judeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims
and did not accord with the system of values recognized by the
19. One should bear in mind that Iran considers itself a model Islamic State. However,
Iran's theocratic regime does not come from a generally accepted model of Islamic gover-
nance, but rather from Ayatollah Khomeini's own distinctive theory of government-by-the-
faqih (the Islamic jurist). For his theory of Islamic governance, see IMAM [RUHOLLAH]
KHOMEINI, ISLAM AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI
27-166 (1991). Iran's Constitution places a faqih at the head of government, even though
after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the original faqih, the office has been downgraded and
it is now clear that the president enjoys greater power. In addition to an executive branch,
there are separate judicial and legislative branches, thelatter with the power to enact laws.
The members of the legislative branch are chosen in elections, in which all citizens 16 years
old and above may vote, but candidates who are not supportive of the Islamic government, or
not in favor with the clerical elite that has dominated the country since 1979, are precluded
from standing for office. For details of the system of government set up in 1979, see FEDER-
AL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 195-203 (4th ed.
1989). For details of the current scheme incorporating constitutional amendments adopted in
1989, see IRAN YEARBOOK '93, at 37-60 (1993). Human legislation is eschewed in traditional
Islamic legal theory and was also rejected in Ayatollah Khomeini's original conception of
how the government would operate. See, e.g., KHOMEINI, supra, at 137. Despite this, legisla-
tion by the Majles, or Parliament, is treated as the law of the land. However, it can be
blocked by a ruling of the Council of Guardians on the grounds that it violates Islamic law.
Legislative stalemates resulting from such rulings can in turn be reviewed by a Council for
the Determination of Exigencies and potentially resolved thereby. See IRAN YEARBOOK '93,
supra, at 52.
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Islamic Republic of Iran; his country would therefore not hesitate
to violate its provisions, since it had to choose between violating
the divine law of the country and violating secular conventions. 20
Thus, Raja'i Khorasani specifically relied on a supposed incompatibility
between values derived from the Islamic heritage and the Judeo-Chris-
tian heritage to justify Iran's deviation from the international human
rights norms, which he associated with the West. Implicit in his remarks
was the notion that Islam imposed a ceiling on permissible rights and
freedoms, so that adhering to Islamic law would require Iran to violate
international human rights conventions, because the latter expanded
rights and freedoms beyond the limits established by Islam. However, in
the same remarks he inconsistently asserted that secular and nonMuslim
States "who could not live up to the divine standards of Islam should at
least meet the minimum requirements established by international
organizations,', 21 thereby suggesting that the international standards provided
a standard of rights protections that was inferior to what was afforded under
Islamic law. Raja'i Khorasani's alternating presentations of Islam as the
reason justifying the regime's failure to observe international rights
standards and Islam as the guarantor of a higher standard of rights than
was afforded by international law may have been contradictory, but they
were presumably necessitated by the regime's reliance on Islam as a
legitimating device. For Iran's official Islam to be useful as a legitimating
device, the proposition that Muslims could only claim an inferior standard
of rights protections as a result of their religion could not be mooted as
such - even though Raja'i Khorasani's argument amounted to this.
Although any critical review would reveal that Iran's human rights
standards fell below the international ones, it was politically preferable to
try to obscure this point as much as possible and to plead that the Islamic
standards were simply different - whence Raja'i Khorasani's need to
maintain that Islam did, in fact, protect human rights, but according to its
own values, values that, because they were fixed in divine law, could be
presented as being in some sense superior to those based on mundane
authority, like those "established by international organizations. 22
The comments published in 1992 by an Iranian journalist supportive
of Iran's official Islamic ideology illustrate what "the system of values
20. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.65, T 95 (1984).
21. Id.
22. Similar confusion has appeared in the remarks of official Saudi spokesmen, who have
alternately appealed to Islam to justify their government's resistance to calls for democratization
and rights and have, at the same time, extolled Islamic rights principles as divinely mandated.
See infra text accompanying notes 34-39, 312-15.
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recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran" would mean for rights.
Although dealing with Iran's policies of press censorship, the comments
have broader relevance and seem to confirm Huntington's thesis that
Islamic religion and culture shape attitudes toward rights. The journalist
claims that the Islamic Revolution rejected "modem civilization in favor
of the religious culture which has superseded it," and that there is no place
for intellectuals in the revolution, because they follow "philosophers who
believed in democracy and individualism. 23 In statements that embody
a philosophy congenial to those favoring cultural relativist approaches to
human rights,24 he invokes the distinctiveness of Islamic values:
Freedom is a concept defined within specific cultural and ideological
boundaries. There is no universal definition of freedom. The problem
we face is the demands by some religious and secular intellectuals
for freedom in its modem, humanist form in the environment created
by a religious revolution .... Religion does not deny freedom, but
its freedom starts with servitude to God. Accepting this means
interpreting freedom within the boundaries of sharia ... and Islamic
values.... In the Islamic sharia, freedom of expression does not
extend to the freedom to corrupt. The purpose of religion is to lead
human beings to perfection; not everything can be permitted.25
Huntington's thesis that the Western promotion of the universality of
human rights would provoke clashes seems to be borne out by other Iranian
reactions. For example, in 1992, the Iranian regime displayed its anger over
international criticisms of Iran's rights record by expelling all of the staff
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and it also rejected the
critical report submitted by U.N. special representative Galindo Pohl on
the Iranian human rights situation,26 claiming that the West used human
rights as a "pretext for interfering in its internal affairs. 27
As the June 1993 World Conference on Human Rights approached,
Ayatollah Khamene'i, Ayatollah Khomeini's successor as Iran's religious
leader, frequently returned to the theme of the U.S.'s unfair criticisms of
Iran's human rights record. In lieu of attempting to defend Iran's human
23. Untitled essay by Shahriar Zarshenaz, in Inside Iran: A Special Survey, INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP, Mar. 1992, at 10.
24. For an examination of how flaws in cultural relativist analyses pertain to the issues raised
by Huntington's "clash of civilizations," see infra text accompanying notes 330-80.
25. Zarshenaz, supra note 23, at 11.
26. See Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by
the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl,
pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/67 of 4 March 1992, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
49th Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/41 (1993) [hereinafter Final Report].
27. See Peter Feuilherade, Iran: An Astute Move, MIDDLE E. INT'L, June 11, 1993, at 11.
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rights violations on cultural grounds, Iranian officials at this stage shifted
tactics and were presenting Islam as the guarantor of human rights and
denying that there were any rights violations. In January 1993, Khamene'i
proclaimed that Iran was standing by all the innocent Muslims in the world,
which angered "despotic powers;" the latter in turn showed their enmity
by making baseless claims that Iran was violating human rights.28 In
.speaking thus, he may have been offering a preemptive strike aimed at
the criticisms that could be anticipated to appear in the forthcoming report
on Iran's 1992 human rights performance by the U.S. Department of State.29
Ayatollah Khamene'i asserted: "America's claims to lead the world
and its interference in the affairs of other countries amount to bullying. 30
In May 1993, he charged that U.S. accusations of human rights violations
in Iran were baseless lies. He claimed that the United States was actually
angry at Iran because of Khomeini's message that religion and politics were
one and because Iran defended the rights of the Muslims of the world.3'
In a speech on June 4, 1993, in response to U.S. charges that Iran was
violating human rights and was involved in terrorism, Khamene'i
condemned the United States for interfering in the affairs of other countries,
insisting that human rights were fully observed "in the Islamic state of
Iran," and he accused the United States of hostile attitudes not just toward
Iran but also against Islam, generally. 32 After the 1993 Human Rights
Conference in Vienna, in which the United States had pressed for the
universality of human rights, an Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister insisted
that "[h]uman rights has come to mean Western culture and that human
rights is a tool [for Western powers] to whitewash their intervention and
28. Iran Will Never Be Reconciled with Enemies of the Islamic Revolution, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Jan. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File
[hereinafter Iran Will Never Be Reconciled].
29. For the actual report, which was critical, see DEPT. OF STATE, 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992, at 999 (1993). In this same period, there had been
other critical assessments of Iran's rights record, as well. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note
26; Little Discernible Progress in Respect for Human Rights in Iran Despite Eight Years of
International Scrutiny, in LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MIDDLE EAST (Nov. 12,
1992).
30. Iran Will Never Be Reconciled, supra note 28. Meanwhile, the official press was insisting
that "world-devouring imperialism" led by "the Great Satan criminal America" was intent on
destroying Islam and Iran's leaders. See Reasons for Yazdi's Travel to U.S. Queried, Middle
East News Network, Dec. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
31. Iran; Khamene'i on Terrorism; Human Rights; Religion and Politics: Palestine, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, May 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB
File.
32. U.S. Real Advocate of Terrorism: Iranian Leader, Xinhua General Overseas News
Service, June 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
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aggression against the weaker countries."33
Milder comments in a similar vein were made by Prince Nayef, the
Saudi Arabian Minister of the Interior in May 1993, just before the Vienna
Human Rights Conference. Because of its political and military ties to the
United States, ties that had expanded in the aftermath of the Gulf War,
the Saudi regime was inhibited from attacking U.S. human rights policies
as forthrightly as the Iranians had done. However, Prince Nayef appeared
to include the United States when he responded to an interviewer's question
about his reactions to reports "by certain Western media" about human
rights violations in Saudi Arabia:
As a human being and a Muslim, and because the people who suffer
from this are Muslims, I am surprised at certain states and world
organizations which claim to protect or urge respect for human
rights.... Every year they issue a statement about human rights and
blame other states for violations.34 Most of the blame is primarily
addressed to some Arab states and the Kingdom might have its share
of this blame. I tell them frankly that governed by our Muslim beliefs,
we in the Kingdom respect human rights more than any other state
or society in the world. We are committed to our Islamic principles.35
That is, he seemed aggrieved at Western criticisms of the Saudi human
rights record, which he portrayed as unjustified, and defended the Saudi
record by appealing to Islamic principles. Prince Nayef's claims that Islamic
principles governed Saudi rights policies echoed King Fahd's comments
made at the time of the issuance of the new Basic Law in March 1992.36
On that occasion, the King had felt obliged to explain why having made
the leap to adopt a constitution, he had afforded his subjects virtually none
of the rights that constitutionalism normally ensures. Defending the lack
of provision for any democratic freedoms, he appealed to "Islamic beliefs:"
The democratic system that is predominant in the world is not a
suitable system for the peoples of our region. Our people's make up
and unique qualities are different from those of the rest of the world.
We cannot import the methods used by people in other countries and
33. Iran; Officials on Human Rights Issue; International Court on Human Rights Proposed,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File.
34. The "they" here most likely refers to the U.S. State Department, and the "statement"
most likely refers to the annual issuance of Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
However, it is also conceivable that he was referring to the reports of Amnesty International.
35. Interior Minister Discusses Human Rights, Extremism, F.B.I.S. (NES-93-093), May
17, 1993, at 38, 39.
36. For an assessment of this law, see infra part ll.B.
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apply them to our people. We have our Islamic beliefs that constitute
a complete and fully-integrated system.... In my view, Western
democracies may be suitable in their own countries but they do not
suit other countries. 3
Following the issuance of a critical report by Amnesty International
in September 1993 about human rights violations in Saudi Arabia,38 a news
report from Jeddah blasted the organization:
Amnesty officials are secularists and atheists. They could not infiltrate
into the Kingdom to spread their venomous ideas. Now they wanted
to tarnish the image of Shariah. The enemies of Islam are using
Amnesty in their worldwide anti-Islam campaign .... We would like
to remind the organization that each sovereign country has the right
to select the rules and regulations it deems suitable .... They say
at international forums that they respect Islam and Muslims but hide
their hatred and vengeance against Islam and Muslims. We have to
take precautions against these enemies. And all Muslim countries
should implement Shariah. Let the enemies of Islam die of rage.39
Notwithstanding Huntington's assessment and the cited Iranian and
Saudi statements, it is actually doubtful whether in the human rights arena
a struggle is being waged that, when properly analyzed, amounts to a clash
of international human rights norms with the Islamic religion per se or
anything that could properly be denominated "Islamic civilization" or
"Islamic culture." In Huntington's case, his argument that there exists a
monolithic Islamic culture that dictates attitudes on rights issues apparently
results from a reliance on Orientalist stereotypes; 4° in the cases of Iran and
Saudi Arabia, their argument that they are following Islamic norms on
rights correlates with their adoption of Islam as a legitimating device for
their undemocratic regimes and retrograde rights policies. In either case,
this article disputes the assertion that it is Islamic civilization that stands
in the way of adopting international human rights.
37. Interview with King Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait (Mar. 28, 1992), quoted
in Empty Reforms, Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws, MIDDLE E. WATCH, May 1992, at 2
[hereinafter Empty Reforms].
38. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: THE ARREST,
DETENTION AND TORTURE OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIPPERS AND SHI'A MUSLIMS (1993) [hereinafter
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE].
39. Maali Hamouda, Amnesty - Thin End of the Wedge?, Moneyclips, Oct. 6, 1993,
available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, Saudi File.
40. For a discussion of Orientalism and Orientalist stereotypes, see infra text accompanying
notes 336-42.
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B. The Islamic Legal Heritage and Human Rights
Before proceeding with a brief review of elements of the Islamic legal
heritage pertaining to human rights, it is essential to clarify how terms will
be employed; otherwise, their connotation may not be clear. Although the
adjectives "Islamic" and "Muslim" are often used interchangeably, it is
preferable to make a distinction between them - using "Islamic" to
designate matters pertaining to the religion and the term "Muslim" to
designate its adherents. More particularly, "Islamic" is best reserved for
indicating normative religious principles - or ones that are presented as
being normative. Thus, there is an Islamic duty to pray facing Mecca or
to testify to the unity of God, principles that Muslims accept as normative.
One should distinguish also between what Muslims universally accept as
being Islamic in the sense of being mandated by their religion and what
only a segment of Muslim opinion or a governmental elite endorses as
Islamic. Thus, for example, Iran's clerics assert that their regime is an
Islamic Republic, but it is in reality a government constituted according
to an idiosyncratic interpretation of Twelver Shi'ism. The Saudi royal family
claims Islamic authority for its monarchical rule, in which it enjoys the
support of Sunni clerics allied with the regime. Neither Iran's clerics nor
the Saudi royal family recognize each other's claims to constitute an Islamic
government even though each regime is by self-designation Islamic; indeed,
Iran's and Saudi Arabia's rulers routinely anathematize each other in the
name of their respective Islams. In calling these regimes "Islamic," the
outside observer is merely acknowledging that they characterize themselves
as having religious character and authority. In contrast, it is confusing to
use "Islamic" to designate a country like Syria, where Islam is not the
religion of the State and the official ideology is secular, or Turkey, which
is an avowedly secular country. It is better to call them "Muslim" countries,
to indicate that the majority of their inhabitants are Muslims.
Concepts analogous to human rights have certain precursors in the
Islamic heritage of philosophy and theology, but human rights as they are
presently formulated in international law lack precise equivalents in the
Islamic legal heritage. 41 Governments of Muslim countries had to define
their stances vis-A-vis human rights in the aftermath of World War II, when
the modern international formulations of human rights were produced,
setting standards that became incorporated in public international law. In
the decades immediately following World War II, Muslim countries for
the most part appeared to accept the international consensus on human
41. See ANNE. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND PoLiTics 47-50 (1991).
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rights. Muslim countries were among the founding members of the United
Nations, which in its 1945 Charter called for respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and all Muslim countries eventually joined the
United Nations. Aspects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), passed by the General Assembly in 1948, had provoked criticism
by the representative of Saudi Arabia, who asserted that the declaration
conflicted with Islamic law, but Saudi Arabia was the only Muslim country
in the United Nations that failed to vote for it.
42
By the 1970s, assertions that international human rights norms were
incompatible with adherence to Islamic law were being voiced more
frequently, and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran became a
vigorous advocate of the proposition that international human rights were
at variance with Islamic norms. The trend to plead Islamic particularism
culminated in 1990, when Muslim countries joined in putting forward the
Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.4
When Muslims charged that international human rights norms had a
Western or Judeo-Christian bias that precluded their acceptance in Muslim
milieus, the alleged conflicts centered around civil and political rights;
problems of the compatibility of Islam with economic, social, and cultural
rights were rarely raised. The principles of freedom of religion - notably
the right to convert from Islam to another faith - and equality for all,
regardless of religion or sex, seemed to pose particular problems for many
Muslims, and in these areas they could point to Islamic authority, albeit
contested authority, for their resistance to international standards.
In the past, Islamic sources have been construed as barring conversions
from Islam, requiring apostates to repent and return to the fold or face the
death penalty, for males, or imprisonment, for females. Contemporary
Muslims have questioned such interpretations, pointing out that there are
principles in the sources that also ban compulsion in religion." The death
penalty for apostasy from Islam, developed when the Islamic community
was a struggling, nascent political entity, has been abandoned in most
contemporary penal codes. To liberal Muslims, retaining the ban on
apostasy appears to be an anachronism in the laws of modem nation States,
where religious affiliations and political boundaries are no longer
coterminous." Although executions for apostasy have become rare,
42. See John Kelsay, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES: WESTERN AND ISLAMIC
PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 35, 35-37 (David Little et al. eds., 1988).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 67-76.
44. See MAYER, supra note 41, at 169-70.
45. See id. at 170.
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restrictions on the ability of nonMuslim faiths to seek converts among
Muslims remain in effect in most countries.
Before adopting modem notions of citizenship in the nation State,
Muslim societies followed Islamic rules that called for according an inferior
status to nonMuslims. 4 Although progress toward according nonMuslims
de jure equality is well-advanced in most countries, Muslims are still
wrestling with the problem of reconciling certain aspects of Islamic law
with the principle of full equality for nonMuslims.47
The most extensive conflicts between past interpretations of Islamic
requirements and international human rights norms lie in the area of
women's rights, although Muslim feminists argue that it is actually
patriarchal attitudes and misreadings of Islamic sources, not Islamic tenets,
that inspire the patterns of discrimination against women.48 De jure
discrimination against women, purportedly resting on Islamic principles,
has persisted in the laws of most Muslim countries, resulting in the denial
of full civil and political rights for women, often in the face of constitution-
al provisions mandating the equality of all citizens. Under conservative
interpretations of the requirements of Islamic law, which are replicated to
varying degrees in the actual laws in force in Muslim countries, women
may suffer from many disadvantages. 49 Against this background, it is not
surprising that few Muslim countries ratified the 19.79 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and those
that chose to ratify did so subject to reservations regarding various central
provisions. The reservations made by Bangladesh, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq
46. See id. at 143-48.
47. See id. at 147-50.
48. See id. at 110-15. See generally FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE:
A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1991).
49. Women are required to be monogamous, whereas men are allowed to have up to four
wives at a time. Muslim women may not marry outside the faith, whereas Muslim men may
marry Christians and Jews. Wives owe obedience to their husbands, who are entitled to beat
them and withhold maintenance if they are disobedient. The husband may compel his wife to
stay within the home, and women may not travel without the permission of a husband or male
relative and without a male relative to chaperone them. Husbands can terminate marriages at
will, whereas wives must establish grounds. Men have advantages in questions of guardianship
and custody. Women inherit one-half the amount of males inheriting in the same capacity.
Moreover, women's testimony as witnesses may be devalued or excluded, and they are valued
as being worth one-half of a man for purposes of compensation. Depending on views, they are
to be kept veiled and segregated from men, barred from obtaining education, and excluded from
various prestigious positions such as the judiciary, the clergy, and political leadership. For an
overview, see GHASSAN ASCHA, Du STATUT INFERIEUR DE LA FEMME EN ISLAM (1987); MAYER,
supra note 41, at 109-13. On personal status laws, see SYED TAHIR MAHMOUD, PERSONAL LAW
IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES (1987).
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were specifically justified by their need to adhere to Islamic law.50 Even
Tunisia, a country where the laws affecting women have in many areas
been reformed to give them approximate parity with men, effectively
indicated that its adherence to Islam limited its compliance with the
Convention.5
In short, religious freedom and equality for all are ideas regarding
which conservative and liberal Muslims have long disagreed, differing
about whether and to what extent the inherited rules of Islamic law can
be updated. With the rise of powerful Islamic fundamentalist movements
opposed to many rights, including the right to freedom of religion and
equal rights for religious minorities and women, the debates on these
topics are not merely academic.52 Promulgating Islamic versions of human
rights that consistently side with the views of Muslims who are opposed
to international human rights is not likely to end the controversies as to
how the Islamic heritage relates to contemporary rights issues but rather
to exacerbate them.
C. Formulations of Islamic Alternatives to the International
Bill of Human Rights
In reaction to the growing influence of international human rights, a
number of alternative Islamic human rights schemes have been propound-
ed since the 1960s that reflect the dissatisfaction of conservative forces
and Islamic fundamentalists with the international human rights frame-
work and a determination to rework the formulations in light of their
theories of Islamic requirements.53 Such Islamic versions of human rights
have tended in most respects to fall far below the standard of protections
for civil and political rights guaranteed under the International Bill of
Human Rights. Protections of religious freedoms and guarantees of full
equality and equal protection of the law for women and religious minori-
ties have been notably absent.54 Insofar as they reject freedom of religion
50. See Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention
on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 299-300 (1991).
51. See Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 688 (1990).
52. For a survey of the negative consequences for rights and freedoms that resulted from
fundamentalist takeovers of three countries, see Ann E. Mayer, The Fundamentalist Impact in
Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITIES,
ECONOMIES, AND MILITANCE 110 (Martin Marty & Scott Appleby eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact].
53. See generally MAYER, supra note 41, where several of these schemes are analyzed in
detail. Before the adoption of the 1992 Saudi Basic Law, only the distinctive Islamic rights
formulations contained in the 1979 Iranian Constitution had actually been enacted into law.
54. See generally id. at 93-187.
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or equal rights for nonMuslims and women, Islamic human rights
schemes propounded by Muslims with conservative agendas are at least
congruent with certain principles found in traditional interpretations of
Islamic requirements." However, many of their provisions have either a
tenuous or nonexistent connection to the Islamic sources or Islamic
tradition. In areas where issues addressed in modem rights provisions
were not prefigured in the Islamic legal legacy, these schemes may resort
to outright borrowing from selected international human rights provisions
- but with a distinctive twist. They subordinate the borrowed interna-
tional human rights provisions to newly-fashioned Islamic derogation
clauses, circumscribing them by subjecting them to "Islamic" conditions.56
This practice of utilizing religious criteria to circumscribe rights protec-
tions afforded under international law conflicts with international human
rights theory, which does not permit religious criteria to override or
circumscribe human rights." Because the permissible scope of the Islamic
qualifications was left undefined by the authors of the new Islamic human
rights schemes and because there were no settled historical guidelines for
how to integrate Islamic conditions with modern human rights norms, the
Islamic qualifications in practice left governments free to determine the
scope of the rights provided and potentially to nullify the rights in-
volved.58 No reasons were offered adequately explaining why granting the
government of a modern nation State, an institution borrowed from the
West and unknown in Islamic tradition, such great latitude in defining the
grounds for denying and restricting rights should be deemed appropriate
in a system based on Islam.59
The authors of provisions in Islamic human rights schemes that are
designed to curb and deny human rights have tended toward disin-
genuousness. Only infrequently have authors shown a readiness forth-
rightly to proclaim their determination to reduce and dilute international
55. However, as already indicated, these interpretations are themselves under fire.
56. MAYER, supra note 41, at 73, 76-91.
57. See id. at 74. In international law, the conditions that can be placed on human rights
are restricted, and some principles of human rights - such as the right to freedom of religion
- allow no derogations in any circumstances. See id. at 73-76 and sources cited therein. See
generally Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 72 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
58. See MAYER, supra note 41, at 73.
59. The author points out elsewhere the difficulties of reconciling the authority claimed
by governments of many modern nation States to determine what will constitute Islamic law
on their territory with the established Islamic theory of sources. See Ann E. Mayer, The
Shari'ah: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRU-
DENCE: STUDIES IN HONOR OF FARHAT J. ZIADEH 177-98 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Mayer, The Shari'ah].
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rights protections. Instead, they have tended to resort to equivocal
formulations that are designed to obscure the underlying intent to curb or
deny human rights, employing wording that, unless closely scrutinized,
might seem to be aimed at promoting them.' For example, authors of
Islamic human rights schemes who wish to accommodate discrimination
based on sex and religion rarely admit squarely that they are repudiating
the principle of equality for women and minorities. Instead, they use
coded or confusing language that disguises their aim to permit such
discrimination.6 ' These attempts to equivocate and to minimize the
appearance of deviation from the international norms are in effect forms
of tribute to the normative force that the International Bill of Human
Rights has acquired in Muslim milieus. It suggests that the authors fear
that their Islamic formulations risk being dismissed as unsuitable ar-
chaisms if they forthrightly acknowledge how widely they diverge from
the international standards.
Some features of the rights principles in the 1979 Iranian Constitution
deserve mention, as they correlate in a general way with the features
found in other Islamic human rights schemes, although varying in some
important particulars. Article 20 is crucial; it stipulates that human rights
are to be subordinated to Islamic criteria.62 That article expressly provides
that all citizens enjoy human, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights according to Islamic standards (mavazin-e eslam).63 Furthermore,
Article 4 provides that all laws should be based on Islamic standards'
and that this principle will, in general, prevail over all of the principles
in the Constitution.65 In addition to setting forth the general proposition
that the Constitution and its rights provisions were subordinate to Islamic
standards, many rights are expressly limited by Islamic criteria - as in
Articles 21 (on women), 24 (on publications), 26 (on associations), 27 (on
assembly), 28 (on choice of profession), and 168 (on definitions of
political crimes and "crimes of the press").'
60. See MAYER, supra note 41, at 106-07, 120-28, 155-60 (analyzing examples of such
formulations).
61. See id. at 95-96, 98-106.
62. IRAN CONST. art. 20, reprinted in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 25 (Albert Blaustein & Gisbert Flanz eds., 1971) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS].
63. Id. Notwithstanding the reference in Article 20 to economic, social, and cultural rights,
the actual concern seemed to be for using Islamic criteria to curb civil and political rights.
64. Since Article 12 establishes Twelver Shi'ism as the sect officially followed in Iran, it
should actually be Twelver Shi'i standards - as interpreted by Iran's ruling clerics - that are
controlling in this regard.
65. IRAN CONST. art. 4, in 8 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 18.
66. Id. at 25-29, 85. See also MAYER, supra note 41, at 81-82.
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The basic notion of the Iranian Constitution and similar Islamic
human rights schemes, that Islamic criteria should be employed to
circumscribe human rights, has since been followed in the Cairo Declara-
tion. issued by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and by the
authors of the new Basic Law in Saudi Arabia. The latter deserve par-
ticular attention as recent, important products of a trend that may have
misled some outside observers into believing that it is Islam that stands
in the way of the reception of human rights. This article evaluates these
officially endorsed constructs, contrasting their basic tenets with the
dissimilar approaches to rights put forward by some independent Muslims
and nongovernmental organizations in the Middle East.
II. ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS: Two NEW CONSTRUCTS
A. The 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
The Cairo Declaration assumes more general significance than the
previous Islamic human rights schemes because it embodies an approach
to rights that has been endorsed by the foreign ministers of the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).The Charter of the OIC, an
international organization founded in 1973 to which all Muslim countries
belong,67 indicates in its preamble that its members are "[r]eaffirming
their commitment to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the
purposes and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful co-opera-
tion amongst all people., 68 However, on August 5, 1990, a meeting in
Egypt of OIC foreign ministers issued the Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam, 69 a document sharply at variance with the International
Bill of Human Rights. With the issuance of the Cairo Declaration, the
OIC indicated that it was asserting the existence of an Islamic
countermodel of human rights. Such a document would appear to validate
Huntington's thesis of a cleavage between Islamic culture and the West,
provided, of course, that this Declaration can be taken as representative
of an Islamic civilizational model. If the Cairo Declaration represents the
epitome of Islamic teachings and values - and this article will argue that
it does not - it proves that constitutionalism, human rights, equality,
67. For, background on this organization, see generally HASSAN MOINUDDIN, THE
CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AMONG ITS MEMBER STATES (1987).
68. Id. at 186.
69. An English translation of the Declaration is included in U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on
Hum. Rts., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993) [hereinafter
Contribution of the OIC].
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liberty, democracy, separation of Church and State, and other "Western"
concepts are irreconcilable with Islamic culture.
Preparation of the OIC document took place in Tehran in December
1989 in the course of a meeting of experts.7' The Iranian Foreign Mini-
ster, Ali Akbar Velayati, claimed that the OIC invitation to Iran to host
this preparatory meeting indicated that Iran enjoyed the confidence of the
organization." Velayati noted that Iran had been accused by the West of
violating human rights, and he countered by condemning the use of the
human rights issue for political purposes. 72 In context, it seemed ap-
propriate that Iran hosted the meeting for the drafting of the Cairo
Declaration, which closely supported Iran's position that Islam mandated
a digtinctive approach to human rights, a position Iran had been taking
since the 1979 revolution. It may have been hoped that the meeting
would provide a united response by Muslim countries that would, by
implication, rebut charges that Iran engaged in human rights violations.
Like other Islamic human rights schemes, the Cairo Declaration is
actually a hybrid of international and Islamic elements. It does not have
an exact counterpart in the Islamic legal legacy. Like the preceding
Islamic human rights schemes, the Cairo Declaration, in formulating its
civil and political rights, borrows extensively from terms and concepts
taken from the International Bill of Human Rights and combines them
with elements inspired by Islamic law or the authors' conceptions of
Islamic values. Other principles simply reflect the authors' policy choices.
The rights in the Declaration diverge significantly from international
human rights standards, thereby prompting questions about how this
Declaration is to be reconciled with other conflicting obligations to
respect international standards, which had already been undertaken by
OIC members in terms of their international commitments or their
domestic laws.73
The central feature of the Cairo Declaration is its implicit conception
of international human rights in the civil and political arena as excessive
- with the concomitant need for Islamic criteria to restrict and reduce
them. After asserting that "fundamental rights and universal freedoms in
Islam are an integral part of the Islamic religion, 74 the authors proceed
70. See Meeting on Human Rights in Islam Ends, Xinhua General Overseas News Service,
Dec. 28, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA file.
71. Id. In actuality, Iran's relations with a number of fellow OIC members were seriously
troubled, and, without official explanation, the meeting took place in the absence of 20 member
countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. See id.
72. Id. The purposes were presumably to discredit Iran's Islamic revolution.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 169-72 for a discussion of these conflicts.
74. Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 3.
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to enumerate rights and freedoms on which "Islamic" qualifications have
been imposed, indicating that in reality the authors saw in Islam justifica-
tions for restricting or denying rights and freedoms. Article 24 provides
that: "All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are
subject to the Islamic Shari'ah" - without any attempt at defining what
limits the shari'a would entail.75 No added clarity is provided by article
25, which states: "The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference
for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declara-
tion," because there is, as previously noted, no settled jurisprudence on
the question of how reference to overriding Islamic criteria should affect
modern rights norms.76
A close examination of the Cairo Declaration reveals deficiencies in
the human rights protection that it affords, evasive wordings designed to
disguise its deficiencies, and elements that are not necessitated by Islamic
doctrine, but that reflect borrowings from international human rights
formulations or the influences of politics. The issues to be examined
include the treatment in the Declaration of: (1) equality for women; (2)
freedom of religion; (3) freedom of the press; (4) freedom of assembly
and association; (5) democratic freedoms; (6) criminal justice; (7) states
of emergency; (8) the prohibition of genocide; (9) the right to security
and privacy; and finally, (10) the prohibition of colonialism and slavery.
1. Equality. of Women
Ambiguous wording in the Cairo Declaration may obscure the fact
that it is deficient in providing for equality. Article 1 of the Declaration
states that human beings (the neutral term al-bashar in the Arabic
version) "are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations
and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race,
colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or
other considerations. 77 This is an example of the' evasiveness in the
formulations often seen in Islamic human rights schemes. At first blush,
article 1 may seem to be a guarantee of equality. However, it speaks only
in terms of "basic human dignity and basic obligations and respon-
sibilities," offering no guarantee of equality in rights and freedoms. The
deficiencies in this formulation become clearer if one compares this
wording with articles in the UDHR which it superficially resembles.
Article 1 of the UDHR provides that "[a]ll humans are born free and
75. Cairo Declaration [hereinafter Cairo Decl.] art. 24, in Contribution of the OIC, supra
note 69, at 10. Shari'a, the path or law, is the Arabic term used to designate Islamic law.
76. Id. art. 25. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
77. Cairo Deci. art. 1, in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 4.
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equal in dignity and rights," and article 2 states that "[e]veryone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status. 78
Due to the failure to provide for equality in rights or freedoms, article
1 of the Cairo Declaration affords no protection for a woman or nonMus-
lim affected by the discrimination that some Muslim conservatives believe
is mandated by Islamic law. Moreover, neither here nor elsewhere does
the Declaration make provision for equality before the law or equal
protection of the law in the terms set forth in article 26 of the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The latter provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall: prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.79
In contrast, article 19(a) of the Cairo Declaration provides that: "All
individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between the ruler
and the ruled., 80 This wording is ambiguous. It might, if read separately,
be construed to be a mandate for full equality for all persons before the
law, with an indication that rulers are no exception. However, in the
context of this Declaration, wherein guarantees for equal rights for
women and nonMuslims have been deliberately eliminated, and in
connection with the other provisions affecting equality, the deviation from
ICCPR article 26 is bound to be detrimental for rights. Taken in context,
article 19(a) indicates only that there may be no favoritism in the law for
rulers - not that all individuals are entitled to equality before the law
regardless of categories like sex or religion.
The significance of the omission of guarantees of equality can be
shown by examination of provisions affecting women. Article 6 provides
that "woman is equal to man in human dignity" - again not equal in
"rights."'" In a human rights scheme that purports to follow a religious
law that, as traditionally interpreted and applied, has reinforced patriarchy
and denied women equality, invocations of women's "dignity" or equality
78. UDHR, supra note 18, arts. 1, 2.
79. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 26.
80. Cairo Decl. art. 19(a), in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 9.
81. Id. art. 6, at 5.
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in "dignity" in lieu of rights are not likely to provide legal grounds for
challenging ingrained patterns of discrimination. As a scholar who has
carefully examined possible counterparts of modem human rights in
traditional cultures has concluded, "dignity" is a concomitant of one's
ascribed status and is granted to the adult "who adheres to his or her
society's values, customs, and norms," and "who accepts normative
cultural constraints on his or her particular behavior. ' .2 "Dignity" is not
to be confused with "human rights," since it entails "quiet endurance and
acceptance of what a human rights approach to the world would consider
injustice or inequality. 83 That is, in the peculiar context of the Cairo
Declaration, the election to affirm women's equal "dignity," in lieu of
their equal rights, can be seen as a coded way of reaffirming the sdbor-
dinate role that has been assigned to women in the patriarchal social order
that prevails in most Muslim countries. Moreover, nothing elsewhpre in
the Cairo Declaration indicates that its guarantee of equality in "human
dignity" was understood by the authors to require law reforms to elimi-
nate the legal disabilities that still affect women in most Muslim coun-
tries.
Article 6 continues its equivocation, providing that a woman "has
rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform," avoiding the stipulation that
the rights and duties of the two sexes are equal." Thereafter, no details
of women's duties are listed. Only three rights are enumerated, ones that
are enjoyed by women even under conservative interpretations of Islamic
law: (1) the right to enjoy legal personality; (2) the right to own and
manage her property; and (3) the "right to retain her name and lineage." 5
The same article also imposes support obligations and the responsibility
to care for the family on the husband. The husband's duty to provide
maintenance, nafaqa, established in Islamic law, continues in force in
many personal status laws in effect in Muslim countries.86 The husband's
duty to support the wife correlates with the husband's legal prerogatives
vis-A-vis the wife, including his right to demand obedience.87 In imposing
one-sided support obligations, the Cairo Declaration effectively calls for
82. Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 81, 83 (Abdullahi An-Na'im ed.,
1992) [hereinafter Howard, Dignity.
83. Id. at 84.
84. Cairo Decl. art. 6, in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 5.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., MAHMOUD, supra note 49, at 278-79; JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF
WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER MODERN LEGISLATION 59-60 (1990).
87. See MAHMOUD, supra note 49, at 278-79.
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the perpetuation of the traditional pattern of inequality in the husband-
wife relationship in which the husband is the master and provider."8
Even where women are not mentioned, implied restrictions on their
rights may be lurking in the Islamic qualifications. Article 12 imposes a
disguised restriction on women's freedoms. It begins: "Every man [the
neutral insan in Arabic] shall have the right, within the framework of the
Shari'ah, to free movement . ,89 This reference to the shari'a as a
framework opens the way to allowing restrictions on women's move-
ments, because according to conservative readings of Islamic require-
ments, wives cannot leave home without their husbands' permission and
women cannot travel unless chaperoned by male relatives.9° Moreover, in
Saudi Arabia, Islam is interpreted to bar women from driving - a
significant restriction on their freedom of movement.
Similarly, article 13 promises that work is "a right guaranteed by the
State and Society for each person able to work."9' In a progressive step,
the article also provides that men and women are entitled to fair wages
"without discrimination. '"92 However, it provides no guarantee against
discrimination in hiring or against excluding women from certain kinds
of work - discrimination that frequently occurs in Muslim countries. It
is instructive to compare this deficient formulation with principles of
international law. The UDHR provides in article 23(1) that everyone has
the right to work and to free choice of employment, 93 and article 6 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) provides that the right to work includes the right "of everyone
to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts." 94 In
contrast, the wording of article 13 of the Cairo Declaration provides that
"[e]veryone shall be free to choose the work that suits him best and
which serves his interests and those of society .... He may neither be
assigned work beyond his capacity nor be subjected to compulsion or
88. This pattern of according the husband superior rights by virtue of his unilateral support
obligations, its Western counterparts, and recent reforms are discussed in Ann E. Mayer, Les
lois sur le statut personnel en Afrique du Nord: Une evaluation comparative, in FEMME,
CULTURE ET SOCIdTI AU MAGHREB (Rahma Bourquia et al. eds., forthcoming 1994).
89. Cairo Decl. art. 12, in Contribution of the 01C, supra note 69, at 7.
90. See, e.g., MINNESOTA LAWYERS INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SHAME
OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD: CONTEMPT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
81-84 (1992) [hereinafter SHAME OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD].
91. Cairo Decl. art. 13, in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 7.
92. Id.
93. UDHR, supra note 18, art. 23(1).
94. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCRI.
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exploited or harmed in any way."'95 The language would seem to afford
a number of ways to justify excluding women from jobs - for example,
on the grounds that employment of women in certain jobs is not in the
interests of society, that certain occupations are beyond their capacity, or
that employment will be harmful for them. Given the prevalence of sex
stereotyping, stereotyping that has been endorsed by Islamic conserva-
tives, 96 it seems likely that such grounds could be utilized to bar women
from desirable professional and public service employment. 97
The Cairo Declaration does not guarantee the freedom to marry the
partner of one's choice. Article 5 provides that on the right to marry there
should be "no restrictions stemming from race, color or nationality," but
does not prohibit restrictions based upon religion.98 In this respect, it
contrasts with the UDHR which states in article 16(1): "Men and women
of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion,
have the right to marry."99 The wording in the Cairo Declaration appears
to accommodate the ban that Islamic law places on Muslim women
marrying outside the faith, as well as the rule that Muslim men may
marry only Muslims, Christians, and Jews - rules that most Muslim
countries have retained as part of their law or public policy.'° As with
many Islamic human rights provisions, the discriminatory potential of
article 5 will only be apparent to persons familiar enough with the
principles of Islamic law to appreciate the significance of the failure to
incorporate a right to marry regardless of religion.
2. Freedom of Religion
No guarantee of freedom of religion is afforded by the Cairo Declara-
tion, even though by the standards of the international human rights
95. Cairo Decl. art. 13, in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 7.
96. See MAYER, supra note 41, at 138-41; ASCHA, supra note 49, at 161-81.
97. See, e.g., the comments of Iranian President Rafsanjani's adviser on women's issues,
explaining why, since the revolution, women's employment has suffered: "It is because we
don't want women to work in factories.... We want them to have a job that matches their
personality, like doctors, cultural work, or work in education." Annika Savill, Sisters of the
Veil, INDEPENDENT, June 7, 1992, at 12. The 1993 report by U.N. Special Representative
Galindo Pohl included reports that Iranian women were banned from studying agriculture,
engineering, mining and metallurgy, and from becoming judges. Women were said to be barred
from 55 fields out of 84 in technology and mathematics and 7 out of 40 in natural sciences.
See Final Report, supra note 26, at 37. In the Sudan, since 1989, the rise of a particularly
retrograde version of fundamentalism has coincided with the dismissal of women from desirable
public sector jobs and the harassment of women working in the informal sector of the economy.
See Sudan: Threat to Women's Status from Fundamentalist Regime, AFR. WATCH, Apr. 9,
1990, at 1-5.
98. Cairo Decl. art. 5, in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 5.
99. UDHR, supra note 18, art. 16(1).
100. See NASIR, supra note 86, at 27-28.
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norms, freedom of religion is a fundamental and nonderogable right,i1 In
failing to incorporate such a principle, the Cairo Declaration follows the
lead of previous Islamic human rights schemes, which similarly failed to
recognize a right to religious freedom."°2 Naturally, the absence of a
provision for freedom of religion will be detrimental for nonMuslims.
However, the failure to provide for religious freedom also has serious
practical implications for Muslims, given the number of Muslim dis-
senters from officially-imposed constructs of Islam and members of local
minority sects who have been mistreated, charged with apostasy from
Islam, or subjected to pressures or threats to compel them to abjure
nonconforming belief. 0 3 Which minority sect will suffer depends on the
politics of religion in the country involved. For example, the Twelver
Shi'i minority is the target of repression and discrimination in Saudi
Arabia, ' n a country that is officially committed to the puritanical Wah-
habi sect of Sunni Islam. In contrast, in Iran, there has been a recent
report noting the mistreatment by Iran's Twelver Shi'i regime of members
of the Sunni minority in Southeastern Iran.'15
In context, the lack of protection afforded for religious freedom
accommodates condemnations and executions for apostasy. Because of
the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism, which is prepared to label
as apostates any Muslims expressing critical perspectives on religion or
challenging fundamentalist doctrines, the issue of whether apostates may
be executed is growing in practical importance.10
6
The Cairo Declaration provisions regarding religion make no pretense
of neutrality; they are forthright in their favoritism of Islam at the
expense of other religions. The Declaration assumes that Islam is the true
faith and that adherence to Islam is natural, with the consequence that it
effectively bans other fariths from proselytizing. Article 10 of the Cairo
101. Article 18 of the UDHR provides: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." UDHR, supra note 18, art.
18. In the ICCPR, article 18(1) begins: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion." ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 18(1).
102. See MAYER, supra note 41, at 163-87.
103. See id. at 159-60, 165, 177-86; Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact, supra note 52, at
117, 125, 137; Persecuted Minorities and Writers in Pakistan, ASIA WATCH, Sept. 19, 1993,
at 11-21.
104. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra note
38.
105. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1993, at 161 (1993).
106. See, e.g., Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact, supra note 52, at 117, 125, 137; Max
Rodenbeck, When Islam Can't Take a Joke: Liberal Muslim Writers Endure Risky Lives, FIN.
POST, Aug. 10, 1992, at 47; Persecuted Minorities and Writers in Pakistan, supra note 103.
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Declaration states that: "Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature" and
prohibits "any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or
ignorance in order to convert him to another'religion or to atheism."'0 7
Article 10 appears to be based loosely on article 18(2) of the ICCPR, but
involves a serious distortion of the principle set forth in article 18(2),
which provides: "No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair
his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice."'0 8
Thus, whereas the prohibited coercion in article 18(2) is coercion that
interferes with religious freedom, in article 10 of the Cairo Declaration,
"compulsion" - along with exploitation - is prohibited only when it is
employed to convert a Muslim to another faith or to atheism, not when
it is used to make someone adopt Islam.'19 Against the background of the
existing restraints on proselytizing by nonMuslims, it is likely that efforts
to convert Muslims away from their faith would be punishable on the
theory that they involve "exploitation," if no "compulsion" could be
found.
3. Freedom of the Press
The Cairo Declaration also does not provide for freedom of the press,
and, as in previous Islamic human rights formulations, Islamic criteria are
used in the Cairo Declaration to curb freedom of speech. Article 22(a)
grants a right to express opinions freely "in such manner as would not be
contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah."" Article 22(b) echoes the
Qur'an, being derived from the Qur'anic verse 22:41, commending those
who command the good and forbid the evil. Article 22(b) provides:
"Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate
what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the
norms of Islamic Shari'ah.""' Of course, there is a negative pregnant in
this provision: no right is being provided to advocate what is wrong or
evil according to Islamic law. Vague, value-laden terms like these could
be broadly construed by censors, thereby opening the way for the curbing
of speech in ways that would suit the political purposes of governments,
albeit using ostensibly religious criteria.
107. Cairo Decl. art. 10, in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 6.
108. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 18(2).
109. Thus, in Saudi Arabia, one of the more energetic sponsors of the Cairo Declaration,
coercion has been used recently to "convert" at least one Christian and two Shi'is to Wahhabi
Islam. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra note
38, at 12, 15, 16-17.
110. Cairo Decl. art. 22(a), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 9.
111. Id. art. 22(b).
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Article 22(c) bars the exploitation or misuse of information "in such
a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine
moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or
weaken its faith."'".2 In a document that already provides several grounds
for curbing speech, this provision affords additional pretexts for justifying
sweeping censorship based on vague criteria.
Taking the position, as article 22 does, that Islam justifies censorship
opens the door to the suppression and punishment of a wide range of
speech and opinions that religious authorities deem could convert or
corrupt Muslims or weaken their faith. Islamic criteria are routinely
invoked in many Muslim countries to censor speech and publications." 3
Fundamentalist groups independent of governments, but not held in check
by them, may also employ threats and terrorism to punish and intimidate
Muslims who express ideas and opinions that they find offensive," 4 and
the language in article 22 seems to legitimize such tactics.
As is often the case with Islamic human rights schemes, the rights
provisions in the Cairo Declaration may take on added significance when
viewed in relation to the context in which they were devised. It appears
that article 22 was deliberately drafted in such a way as to accommodate
the banning of the book, The Satanic Verse, and the condemnation of its
112. Id. art. 22(c).
113. See, e.g., Karim Alrawi, The Still Small Voice Within Egypt, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP,
Feb. 1992, at 25; Sadik [sic] J. al-'Azm, The Importance of Being Earnest about Salman
Rushdie, 31 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 1, 30-34 (1991) [hereinafter al-'Azm, Importance of Being
Earnest]; Youssef Ibrahim, Egypt Fights Militant Islam With More of the Same, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1993, at A3. On the complex situation of Islamic censorship in Iran, see Inside Iran,
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Mar. 1992, at 7; Guardians of Thought: Limits on Freedom of
Expression in Iran, MIDDLE E. WATCH, Aug. 1993. Recent examples of Islamic grounds for
censorship indicate how far-reaching the impact of censorship using Islamic criteria has become
in recent years. See Rodenbeck, supra note 106.
114. For example, the secularist Egyptian intellectual Farag Fuda was assassinated by
fundamentalist terrorists in 1992; Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a University of Cairo professor, was
declared an atheist in 1993 on the grounds of his linguistic research and found himself living
under death threats; and six Algerian intellectuals were assassinated by fundamentalists within
three months in 1993. See Ibrahim, supra note 113. On the details of the Abu Zayd case, see
"Silencing is at the Heart of my Case": Ayman Bar and Elliott Colla Talk with Nasr Hamid
Abu Zayd about Ideology, Interpretation and Political Authority, MIDDLE E. REP., Nov.-Dec.
1993, at 27-29; Caryle Murphy, An Islamic Twist on Divorcing, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 29,
1993, at G1. Women who challenged fundamentalist ideals were subject to similar threats, as
in the case of the Jordanian journalist turned politician, Toujan al-Faisal. An outspoken
feminist, she was charged with atheism by fundamentalists in 1989, who sought to get a court
ruling that her marriage should be dissolved, her children taken from her, and immunity given
to whomever would kill her. See, e.g., Alistair Lyon, Islamic Court Throws out Apostasy Case
Against Jordanian Woman, Reuter Textline, Nov. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
TXTNWS File. Having waged a public war against her fundamentalist critics for years, she was
vindicated by her election to parliament in the free elections held in November, 1993. See Rana
Sabbagh, Jordan: Jordanian Parliament Has First Woman Member, Reuter Textline, Nov. 9,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.
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author, Salman Rushdie, as an apostate. Ayatollah Khomeini had issued
his fatwa calling for Rushdie's assassination on February 14, 1989."1
Before the drafting of the 1990 Cairo Declaration and at the behest of
Iran, the OIC foreign ministers, during a meeting in Riyadh on March 16,
1989, had already condemned the novel as blasphemous. They had also
called for banning the novel and declared Rushdie an apostate but had
refused to endorse the death sentence that had been decreed by Ayatollah
Khomeini or Iran's call for economic sanctions against Great Britain." 6
Having adopted this antiRushdie stance, it was obvious that the OIC
believed Islamic criteria could be used as a criterion for censoring
publications.
4. Freedom of Assembly and Association
Noteworthy by their absence in the text of the Cairo Declaration are
guarantees of freedom of assembly, as provided in article 21 of the
ICCPR, which establishes a right of peaceful assembly, or the right to
freedom of association, as provided in article 22 of the ICCPR. Because
restrictive laws on associations are utilized by Middle Eastern govern-
ments to ban human rights associations or to exert pressure on them, the
absence of a right of freedom of association or a guarantee of human
rights advocacy in the Cairo Declaration cannot help the cause of human
rights."'
5. Democratic Freedoms
The vagueness of the Cairo Declaration on the elements of an Islamic
political system results from the sharp division among Islamic political
theorists and governments of Muslim countries." 8 The Cairo Declaration
115. For a copy of the fatwa, see'THE RUSHDIE FILE 68 (Lisa Appignanesi & Sara
Maitland eds., 1990).
116. See Anton La Guardia, Moslem States Urge Rushdie Book Ban, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Mar. 17, 1989, at 15.
117. In contrast, the 1989 Algerian Constitution, conceived in a period of openness when
the trend was toward democratization, specifically protects human rights advocacy in Article
32. See ALG. CONST. art. 32, in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 8.
118. Disputes continue to rage about what form of government is required by Islamic law
- or whether Islam even provides for a specific form of government. There is a vast literature
on this topic. Relevant background is provided in LEONARD BINDER, ISLAMIC LIBERALISM
(1988); HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT (1982); JOHN ESPOSITO, ISLAM
AND POLITICS (1991); ISLAM, POLITICS AND THE STATE: THE PAKISTAN EXPERIENCE (Moha-
mmad Asghar Khan ed., 1985); EDWARD MORTIMER, FAITH AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF
ISLAM (1982); ABDERRAHIM LAMCHICHI, ISLAM ET CONTESTATION AU MAGHREB (1988); SAMI
ZUBAIDA, ISLAM THE PEOPLE AND THE STATE (1989); Shahrough Akhavi, Islam, Politics and
Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khumayni, Ayatullah Taliqani, and 'Ali Shariati, 24
MIDDLE E. STUD. 403 (1988).
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provisions that do relate to government do not have a particular Islamic
character; they are distinguishable from their international counterparts
simply by reason of their failure to endorse the democratic principles that
are included in international human rights norms.
1 19
Instead of providing for democratic elections, article 23(a) of the
Cairo Declaration stipulates that authority is a trust - without explaining
the political mechanisms by which leaders are to accede to or be removed
from this trust. 20 It also provides that "abuse or malicious exploitation"
of authority is prohibited, "so that fundamental human rights may be
guaranteed."' 2' Without any guarantees of free elections or procedural
provisions for holding rulers accountable to the ruled, it is difficult to
imagine what steps the citizenry could take to prevent such abuse of
authority. Moreover, the expression of concern for "fundamental human
rights" seems misplaced in a document geared to strip away rights
protections already afforded by international law. The provisions regard-
ing access to government functions are likewise deficient. Article 23(b)
provides that "[e]veryone shall have the right to participate, directly or
indirectly in the administration of his country's public affairs. He shall
also have the right to assume public office in accordance with the
provisions of Shari'ah."'22 The latter provision has been drafted to
accommodate the use of Islamic criteria to bar persons from public office,
thereby opening the door to discrimination based on sex or religion,
discrimination that many conservative Muslims would say is required by
Islamic principles. 23 This article differs significantly from the ICCPR,
which in article 25 provides that:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 [barring distinctions based
on criteria such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status] and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
119. See, e.g., article 21(3) of the UDHR, which provides: "The will of the people shall
be the basis of the authority of the government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." UDHR, supra note 18, art. 21(3).
120. Cairo Decl. art. 23(a), in Declaration of the OIC, supra note 69, at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 23(b).
123. See ASCHA, supra note 49, at 175-81; MAYER, supra note 41, at 143-61.
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(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held
by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of
the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.
124
In the Cairo Declaration, the provision for "freely chosen representatives"
has disappeared, and there is no provision for free elections or equality
of access to public service. In short, the provisions of article 23 of the
Cairo Declaration are designed to establish neither a democratic system
of government nor the equal participation of all citizens, irrespective of
gender or religion, in public affairs.
6. Criminal Justice
Only a few features of the extensive rights and procedural safeguards
in the area of criminal procedure provided in articles 9 and 14 of the
ICCPR 125 are duplicated in articles 19, 20 and 2 of the Cairo Declaration,
which deal with aspects of criminal justice. Shari'a law was historically
underdeveloped in the area of criminal procedure, 126 and until the recent
Islamization trend, it had long been abandoned in almost all countries and
replaced by criminal procedure rules of Western provenance. Thus, in
practice, Islamic rules on criminal procedure are not a facet of the Islamic
legacy that has commanded much loyalty or that has constituted a serious
obstacle to the modernization of criminal justice. Therefore, it is difficult
to make an argument that the decision by the authors of the Cairo
Declaration to omit the safeguards of articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR was
compelled by a generally accepted view of which elements in the Islamic
legal legacy deserve high priority.
124. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 25.
125. These include but are not limited to: the right not to be deprived of liberty, except
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law (article 9(1));
the right to be informed of the reasons for one's arrest and to be informed promptly of any
charges against one (article 9(2)); the right to prompt arraignment before a magistrate and
prompt trial (article 9(3)); the right to challenge the reasons for one's detention in court (article
9(4)); the right to equality before the courts and a fair and public hearing before an impartial
court (article 14(1)); the right to be present at one's trial and to the assistance of counsel
(article 14(3)(d)); the right to examine witnesses against one (article 14(3)(e)); the right to the
appeal of criminal convictions (article 14(5)); and the right not to be tried or punished for an
offense for which one has already been tried and either convicted or acquitted (article 14(7)).
See ICCPR, supra note 18.
126. For this reason, criminal procedure was one of the first areas where Muslim countries
resorted to borrowing laws from European countries. These borrowings started in the nineteenth
century. See NOEL COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 151-58 (1964).
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Article 19(b) of the Cairo Declaration provides that the right "to
resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone."' 27 This is a weak provision,
because the Declaration does not provide sufficient procedural guarantees
to ensure that this right "to resort to justice" includes a fair hearing with
safeguards (for both civil and criminal litigants) according to the rights
provided under international law.
Article 19(d) provides: "There shall be no crime or punishment
except as provided for in the Shari'ah."'128 This contrasts with article 15
of the ICCPR, which states: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed."' 129 By referring to the shari'a rather than national and
international law, article 19(d) opens the way for nonobservance of the
principle of legality as set forth in article 15 of the ICCPR. In Islamic
law in the past, there was no principle that an act had to be defined as a
crime in the text of a law for it to be the basis for prosecution or punish-
ment. Thus, the article 19 provision that there should be no crime or
punishment except as provided for in the shari'a seems to open the door
to the application of discretionary ta'zir penalties, where the judge
assesses punishment according to his personal notions of what constitutes
criminal behavior and what penalty should be imposed. 130 Such discretion-
ary justice, whether under the rubric of ta'zir or otherwise, is deeply
ingrained in the legal system of Saudi Arabia, where both the dearth of
codified law and the government's authority to interpret the scope of laws
have meant that advance notice , of what acts will be treated as criminal
and what the applicable penalties will be - is not provided to the
public. '3
1
The principle set forth in article 19(d), as already noted, allows the
shari'a to determine crimes and punishments. The hadd penalties, ones
that are set forth in the Qur'an, either expressly or by implication,
include flogging, amputation, stoning to death, and crucifixion. Qur'anic
qisas penalties include mutilations and executions imposed in retaliation
for injuries or killings. These penalties had been abandoned in the
criminal laws in almost all Muslim countries due to their unsuitability by
the standards of modem criminal justice, although Saudi Arabia is one of
127. Cairo Deci. art. 19(b), in Contribution of the OC, supra note 69, at 9.
128. Id. art. 19(d).
129. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 15.
130. See LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 231-32 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert Liebesny eds.,
1955).
131. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 31.
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the rare exceptions in this regard. The Islamization trend of the 1970s and
1980s, however, led to the reinstatement of elements of Qur'anic criminal
laws in several countries. The imposition of Islamic criminal penalties in
countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia has been criticized by international
human rights organizations. 132 Article 19(d) accommodates Islamization
and the application of penalties that conflict with norms barring cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment established in ICCPR article 7,133 and
it is also difficult to reconcile with the language of article 20 of the Cairo
Declaration, which bars torture, humiliation, cruelty, or indignity.'34 The
article 19(d) principle that Islamic standards govern punishments is
reinforced by article 2(a) of the Cairo Declaration, which prohibits taking
away life "except for a Shari'ah-prescribed reason."' 135 If one follows
interpretations of the scope of the death penalty of shari'a law like those
used by Iran and Saudi Arabia, this permits the imposition of the death
penalty for hadd crimes such as fornication, highway robbery, apostasy,
and also potentially for political opposition or adherence to disfavored
religions or sects, which contemporary regimes may classify as religious
offenses. 3 6 The application of the death penalty to this range of activities
creates potential conflicts with international law in a number of areas.
The imposition of the death penalty for moral offenses such as fornication
seems to violate ICCPR article 6(2), which states that the death penalty
"may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.' 37 In the case of the
death penalty for apostasy, which by itself violates the human rights
guarantee of freedom of religion, the conflict between the Cairo Declara-
tion and international rules is especially grave.
132. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: Docu-
MENTS SENT BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN 45-46, 63-65 (1987) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN VIOLATIONS];
Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 30-31.
133. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 7.
134. See infra text accompanying note 143.
135. Cairo Decl. art. 2(a), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 4.
136. For discussions of the application of the death penalty in Iran and Saudi Arabia, see
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN VIOLATIONS, supra note. 132, at 63-65; Iran: Victims of
Human Rights Violations, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, 5-7 (Nov. 1993); Empty
Reforms, supra note 37, at 30-31. See also the discussion of the beheading of a Saudi Shi'i,
infra note 217, for what may have been a combination of religious and political opposition.
In the contemporary context, not only may political opposition be treated as a "religious"
offense warranting capital punishment by regimes purporting to possess Islamic authority, but
political and moral offenses may also be conflated in curious ways. For example, in 1992 a
prominent Sunni leader was executed in Iran after being charged with the combination of
spying for the United States and Iraq, along with adultery and "homosexuality." AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 162 (1993).
137. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 6(2).
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Article 19(e) of the Cairo Declaration provides that a defendant "is
innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he shall be given
all the guarantees of defence."'38 What these "guarantees of defence"
would entail is left open to speculation. Since article 25 states, as noted,
that the shari'a "is the only source of reference or the explanation or
clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration,"'' 39 it could mean
that a trial would be deemed "fair" as long as it was conducted in
conformity with shari'a norms, regardless of how many international
norms it violated. This is not an academic point, because the standards of
criminal procedure in effect in countries that purport to be following
Islamic rules, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, fall far short of the relevant
international human rights standards."4
Article 20 of the Cairo Declaration is an example of provisions that
have little specific connection with Islamic tradition. It begins: "It is not
permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his
freedom, to exile or to punish him.'' 4 In the absence of other procedural
safeguards, this vague provision is inadequate, as is shown by a com-
parison with counterpart provisions in article 9 of the ICCPR, which are
more specific and comprehensive. 4 2 Here the dilution of international
norms appears attributable to the authors' own policy choices. Article 20
continues: "It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological
torture or to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it
permitted to subject an individual to medical or scientific experimentation
without his consent or at the risk of his health or of his life.' 43 This
wording, which has no direct antecedent in Islamic doctrine, is reminis-
cent of article 7 of the ICCPR, from which it apparently derives.' 44
Enunciating a ban on torture and grounding it in Islamic principles
appears to be a constructive step, particularly since torture has been a
routine feature of criminal justice in many Muslim countries. However,
the disparity between theory and practice raises troubling questions. The
evidence that self-professed Islamic States like Iran and Saudi Arabia
138. Cairo Decl. art. 19(e), in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 9.
139. Id. art. 25, at 10.
140. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1987-199o, at 11-34 (1990); Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 26-31.
141. Cairo Decl. art. 20, in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 9.
142. See supra note 125, at 9.
143. Cairo Decl. art. 20, in Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 9.
144. Article 7 of the ICCPR states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 7.
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subsequently continued their patterns of recourse to egregious torture 45
suggests that this Islamic rights model, in practice, lacked normative force
even among countries that ranked among its most vigorous official
proponents in the international fora. Such a gap between the law and
reality prompts doubts as to whether the OIC members who supported the
Cairo Declaration ever intended to follow its supposedly culturally-based
principles, especially in cases where those principles would redress the
imbalance of power between the ruling elites and the average citizen or
act as a restraint on government repression. It thus appears that the OIC
simply borrowed the prohibition of torture from international law, where
it figures as a central principle of modern human rights, and used it as
window dressing - in hopes of making the Cairo Declaration appear
more serious and respectable.
In their treatment of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish-
ment, provisions in different articles of the Cairo Declaration seem to be
at odds with each other. As has already been noted, it is no easy matter
to reconcile the principle in article 20 of the Cairo Declaration barring
humiliation, cruelty, or indignity with corporal punishments like crucifix-
ion and stoning, or other capital penalties permitted under Islamic law,
which the Declaration is designed to accommodate 146 - nor is it clear
how these penalties are to be reconciled with the article 20 prohibition of
torture.
7. States of Emergency
In a rule that is loosely modelled on international law, article 20 of
the Cairo Declaration concludes: "Nor is it permitted to promulgate
emergency laws that would provide executive authority for such actions,"
a prohibition that, in context, appears only to reach the promulgation of
"emergency laws" authorizing "such actions" as were barred by the
preceding three sentences of article 20.147 Article 20 therefore does not
appear to deal with the general, and serious, problems of regulating states
of emergency or derogations from human rights protections in these
times, and it provides far fewer safeguards against the governmental
abuse of states of emergency to deny rights than does article 4 of the
ICCPR. 48 Because there were no settled Islamic principles dealing with
145. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993).
146. For a discussion of article 19(d), see supra text accompanying notes 128-37.
147. Cairo Decl. art. 20, in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 9.
148. Among other things, article 4 of the ICCPR limits measures derogating from rights
to states of emergency, officially proclaimed when the life of the nation is threatened and to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation - provided that the emergency
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states of emergency, there were no Islamic cultural norms that stood in
the way of borrowing the more comprehensive safeguards afforded by the
ICCPR against abusive use of states of emergency. This is, again, an
instance where international human rights were watered down to suit the
political agendas of the authors and not because any Islamic dictates
preclude the adoption of the fuller human rights protections afforded
under international law.
8. Prohibition Against Genocide
According to article 2(b) of the Cairo Declaration, it is prohibited "to
resort to such means as may result in the genocidal annihilation of
mankind."' 49 Loosely modelled on modem international law provisions, 50
this is another instance where the authors went beyond the Islamic
sources in fashioning their principles. The concept of genocide is not a
concept expressly prefigured in Islamic principles.
9. Right to Security and Privacy
Article 18(a) of the Cairo Declaration provides that "[e]veryone shall
have the right to live in security for himself, his religion, his dependents,
his honour and his property.' 5' This guarantee of "security" is vague,
offering little reassurance in the context of a document where other rights
guarantees are weak and ambiguous. Again, it possesses no distinctively
Islamic character.
Article 18(b) of the Cairo Declaration stipulates a right to privacy in
the conduct of personal affairs, in the home, in the family, and regarding
property and relationships. 52 Article 18(b) states: "It is not permitted to
measures are not inconsistent with other obligations under international law, precludes any
derogations from certain rights even under a state of emergency, and requires the government
involved to notify the Secretary General of the United Nations of the derogations and the
reasons therefor. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 4.
149. Cairo Decl. art. 2(b), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 4.
150. The borrowing of the notion that genocide was a crime may have been encouraged
by the fact that many Muslim countries are parties to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. However, the Convention does not deal with
the "genocidal annihilation of mankind," the connotations of which are unclear. The Conven-
tion, in article 2, lists five specific categories of acts, providing that such acts constitute
genocide where they are "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical [sic], racial or religious group." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 179th plen. mtg., pt. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). As elsewhere, the decision of
the authors of the Cairo Declaration to deviate from international legal standards and to use
ambiguous substitutes raises doubts about their motives.
151. Cairo Decl. art. 18(a), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 8.
152. Id. art. 18(b), at 9.
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spy on him [sic], to place him under surveillance or to besmirch his good
name. The State shall protect him [sic] from arbitrary interference."'
' 53
This principle resembles article 17 of the ICCPR, from which it apparent-
ly derives. 54 Article 18(b) actually contains a constructive principle that,
if honored in practice, could do much to ameliorate the situation in many
Muslim countries, where spying and surveillance by State security police
is widespread, intrusions on privacy by government agents are ex-
tensive, 55 and government campaigns to damage opponents' reputations
may occur.' 56 Article 18(c) provides that a private residence "is inviolable
in all cases. It will not be entered without permission from its inhabitants
or in any unlawful manner, nor shall it be demolished or confiscated and
its dwellers evicted."'
157
Article 18 is notable for its lack of Islamic character, although it is
congruent with features of Islamic culture supporting the notion that the
home is a private sanctuary. Because warrantless searches of homes
frequently occur in Middle Eastern countries 5' and persons may be
evicted and their homes destroyed,'59 the protections in this section, if
honored in practice, would also advance the cause of rights and freedoms.
Although no comprehensive survey of actual human rights practice can
be attempted in this article, the disparity between the Cairo Declaration
and actual government practice in this area deserves consideration. OIC
members have shown little inclination either before or after the issuance
of the Cairo Declaration to honor the principles set forth in articles 18(b)
and 18(c). Like other provisions in the Declaration that could, if imple-
mented, curb actual patterns of governmental rights abuses, these seem
to have remained a dead letter - notwithstanding their official grounding
153. Id.
154. The article states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful inter-
ference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor
and reputation." ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 17.
155. See, for example, the sections, Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,
or Correspondence, in the reports on Middle Eastern countries in the U.S. Department of
State's annual COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES; Empty Reforms, supra note
37, at 32; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN VIOLATIONS, supra note 132, at 9-13.
156. See, for example, the language used in the Saudi government's attempts in 1993 to
discredit the members of the new human rights organization, infra text accompanying notes
262-64.
157. Cairo Decl. art. 18(c), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 9.
158. See, for example, the sections Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence, supra note 155.
159. For example, in Iran, the razing of houses of poor people by the authorities caused
rioting in several cities in 1992. See Vahe Petrossian, Iran: Housing Problems Reach Boiling
Point, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Nov. 6, 1992, at 18; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1993,
at 161.
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in Islamic values that OIC members are ostensibly committed to respect.
The failure to implement these principles suggests that they lack norma-
tive force for the governments involved, which in turn suggests that
whether or not these governments violate human rights does not depend
on whether these rights are grounded in "Western" principles or an
authentic "Islamic" model.
10. Prohibition of Colonialism and Slavery
Reflecting the Third World setting in which Muslim nations elaborate
their positions on rights, article 1 l(b) of the Cairo Declaration states that
colonialism is "totally prohibited. ' 60 Again, this article has no express
antecedent in Islamic doctrine. Article 11 seems to say that there can be
no qualifications, not even Islamic ones, of this particular principle and
states that "peoples suffering from colonialism have the full right to
freedom and self-determination."' 61 However, the history of OIC members
since the organization was founded in 1973 indicates that this commit-
ment to self-determination has not been interpreted to require OIC
members to yield territory to their own restive minorities demanding self-
determination. The right to self-determination only appears to address
situations where colonialism by the West or the former U.S.S.R. is
involved. 162
Article 11 (a) of the Cairo Declaration provides that no one has the
right to enslave human beings - without any Islamic qualifications. 63
This is emblematic of the selectivity with which rules taken from Islamic
law have been resuscitated in Islamic human rights schemes. Slavery was
a deeply ingrained feature of many Muslim societies and was extensively
regulated in Islamic law.' 64 It survived in milieus where traditional
160. Cairo Decl. art. I 1 (b), in Contribution of the 01C, supra note 69, at 6.
161. Id. For an examination of the way that Muslim approaches to contemporary self-
determination issues relate to Islamic legal tradition, see Ann E. Mayer, War and Peace in the
Islamic Tradition and International Law, in JUST WAR AND JIHAD: HISTORICAL AND THEORETI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 195, 211-17
(John Kelsay & James T. Johnson eds., 1991).
162. The charter of the OIC affirmed "the right of self-determination" in article II(B)(2).
MOINUDDIN, supra note 67, at 187. However, article II(B)(3) also affirmed the "respect of (sic]
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each member State." Id. at 188. How
the two principles were to be reconciled was not indicated, but this was hardly an academic
point, because many OIC members were themselves struggling to suppress internal separatist
movements by "peoples" claiming the r.ght to self-determination.
163. Cairo Decl. art. 1 (a), in Contribution of the 01C, supra note 69, at 6.
164. See, e.g., 'Abd, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (new ed. 1960) ("'abd" is the ordinary
word for "male slave," "female slave" being "ama"); BERNARD LEWIS, RACE AND SLAVERY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 6-15 (1990); JOSEPH SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 127-30
(1964).
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formulations of Islamic law remained in force until recently; it was only
abolished in Saudi Arabia in 1962.165 However, because slavery was an
institution that by 1990 had fallen into practical desuetude and interna-
tional disrepute, the authors of the Cairo Declaration were ready to lay
down a principle that flew in the face of norms ingrained in Islamic
institutions and the Islamic legal heritage. In so doing, they were proving
that, in the formulation of their rights provisions, they were actually
prepared to respond to considerations other than those contained in the
Islamic tradition. Moreover, they proved that they did not feel themselves
bound to adhere to venerable Islamic principles and could, where cir-
cumstances warranted, adopt conflicting modem norms.
11. Summation
In a country like Saudi Arabia, where slavery has only recently been
eliminated, article 11 (a) might seem to be a breakthrough. But when one
measures the Cairo Declaration by the standards of the civil and political
rights afforded by the International Bill of Human Rights, its deficiencies
are revealed to be both serious and extensive. The retrograde character of
the Cairo Declaration led to its vigorous denunciation by the International
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) when it was submitted in 1992 to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission."6 Adama Dieng, the Senegalese Secretary
General of the ICJ, condemned the Declaration for challenging the
intercultural consensus on the international human rights standards,
introducing discrimination against nonMuslims and women, deliberately
restricting certain fundamental rights and liberties, and ratifying, under
the cover of shari'a, the legitimacy of practices like corporal punish-
ment.167
Because it strips Muslims of a wide range of civil and political rights
that are afforded under international law and because it purports to be
relying on Islamic criteria in doing so, if one takes the Cairo Declaration
as a definitive "civilizational" statement of rights, it would support
Huntington's assumption that human rights do not fit into Islamic culture.
Whether the divergences actually result from a cleavage between Islamic
and Western culture is another question. That Iran and Iraq joined in
promoting the Declaration, indicated that the Islamic religion is unlikely
to have been the determinative factor in shaping this regime of pseudo-
rights. The two countries, which had fought a destructive war from
165. See SAUDI ARABIA. A COUNTRY STUDY 208 (Richard Nyrop ed., 1984).
166. See Isabelle Vichniac, La commission internationale de juristes ddnonce un projet de
"diclaration des droits de l'homme en Islam," LE MONDE, Feb. 13, 1992, at 6.
167. Id.
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1980-88, stood at opposite extremes in terms of their actual religious
policies. After the 1979 revolution, Iran became a Twelver Shi'i theocracy
dedicated to carrying out an Islamic fundamentalist agenda, whereas Iraq
was a military dictatorship dominated by Sunnis who followed a secular
Arab nationalist ideology and ruthlessly persecuted Islamic fundamental-
ists and the large and disaffected Twelver Shi'i population. These two
bitter enemies did share a common political interest in their approaches
to rights questions, however; they shared policies of disregard for the rule
of law, riding roughshod over human rights, resorting to terror and torture
to crush dissent, and carrying out mass executions of political op-
ponents.168 Both were badly in need of a scheme that would legitimize
their deviations from international standards, and it was this need, more
than a shared Islamic culture, that dictated both regimes' support for the
Cairo Declaration.
Any appearance of an emergent unified Islamic stance on human
rights at the time of the issuance of the Declaration in 1990 proved
chimerical. In the three years since the issuance of the Cairo Declaration,
there has been no sign that it signals a genuine consensus among OIC
member countries. Countries that were not previously disposed to exploit
Islam as the rationale for denying human rights have not been more
inclined to do so, and they have not been moved to modify their laws to
reflect the standards set forth in the Declaration, which in many cases
would lie far below the rights standards heretofore embodied in their
domestic laws and constitutions. For example, the 1979 Iranian Constitu-
tion, itself purportedly based on Islam, continues at least in theory to
afford a higher level of protection for rights than does the Cairo Declara-
tion. 169 Not only do the constitutions of individual Muslim countries
168. Their equally unsavory records can be compared by reading the relevant sections in
the annual Amnesty International reports. An important recent analysis of how Iraq's Baathist
ideology has shaped a regime that tramples on rights and how the regime of Saddam Hussain
dominates Iraqi society is offered in SAMIR AL-KHALIL [pseud.], REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE
INSIDE STORY OF SADDAM'S IRAQ (1989).
169. For example, in Article 20, the Iranian Constitution offers the equal protection of the
secular law for all citizens, albeit in a formulation that in context is problematic. IRAN CONST.
art. 20, in 8 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 25; see also MAYER, supra note 41, at 100-01.
Article 14 calls for the human rights of nonMuslims to be honored, albeit with troubling
qualifications and without clarifying the relationship of this Article to other Articles that seem
to curb rights of religious minorities. IRAN CONST. art. 14, in 8 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62,
at 22; see also MAYER, supra note 41, at 155-58. Article 23 prohibits the interrogation of
people regarding their beliefs or attacking any person for his beliefs, and Article 38 provides
that coerced testimony or confessions are null and void. Article 32 bars arrests, save where
permitted by law and in accordance with proper legal procedures and requires immediately
notifying the accused of the reason for the arrest and passing on the file to the judicial
authorities within 24 hours. There are also provisions for the right to counsel in Article 35.
Moreover, at least in theory, the government is to be democratic. Article 6 provides for
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diverge from the rights set forth in the Cairo Declaration, but also the
rights provisions in any given constitution may vary significantly from
those set forth in another. 170 Moreover, the OIC endorsement of the Cairo
Declaration with its supposedly authoritative Islamic standard of rights
did not affect the positions of Muslim countries vis-h-vis international
rights conventions. OIC members have differed dramatically in their
willingness to ratify international human rights conventions, some
ratifying most and some virtually none.'
elections of officials like the president and members of the national assembly, Article 62
provides that members of the national assembly are to be elected by direct and secret ballots,
and Article 59 provides for referendums. See IRAN CONST. arts. 6, 23, 32, 35, 38, 59, in 8
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 19, 26, 29-30, 40.
In practice, Iran has disregarded its own Constitution, and even asking for it to be
respected has proven dangerous. See infra text accompanying notes 278-82.
170. A comparison of the rights formulations in the constitutions of various Muslim
countries will readily establish the wide range of models that they exemplify, of which only
a few will be cited.
One OIC member, Turkey, remains resolutely secular. Article 2 of the 1982 Turkish
Constitution proclaims Turkey to be, among other things, a democratic, secular, and social law
State "respecting human rights" - without imposing any Islamic qualifications on such rights.
Article 12 states that everyone possesses inherent fundamental rights and freedoms which are
inviolable and inalienable. The provisions in Article 13 on permissible restrictions on fun-
damental rights and freedoms are both specific and secular; furthermore, the restrictions must
be by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. The provisions in Article
14 prohibiting the abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms are likewise specific and secular.
TURK. CONST. arts. 2, 12, 13, 14, in 19 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 3, 5.
Recent constitutions that are products of democratizing trends deviate from the OIC model
of rights. Article 31 of the 1989 Algerian Constitution guarantees fundamental liberties and
human rights. It imposes no Islamic qualifications. ALG. CONST. art. 31, in I CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 62, at 8.
The Yemeni Constitution, approved by referendum in 1991 after the adoption of the Cairo
Declaration, provides in Article 5 that the State shall abide by the U.N. Charter, the UDHR,
the Charter of the League of Arab States, and the generally accepted norms of international
law. YEMEN CONST. art. 5. See Draft Version of Yemen Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONS
(supp.), supra note.62, at 15.
The preamble to the 1992 Moroccan Constitution, which also was drafted after the Cairo
Declaration had been adopted, provides that Morocco "reaffirms its attachment to human rights
such as they are universally recognised." See Text of Draft Revisions of the Constitution as
Proposed by King Hassan, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 24, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. For an analysis of this Constitution and human rights
issues in contemporary Morocco, see Ann E. Mayer, Moroccans: Citizens or Subjects? A
People at the Crossroads, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (forthcoming 1994) [hereinafter,
Mayer, Moroccans].
Kuwait has been intermittently democratic since its independence. The 1962 Kuwaiti
Constitution provides in Article 6 that the system of government shall be democratic and in
Article 29 that all people are equal in human dignity and in public rights and duties before the
law, without distinction as to race, origin, language, or religion (but not sex). KUWAIT CONST.
arts. 6, 29, in 9 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 12, 16.
171. The current status of ratifications can be found in the table appended to U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PENALTIES FOR 1992, at
1189-92 (1993). Even in the policies of one country, one might find inconsistencies. For
example, despite its attacks on international human rights and its pursuit of policies that were
at odds with international norms on civil and political rights, Iran did not terminate its status
as party to the ICCPR, which it had ratified under the late Shah in 1975.
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The lack of uniformity in the legislation in effect in Muslim countries
shows that this Declaration does not represent a true meeting of the minds
on the part of Muslim governments about how Islam applies to rights -
whether at the level of domestic legislation or international law. The
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in April 1993 issued a resolution
that specifically acknowledged "the existence of different constitutional
and legal systems among OIC Member States and various international
or regional human rights instruments to which they are parties" '72 -
without explaining how these differences can be reconciled with their
endorsement of the Cairo Declaration, which presupposes a uniform
Islamic approach to rights questions. The inefficacy of the Cairo Declara-
tion suggests that many delegations' endorsements may have been no
more than perfunctory or rhetorical, perhaps motivated by nothing more
than a reluctance to differ in public with a document that is nominally
associated with "Islam" and "human rights" - both of which have
positive connotations.
Thus, a document that might, at first blush, appear to offer a confir-
mation of Huntington's thesis, reveals, after close scrutiny, to embody
one variation out of many differing approaches to human rights questions
that Muslim countries have adopted. These deep and persisting dif-
ferences belie the notion that governments of Muslim countries do share
a common rights philosophy or that there is anything like a monolithic
"Islam" determining their laws affecting human rights or their willingness
to endorse the internationally accepted norms.
B. The 1992 Basic Law of Saudi Arabia
Although Saudi Arabia, like Iran, strongly supported the Cairo
Declaration, the rights set forth in the Cairo Declaration did not dictate
the rights provisions of the subsequently promulgated Saudi Basic Law.
In the Saudi case, as the following analysis will show, the level of
domestic rights protections are revealed to be generally much lower. Even
though Islam is repeatedly referred to, any careful examination prompts
doubts as to whether the deficiencies of the Saudi Basic Law on rights
questions should be attributed to Islam, as opposed to the strategies of the
Saudi family to maintain their monopoly on political power and their
control of the national wealth.
172. Resolution No. 41/21-P on Coordination Among Member States in the Field of
Human Rights, included in the OIC submission to the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights. Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 11.
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Islamic jurisprudence, as set forth in the treatises of medieval jurists,
survived as the official law in Saudi Arabia,173 a country whose rulers
derive their legitimacy from their alliance with leaders of the Wahhabi
sect of Sunni Islam. The Saudi family emerged from obscurity in the
eighteenth century near what is now the capital city of Riyadh. The
Saudis were allied with Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1691-1787),
an exponent of a rigid, intolerant, puritanical version of Islam that
became known as Wahhabism. 174 In 1801, demonstrating their vehement
opposition to Shi'ism, which continues to characterize Saudi policy, a
Saudi-Wahhabi force, impelled by iconoclastic zeal, crossed the border
into Iraq and destroyed one of the most sacred shrines of Shi'i Islam.1
75
After many vicissitudes, in 1932, the Saudis succeeded in establishing
themselves as the rulers of what later became known as Saudi Arabia.
Although the Saudi monarchs are not from a religiously-sanctified
lineage, they have buttressed their claims to power by careful deference
to Islamic jurists allied with the regime - consulting with them, honor-
ing their opinions, and retaining Islamic law as the law of the land. In
return, Saudi Arabia's Islamic jurists have issued rulings supporting the
Saudis' absolute monarchy. 176 Although superficially stable, the Saudi
system faces internal opposition forces, which include both secular critics
and disaffected fundamentalists who call for a more rigorous adherence
to Islamic tenets.
177
Partly because of their commitment to the traditional notion that all
laws are to be founded in Islamic sources and that there is no place for
human legislation in an Islamic system, Saudi leaders were reluctant to
adopt a constitution. Moreover, they seem to have feared that con-
stitutionalism could threaten the Saudi family's monopoly on all power.
173. Farouk Sankari, Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia, in THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN
THE ARAB WORLD 181-82 (Ali Dessouki ed., 1982).
174. Id. at 179.
175. Id. at 180.
176. Id. at 181-88. For background on the relationship between the royal family and
Wahhabi Islam, see MORTIMER, supra note 118, at 63-64, 159-85, and AYMAN AL-YASSINI,
RELIGION AND STATE IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (1985). According to al-Yassini, the
interaction between religion and State in Saudi Arabia is unique, being: "a quasi-capitalist mode
of development in a semi-tribal traditional society; abundant financial resources and extreme
affluence in a society governed by an austere and puritanical ideology; and a quasi-secular
polity in which the ulama [religious scholars] continue to influence national politics." Id. at
130.
It would be strange for anyone to classify Saudi Arabia with Japan and Singapore as
"modern, prosperous societies" that are "clearly non-Western," but Huntington has done
precisely that. See Huntington, If Not Civilizations, What?, supra note 2, at 192. In this, as in
other areas, Huntington does not seem in touch with the realities of the "Islamic civilization"
he characterizes.
177. On the secular and religious opposition to the Saudi regime, see generally AL-
YASSINI, supra note 176, at 117-31.
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The mounting dissatisfaction of their subjects over the delay in establish-
ing a constitutional form of government was indicated by two petitions
demanding democratic reforms, one distributed by liberal Saudis in
December 1990 and another distributed by conservative religious scholars
in February 1991. The petitions clearly revealed that Saudi subjects of
differing political stripes were chafing under the Saudis' absolute monar-
chy. 17
8
The secular petition called for, inter alia, recognition that human
interpretations of shari'a requirements were subject to question, the
issuance of a Basic Law, formation of a consultative council that would
exercise effective scrutiny over executive agencies, independence of the
judiciary, total equality for all citizens and protection against interference
in their lives, an advanced media policy for enriching dialogue "in an
open Muslim society," comprehensive reforms of the mutawwa (religious
police), allowing women to participate in public life, and educational
reform. 17
9
The petition from religious figures called for, inter alia, an indepen-
dent consultative council to decide issues according to the shari'a, repeal
of legislation not in conformity with the shari'a, justice applied equally
among all citizens, independence of the judiciary, accountability of
government officials and elimination of corrupt ones, fair distribution of
wealth, a strong army, media that follow Islamic criteria, a foreign policy
to serve Islam, a strengthening of religious institutions, and guarantees for
the rights of individuals and society within religious guidelines. 80
Neither petition demanded respect for international human rights and
neither directly challenged the Saudi monarchy. However, in the cata-
logue of demands, one can sense a common frustration over the absence
of checks and balances in the system of government, the lack of judicial
independence, and the inequalities and inequities in the administration of
justice. The disparity between the petitions regarding the role accorded to
religious law was striking; unlike the religious figures, the authors of the
secular petition did not stipulate that rights were to be governed by
religious guidelines.
The combination of restiveness among their subjects, the disruptive
impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the Gulf War finally
prompted the Saudi royal family to recognize the need for reforms.' 8 '
178. Translations of these petitions are contained in Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at
59-62.
179. Id. at 59-61.
180. Id. at 61-62.
181. See Roger Matthews, Saudi Arabia; Rulers under Pressure, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30,
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Change was officially inaugurated on March 1, 1992, when a Basic Law
of Government, a Shura Council Decree, and a Decree on Provinces were
issued. These governmental acts suggested that the country was belatedly
moving toward a system that would accord at least limited recognition to
constitutionalism. However, in a speech about the Basic Law, King Fahd
seemed anxious to deny that there had been any break with tradition; in
fact, he maintained that for the two and a half centuries since the estab-
lishment of the first Saudi State, Saudi rulers had continuously abided by
Islamic law and that "the basis of the program of Islam is fixed and is not
subject to change or alteration."'' 8 2 That is, he specifically ruled out the
possibility of changing Islamic law as it had existed in Arabia in the
eighteenth century, when the Saudi family had begun its conquests. He
also denied that the new laws in any way constituted a break with
tradition; according to King Fahd, they simply aimed at strengthening the
existing system and formulating what was already in operation., 3 Sig-
nificantly, he maintained that the ruler had rights as well as duties but
made no mention of any rights accruing to the subjects.8 4
King Fahd also asserted that the Basic Law was an outgrowth of
Saudi culture and tradition, considering "the distinguished position of the
Kingdom on the Islamic scene and its traditions, customs, and its social,
cultural, and civilized conditions. Therefore, these statutes spring from
our reality, taking into consideration our traditions and customs, and
adhering to our true religion."'' 8 5 In his speech, King Fahd claimed that
the relationship between ruler and ruled was "governed by the law of
God."'8 6 He further maintained that the people governing the country
adhered to "the Islamic line," as did officials and the people,8 7 thereby
positing that all Saudis followed a common Islamic standard.
The Basic Law (al-nizam al-asasi li'l-hukm),8 8 drafted by an ad hoc
committee under Prince Nayef, 19 presents the form of government as
Islamic. Article 1 asserts the identity of Saudi Arabia as an Arab Islamic
1992, at 5; Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 5-7.
182. F.B.I.S. (NES-92-041), Mar. 2, 1992, at 35.
183. Id. at 35.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 36.
186. Id. at 35.
187. Id. at 36.
188. English translations of the law, which have been relied on for aspects of the
translations offered here, are presented in id. and in Saudi Arabia - The New Constitution, 8
ARAB L. QTLY. 258 (1993) [hereinafter Basic Law]. An Arabic version was kindly provided
by the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
189. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 2.
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State with Islam as its religion and strains to maintain the pretense that
the Basic Law has not supplanted the Islamic sources, claiming that the
Qur'an and the sunna, or custom, of the Prophet are its Constitution. In
article 7, the government is said to derive its power from the Qur'an and
the Prophet's tradition."9 There is a gap between these Islamic references
and the bald assertion of the Saudi family's royal prerogatives that
follows. According to article 5(a), the "law of government in the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia is monarchy,''. and article 5(b) puts the power of
government in the hands of the House of Saud.' 92 According to article
5(c), the King determines the heir apparent and possesses the power to
remove him. 93 Article 6 tells the citizens that they "are to pay allegiance
to the king in accordance with the Holy Koran and the Prophet's tradi-
tion, in submission and obedience and in times of ease and difficulty,
fortune and adversity."'' 94 Presumably, Saudis who object to this system
of dynastic rule will be punished by the State, which is ordered in article
12 to "prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition, or separa-
tion."'9" Incongruously, article 12 is placed in the chapter on components
of Saudi society, along with provisions regarding the family. The King
is the linchpin of this system, as indicated in article 55: "The king carries
out the policy of the nation, a legitimate policy in accordance with the
provisions of Islam; the king oversees the implementation of the Islamic
shari'ah, the systems/regulations [al-anzima], the State's general policies,
and the protection and defense of the country."'
196
In these provisions, one sees another example of why the assumption
that there is a monolithic Islam that determines politics is misguided.
Here, the local "Islam" confirms the monarchical prerogatives of the
dynasty in power and serves as a legitimating device for the Saudi
family's autocratic rule, just as Iranian "Islam" officially confirms the
legitimacy of the radically dissimilar system of Shi'i clerical rule there.
Although an examination suggests that the Basic Law actually strengthens
the hand of the monarch,197 there are various vague provisions conveying
the impression that the system has been reformed along principles more
190. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 7.
191. Id. art. 5(a).
192. Id. art. 5(b).
193. Id. art. 5(c).
194. Id. art. 6.
195. Id. art. 12.
196. Id. art. 55.
197. Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 10-11.
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in accord with modem constitutionalism. There is a pretense of separation
of powers: In article 44 the powers of the State are said to be divided into
the judicial, executive, and regulatory (tanzimiya) branches - with no
provision for legislative powers.'"8 However, an assessment of the Basic
Law has concluded that the powers of government remain concentrated
in the hands of the King, who is accountable to no other institution in the
scheme of government.'"
Article 8 states that the government "stands on the bases of justice,
shura (consultation), and equality in accordance with -the Islamic tradi-
tion."2' Article 15 outlines various functions of the new Shura Council,
which replaces a council established in 1926, which had no real impact
on curbing the monarch's prerogatives. 20 1 Although the Shura Council
may offer suggestions and opinions to the King on matters referred to it
by the Council of Ministers, the members of which are appointed by the
King,2" there is no indication that the King needs to abide by them. An
examination of how shura is conceived in the Shura Council Decree
reveals that it is not designed to constrain the King's discretion. 23 Not
until August 1993 was the Shura Council actually set up2° - suggesting
that the royal family had been reluctant even to allow such an anemic
consultative body to undertake its functions.
Given the thrust of the King's speech on March 2, 1992, one would
have anticipated that any rights provisions in the new Basic Law would
be ones that would preserve the existing hierarchies in Saudi society. As
a critical analysis has already demonstrated, the rights provisions are
198. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 44. The absence of provision for legislation or a
legislature fits with traditional Islamic legal theory, according to which all laws are derived
from the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet Muhammad. Even a self-professed Islamic
State like Iran has come to terms with the need in a modern nation State for man-made laws.
In Saudi Arabia, where man-made legislation exists, it seems it will continue to be disguised,
being called "regulations" or "administration" to minimize the friction with Islamic theory.
Thus, the Basic Law itself is called al-nizam al-asasi li'l-hukm, which translates roughly as "the
basic order/regulation of government."
199. Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 2, 11-13.
200. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 8.
201. Id. art. 15.
202. Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 12.
203. See id. at 15-18, 56. Article 3 of the Shura Council Decree calls for a Consultative
Council of 60 members, to be chosen by the King from among scholars and knowledgeable and
experienced men, their "rights and duties and all their affairs" being defined by royal decree."
The King is in a strong position vis-h-vis this Council. There is no immunity for members of
the Council: Article 6 provides that members of the Council should be investigated and tried
if they fail to carry out their duties in accordance with rules and measures to be issued by royal
decree. The members therefore serve at the King's pleasure and are not shielded from the
consequences of royal dissatisfaction.
204. See Mark Nicholson, Saudis Widen Political Horizons, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993,
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seriously deficient according to the standards set forth in the International
Bill of Human Rights.2 °5
It is noteworthy that only a few political or civil rights are actually
provided for in the text of the provisions of chapter five on rights and
duties. Moreover, the Basic Law tends to formulate provisions in terms
of obligations of the State to make provisions for citizens, only infre-
quently using the terminology of rights belonging to the individual or to
the citizenry. That is, it seems to offer a conception of Saudi subjects as
dependent on the State, presenting the State as a paternalistic entity with
duties to care for Saudi subjects, rather than treating Saudi citizens as
individuals with entitlements.2' Even where rights are spoken of, the
provisions may be designed to perpetuate the existing Saudi system of
paternalistic monarchical rule, in which citizens remain dependent on
their rulers' favor.20 7
In sum, the Basic Law aims to assuage the dissatisfaction of Saudi
subjects by offering them a document that can be represented as a
constitution and, simultaneously, to reaffirm the absolute power and
religious legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty. These aims are not compatible,
and the human rights in the Basic Law are, as a consequence, inadequate.
Their deficiencies can be seen in the provisions involving: (1) freedom
of religion; (2) the imposition of "Islamic" criteria limitations on human
rights; (3) criminal justice; (4) the rights of women; (5) freedom of
speech and expression; (6) the right to equality and equal protection; and
finally, (7) the failure to endorse international law.
1. Freedom of Religion
Article 23 is incongruous as the first article in a chapter ostensibly
treating rights and duties. Instead, it belongs in the second chapter on law
of government. 2 ' The article affirms that the State protects Islam and
205. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37.
206. Outside the sphere of political and civil rights, a number of articles impose obliga-
tions on the State to provide for people's needs. See articles 27 (on social welfare and social
security), 28 (on employment), 30 (on education), and 31 (on health care). Article 32 calls on
the State to protect the environment. Basic Law, supra note 188, arts. 27, 28, 30, 31.
207. For example, article 43 protects the right of "citizens" to petition the King and Crown
Prince. There is no provision for a neutral judicial process to evaluate the merits of petitions
submitted; instead, the petitioners will be entirely dependent on the goodwill and benevolence
of the King and Crown Prince for redress of their grievances. Basic Law, supra note 188, art.
43. The same article provides for the right of the individual "to address the public authorities
in all matters affecting him," but without indicating what the individual can do if dissatisfied
with the authorities' response. Id.
208. Several provisions in the chapter dealing with rights and duties have little connection
with that subject (see articles 24, 25, 29, 33, 35); whereas certain provisions outside the chapter
do relate to rights, albeit sometimes indirectly. From the disorganized approach to rights
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implements Islamic law and calls on the State to order people to do right
and to shun evil.2 ' 9 In context, the principle set forth in article 23 is
tantamount to an endorsement of the traditional functions of Saudi
Arabia's notorious religious police, a force known to act in ways that are
harmful for rights and freedoms. It has been under the auspices of a
committee that is assigned to propagate virtue and to prohibit vice that
the Kingdom's mutawwa'in, or religious police, have operated.2 0 The
committee relies on retrograde readings of Islamic requirements and a
reactionary version of Islamic morality to guide them in attacking all
manifestations of vice. Acting in vigilante fashion, the mutawwa members
carry out patrols throughout the Kingdom, resorting to arrests or beatings
if they discover anything that offends their puritanical sensitivities, such
as infringements of the dress code for women.21t Moreover, it appears
that they have undertaken to monitor worship by nonMuslims, 2 2 even
though all nonMuslim worship must be conducted in private in Saudi
Arabia, so that policing religious services entails invading private quar-
ters. Article 23 also calls on the State to fulfill the obligation to propagate
the faith, thereby engaging the government in the task of proselytizing on
behalf of Islam, which in context can only mean the officially-approved
Sunni Wahhabism.213
As in the Cairo Declaration, there is no provision for freedom of
religion, an omission that seems especially ominous given the upswing
in religiously-based persecutions of nonMuslims that has occurred since
the Gulf War.2 14 However, it is ultimately Muslims who have the mpstto
fear from the absence of any protection for religious freedom. Members
of Saudi Arabia's large Shi'i minority are often condemned as infidels or
apostates by defenders of the State-sponsored Wahhabi orthodoxy.1 5 In
part due to intercommunal tensions, which have been exacerbated'by the
antagonism between the Saudis and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Saudis treat members of their Shi i minority as if they are likely to be
embodied in the document, one would tend to surmise that the drafters of the Basic Law
possessed only a rudimentary grasp of constitutionalism and human rights principles.
209. The Islamic basis for this has been discussed above in connection with article 22 of
the Cairo Declaration. See supra text preceding note 111.
210. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA; RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra note
38, at 6.
211. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 28-29.
212. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra note 38,
at 7.
213. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 23.
214. See generally id.
215. See id. at 14-17; MUNSON, supra note 12, at 72-73.
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disloyal, subjecting Shi'is to discrimination and religious persecution.216
In September 1992, a young Shi'i was beheaded for apostasy and
blasphemy.217 In turn, members of the Shi'i minority have agitated for the
overthrow of the House of Saud, viewing Saudi monarchs as "the most
dangerous enemy of Islam because they used the cover of religion to
legitimate their otherwise unlslamic rule." '218 Of course the unwillingness
of the Shi'is to accept that the Saudi family has a legitimate Islamic claim
to rule Arabia has made them targets for persecution.
2. The Imposition of "Islamic" Limitations on Human Rights
The most critical principle in the Basic Law that specifically relates
to human rights is article 26, which, as in other Islamic human rights
schemes, borrows the concept of human rights but subordinates such
rights to Islamic law. It provides that "the state protects human rights in
accordance with the Islamic shari'a.'' 21 9 The shari'a limits on rights
cannot be definitely fixed, since Saudi law is uncodified and the legal
sources remain open to a variety of interpretations. 220 To clarify what
these limits are, the executive might choose to refer to the government-
appointed Council of senior religious scholars. However, as has been
noted, this Council "has traditionally deferred to the King's interpretation
of the Shari'a in political matters, including the treatment of most human
rights. '221 This is yet another illustration of how the content of Islamic
restrictions on rights is likely to reflect the local balance of power and
interests of the ruling group in any given political setting. Given the
216. See, e.g., SHAME OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD, supra note 90, at 95-106; Empty Reforms,
supra note 37, at 37-39; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE,
supra note 38, at 13-17.
217. The reports relating to this case, which concerned a young man named Sadiq 'Abd
al-Karim Malallah, are not as solid or as consistent as one would wish, except on the matter
of the victim having been beheaded for apostasy and blasphemy in al-Qatif. It appears that
during four years of detention he was told that he should convert to the Wahhabi version of
Sunni Islam favored by the Saudi regime but refused. He may have been involved in efforts
to improve the rights of the Shi'i minority. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: AN
UPSURGE IN PUBLIC EXECUTIONS 6 (1993). Other reports stated that he had been arrested
because he had been found carrying a Bible, which he was reading out of curiosity to learn
about other religions. See, e.g., DIALOGUE (Public Affairs Committee for Shia Muslims in
London) Nov. 1992, at 1.
218. See MUNSON, supra note 12, at 73. Profoundly embarrassed by critical exposds of
the Saudi human rights record that were published by dissident Shi'is in Europe and the United
States, the Saudi regime in 1993 somehow succeeded in reaching an accommodation with the
dissidents, so that the exposds ceased to be published. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1994: EVENTS OF 1993, at 328-30 (1994).
219. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 26.
220. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 21-22, 25.
221. Id. at 25.
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human rights record of the Saudi regime, one can predict that Islamic
criteria will be extensively invoked by the monarchy to justify curbs
placed on rights and freedoms,222 particularly where its critics are con-
cerned.
3. Criminal Justice
The rights specifically covered include the provision that no one shall
be arrested, imprisoned, or have his actions restricted except as provided
by law,223 that homes shall not be entered or searched save in cases
specified by statutes,224 and that communications shall not be confiscated,
delayed, read, or listened to except in cases defined by statutes.225 These
provisions, which have no particular Islamic character and are not
specifically qualified by Islamic criteria, resemble provisions in articles
18(b) and 20 of the Cairo Declaration. 226 They appear to be useful
reforms, ones designed to curb actual patterns of abuses that violate
international human rights norms. However, it remains to be seen whether
the Saudi government intends to take the reforms needed to ensure that
they will be implemented.227
Article 38 is a rare instance where the Saudi law improves on the
Cairo Declaration. Article 19(d) of the latter had provided that crimes and
punishments were to be defined by the shari'a.228 In contrast, article 38
of the Saudi law provides that there shall be no crime or penalty except
in accordance with a shari'a text (nass shar'i) or "regulatory" text,(n~s
nizami), and that there shall be no punishment except for acts committed
subsequent to the entry into force of the regulatory text (nass nizami).229
This amounts to borrowing the modern criminal justice standard of
legality, meaning that crimes and penalties, including ones based on
Islamic law, need first to be set forth in the texts of regulations promul-
gated by the government before conduct can be penalized. This is a
progressive reform and would entail ending the practice of imposing
ta'zir penalties. It is, however, unclear whether the welcome incorporation
222. In this connection, consider the Islamic ruling issued in 1993 to justify the sup-
pression of the Saudi human rights organization, discussed infra text accompanying notes
258-65.
223. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 36.
224. Id. art. 37.
225. Id. art. 40.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43, 152-56.
227. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 26-27, 32.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 128-34.
229. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 38.
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of this principle in the Saudi Basic Law will mean that it will be honored
in practice.
4. Rights of Women
There is, notably, no provision whatsoever in the chapter on rights
and duties regarding the rights of women - even though disputes over
the rights of women are one of the main preoccupations of many con-
temporary Saudi Arabians. Instead of squarely addressing women's rights,
the Basic Law has chosen to treat the subject indirectly, touching on
women's status by implication in the provisions on the family in chapter
three, such as article 9. It provides that:
The family is the kernel of Saudi society ... and its members shall
be brought up on the basis of the Islamic faith and loyalty and
obedience to God, the Prophet, and to guardians ... respect for and
implementation of the law, love of and pride in the homeland, and
the glorious history that the Islamic faith stipulates.230
The traditional patriarchal Saudi family structure, reinforced by Islamic
personal status law and Saudi rules segregating women and requiring
them to be fully veiled, is one that keeps women subordinated, secluded,
and deprived of basic freedoms. 23' The treatment of the family in the
Basic Law, in endorsing these restrictions, reinforces the constraints
imposed on women by familial structure and religious law. Similar. ideas
are recapitulated in article 10, where the State is called on to "aspire to
strengthen family ties" and to maintain "Arab and Islamic values. 232 That
is, in addition to shari'a law, the Saudi version of Arab-Islamic culture
will govern the family. Given the nature of Saudi traditions, this
provision effectively invokes cultural grounds to justify the historical and
present subjugation of women.
5. Freedom of Speech and Expression
No guarantee of freedom of speech or freedom of expression is
included in the Basic Law. Instead, there are indications that the Law
affords various rationales that could be used to suppress any speech,
especially speech that could attack or threaten the monarchy. Article 39
provides that the media, publications, and all methods of expression shall
adhere to courteous language and State regulations and shall contribute
230. Id. art. 9.
231. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 36-37.
232. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 10.
[Vol. 15:307
Universal versus Islamic Human Rights
to the education of the nation and support its unity.233 It forbids publish-
ing anything that can lead to sedition or strife or harm the security of the
State or its public relations or degrade man's dignity and rights as
specified by the laws - thereby providing broad, vague bases for
censorship.234 This article appears to endorse the existing censorship
standards, which are extensive and stringently enforced by the govern-
ment, not just against secular speech but also against clerics and fun-
damentalists whose interpretations of Islam are at variance with those
sponsored by the Saudi regime.235
6. The Right of Equality and Equal Protection
In addition to the deficiencies already mentioned, among the human
rights set forth in international law that are missing from the Saudi Basic
Law are rights of equality and equal protection of the law. The lack of
guarantees for such rights will be detrimental for women and nonMus-
lims, who were already disadvantaged under shari'a law. However, the
fact that noncitizens do not have equal protection rights will mean that
millions of foreign workers, many of whom are Muslims, will be disad-
vantaged vis-a-vis Saudi citizens.236 Many expatriate laborers are
desperately poor migrants from developing countries who have been
exposed to grievous hardships and even torture while working in Saudi
Arabia, without hope of redress.237 Many of these laborers are Muslims
and should be entitled, under traditional interpretations of Islamic law, to
exactly the same treatment as those Muslims who do possess Saudi
citizenship. Because the new Basic Law affords no new protections to
noncitizens, the categories of citizenship or alien status in the nation
State, unknown categories in Islamic law in the past,238 will continue to
provide the basis for discriminatory treatment. Thus, via provisions that
allow discriminatory treatment of Muslims on the basis of nationality,
Saudi Arabia is breaking with the same traditions of Islam that it invokes
233. Id. art. 39.
234. Id.
235. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 33-35.
236. Whether one possesses Saudi citizenship conditions the scope of rights and duties in
articles 27, 31, 34, 36, and 43. In contrast, article 47 affords the right to litigate to citizens and
residents alike on an equal basis. See Basic Law, supra note 188.
237. See SHAME OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD, supra note 90, at 52-77. For examples of the
serious ill-treatment of nonSaudis, sometimes solely on the basis of their status as aliens, see
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT t991, at 196-98.
238. The legitimacy of the nation State in Islam remains a contentious issue. Given the
pervasiveness of the nation State in practice, Islamic doctrine is struggling to come to terms
with it. For background on this subject, see JAMES PISCATORI, ISLAM IN A WORLD OF NATION-
STATES (1986).
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as inviolable when seeking to justify other policies, such as those that
subjugate women. As in the case of the Cairo Declaration, one sees that
the adherence vel non to Islamic norms is highly selective.
Just as resident Muslim aliens are denied the equality with indigenous
Muslims that would be afforded under traditional interpretations of
Islamic law, so too are resident nonMuslim aliens, who are denied the
freedom to follow their own customs and carry out their religious obser-
vances that they would expect to enjoy under such interpretations. Article
41 in the chapter on rights and duties requires that residents in Saudi
Arabia "shall abide by its laws and shall observe the values of Saudi
society and shall respect its traditions and sentiments." '239 Through this
provision, the Saudi government presumably intends to reaffirm its policy
of forcing the expatriate community to comply with Saudi versions of
Islamic norms - such as the bans on consumption of alcohol, driving by
women, or religious worship by nonMuslims. The incidents of serious
harassment of nonMuslim expatriates that were reported in 1993 indicated
that "the values of Saudi society" permit raids, arrests, beatings, imprison-
ment, and torture of nonMuslims caught in the act of peacefully wor-
shipping in private. 24°
7. The Failure to Endorse International Law
There are passing references to international law; for example, it is
mentioned in article 70, where it is stated that international treaties are
approved by royal decrees.24' There is no indication what should happen
in the case of an international treaty that is approved by the King but that
is arguably not in conformity with Islamic law. Article 42 provides that
"the state shall grant political asylum when the public interest demands
this," implying that it will only grant political asylum in cases where it
is in the Saudi public interest to do so, regardless of the humanitarian
stakes in the case, a provision that is at odds with international norms.242
This position also conflicts with its counterpart in the Cairo Declara-
tion. The Saudi regime does not have a record of showing sympathy for
239. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 41.
240. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI ARABIA: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, supra note
38, at 7-12. The nonMuslims victimized by this mistreatment were largely Asian expatriate
laborers like Filipinos, Indians, Koreans, and Sri Lankans, whose embassies lacked the power
of the major Western countries to register effective protests against mistreatment of their
nationals.
241. Basic Law, supra note 188, art. 70.
242. Id. art. 42. See also Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 39 n.32.
243. Article 12 of the Cairo Declaration provides that every person, if persecuted, is
entitled to seek asylum in another country, and that the country of refuge shall ensure his
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refugees and asylum seekers, 2" and this provision does not suggest that
it intends to follow international norms for treating political refugees.
8. Summation
The deficiencies of the Saudi Basic Law by the standards of interna-
tional human rights norms are patent. In addition to those already men-
tioned, other deficiencies include the lack of provision for freedom of
association and assembly and the failure to protect freedom of thought.
The Basic Law affords no guarantee of due process and no right to a fair
trial in public, to the assistance of counsel, or to appeal.245 There is no
indication that reforms in the judiciary are envisaged that could satisfy the
critics of the legal system.2l
In most respects, the Saudi Basic Law falls below the already in-
adequate standards of the Cairo Declaration. In addition to the disparities
that have already been noted, the Cairo Declaration established a right to
247privacy, to express one's opinion freely (in a formulation the deficien-
cies of which have already been indicated),248 of equality before the law
(in a formulation the deficiencies of which have already been indicat-
ed),249 and a presumption of innocence, 250 as well as a provision which
bans sex-based discrimination in wages, 25' and a guarantee against torture
or cruel and unusual punishment. 252 Article l(a) of the Cairo Declaration
states that no one has the right to enslave people, a principle that is also
not replicated in the Saudi Law.253 These significant disparities belie the
official Saudi professions of commitment to the Islamic human rights
model set forth in the Cairo Declaration, which were made at the 1993
protection until he reaches safety unless the asylum claim is based on an act which the shari'a
regards as a crime. Cairo Decl. art. 12, in Declaration of the OC, supra note 69, at 7.
244. See Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 39-41.
245. For a discussion of Saudi practice in relating to criminal procedure, see SHAME OF
THE HOUSE OF SAUD, supra note 90, at 30-51; Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 26-27, 55.
246. On the inadequacy of the judiciary, said to lack independence and to administer
justice in an arbitrary fashion, see Empty Reforms, supra note 37, at 21-23.
247. Cairo Decl. art. 18(b), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 9.
248. Id. art. 22, at 10.
249. Id. art. 19(a), at 9.
250. Id. art. 19(e).
251. Id. art. 13, at 7.
252. Id. art. 20, at 9. With regard to the Saudi failure to prohibit torture or cruel and
unusual punishment, it seems relevant that Saudi Arabia has not become a party to the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984).
253. Cairo Deci. art. 1l(a), in Contribution of the 0IC, supra note 69, at 6.
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World Human Rights Conference. 254 Another disparity lies in the un-
equivocal affirmation of the divine right of Saudi Kingship. Freed from
the need to accommodate the variety of regimes in the Muslim world,
which includes Iran's theocracy as well as military dictatorships, monar-
chies, and sundry emirates and sultanates, and the rare democracy such
as Turkey, which had prevented the Cairo Declaration from making
specific stipulations about what form of government Islam required, the
Saudi royal family insured that their Basic Law endorsed the divine right
of Saudi Kingship. Far from embodying a definitive Islamic version of
rights, the Saudi Basic Law disregards the rights of Saudi citizens in the
process of reinforcing the existing system of family rule in the Arabian
peninsula, ratifying the dynasty's long-standing opposition to democrati-
zation and any granting of greater rights and freedoms to the Saudi
people.
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTRUCTS
A. Dissident Muslim Voices
Before dissecting the Iranian and Saudi stances at the 1993 Vienna
Conference, it is illuminating to contrast the official positions on Islamic
human rights with the radically different perspectives of Muslims in
nongovernmental human rights organizations (NGOs). Muslims who
support the universality of human rights view with profound skepticism
governments' appeals to Islam to justify their human rights violations.
The views of such Muslims deserve to be considered before jumping to
the conclusion that it is Islamic culture that is being assaulted and
insulted when Western nations or international organizations decry
governmental human rights violations and call for the universal obser-
vance of international human rights norms. Far from charging Western
nations and international organizations with cultural insensitivity, indepen-
dent human rights organizations in the Middle East have encouraged
outsiders to criticize human rights violations and to express support for
their domestic initiatives on behalf of human rights, and they have
collaborated with intemational human rights organizations that were
likewise committed to international norms.255
254. See infra text accompanying notes 312-15.
255. Based on the author's personal experience researching human rights issues, they
cooperate with institutions such as Amnesty International, the Federation Internationale des
Droits de I'Homme, the International Commission of Jurists, The International Committee of
the Red Cross, Middle East Watch, Africa Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights.
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Independent NGOs that are founded for the defense of human rights
in Muslim countries have spearheaded campaigns to improve respect for
human rights. Such NGOs proliferated throughout the Middle East and
North Africa in the 1980s in the face of daunting obstacles and dan-
gers.256 One of the most important of the NGOs is the Arab Organization
for Human Rights (AOHR), founded in 1983, which still continues to
operate in the face of daunting obstacles. Like other major independent
human rights organizations, it espouses the human rights standards set
forth in international law.257
Because of the high level of repression and the intolerance of dissent
in Saudi Arabia, independent human rights organizations have been
unable to function inside the country. 258 Thus, it was a startling develop-
ment when the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, the first
independent human rights group seeking to operate inside Saudi Arabia,
emerged on May 3, 1993, only to be banned a mere thirteen days later.259
As punishment for setting up this Committee, four university professors
and a civil servant were dismissed and two lawyers were banned from
practicing.2" The AOHR reported that about 400 supporters of the group
had been arrested and that more than 10,000 Saudis had signed a petition
supporting the Committee.26'
256. See, e.g., the collection of articles on human rights in MIDDLE E. REP., Nov.-Dec.
1987; KEVIN DWYER, ARAB VOICES: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(1991); Susan Waltz, Making Waves: the Political Impact of Human Rights Groups in North
Africa, 29 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 481 (1991); and numerous reports by Africa Watch, Middle
East Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights on the treatment of human rights
activists. Even in the extremely inhospitable setting of Syria, human rights activists pursue their
work - and suffer the expected consequences. See Syria, Human Rights Workers on Trial,
NEWS FROM MIDDLE E. WATCH, Mar. 9, 1992. For a discussion of the fates of independent
human rights organizations in Iran and Saudi Arabia, see infra text accompanying notes
260-64, 282-85.
257. See Adib al-Jadir, Forward to the Special Edition on Human Rights in the Arab
World, 9 J. ARAB. AFF. 1, 2-3 (1990). The author's own human rights activity has entailed
contacts with human rights NGOs from Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. All of
them refer to the international human rights norms, like the UDHR and the subsequent rights
conventions; not one of them utilizes an "Islamic" version of human rights. On the efforts of
individual Moroccans to have international human rights norms recognized, in lieu of norms
supposedly derived from distinctive Moroccan values, see Mayer, Moroccans, supra note 170.
258. Saudis had joined the Gulf National Forum, a movement set up in 1992 to promote
democracy and freedom of expression in the Gulf region, but they met with other members in
the relatively free setting of Kuwait. See Diana Abdallah, Gulf Democrats Set up Regional
Pressure Group, Reuter Library Report, May 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ALLWLD File.
259. See Arab Group Condemns Saudi Action on Rights, Reuter Library Report, May 16,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Arab Group]; Helga
Graham & Marie Colvin, Saudi Royals Act to Quell First Open Opposition, SUNDAY TIMES,
May 16, 1993, at 18.
260. See F.B.I.S. (NES-93-092), May 14, 1993, at 19-20.
261. See F.B.I.S. (NES-93-093), May 17, 1993, at 37.
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Naturally, the regime invoked Islamic reasons for the banning and
sought to cast aspersions on the members' motives. The official media
maintained that, since Saudi Arabia was already implementing "God's
law," there was no need for an organization to speak about rights; it also
attacked the members of the Committee for behaving "as tools in the
hands of suspicious people who do not wish good things for this country
and its people. 262
The Saudi regime took the precaution of securing a ruling from the
Council of senior religious scholars to support the banning of the or-
ganization. The Council attacked the new Committee, denouncing it as if
it had been proven that the Committee was acting in concert with persons
who belonged to terrorist and extremist groups and who utilized "the
cover of religion to spread corruption among people," while themselves
"living in isolated towers away from actual life and far from the real
Islam. '263 The Council referred to groups - presumably fundamentalists
- in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia as "wild vicious beasts" hiding behind
the banner of Islam, and asserted that the Committee was "a tool to
execute this extremist plot in this secure country" and a "terrorist ploy in
the name of Islam.' ,2 ' Buttressed by this ruling, the Saudi authorities
could claim that they were banning the new Committee for religious
reasons. However, outside observers were not equally convinced that
there was an Islamic basis for the banning; the AOHR, for example,
expressed its "shock and sadness" at this ruling, pointing out that the
scholars had offered no evidence to support the ban.265
Despite the prompt clampdown, the inauguration of this independent
human rights Committee provided additional, concrete evidence of
divisions inside Saudi Arabia on rights questions. Official pretensions that
there was one single normative version of human rights that was founded
on Saudi culture and religion were exposed as specious.
The human rights Committee manifested its dissent from the official
Saudi construct of Islam, asserting the Islamic character of its own
262. See F.B.I.S. (NES-93-092), May 14, 1993, at 19.
263. See Opinion: Saudi "Human Rights Committee" A Tool for Religious Extremists,
ARAB TIMES, May 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
264. Id.
265. See Arab Group, supra note 259. The AOHR also claimed that the banning violated
the commitments made by Saudi Arabia in agreeing to the Cairo Declaration, which, in article
22, had allowed for freedom of opinion within a system of Islamic law. Of course, article 22
had left full discretion to governments to decide what Islamic limits should be imposed on the
expression of opinions. See generally supra text accompanying notes 110-14. Acting as an
advocate, the AOHR may have decided to overlook the problematic aspects of the religious
qualifications that had been included in the article.
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principles and claiming that its actions were inspired by Islamic law.26
It professed to realize "the difference between human rights as decreed
in Islam and human rights in other countries. ''267 There was, therefore,
reason to doubt whether members of this organization were dedicated to
human rights as established in international law. Not only did they appeal
to a distinctive Islamic version of human rights, but they also came from
conservative Wahhabi milieus. The religious orientation of the member-
ship prompted doubts about the genuineness of the Committee's support
for human rights, so that when the Committee indicated its desire to open
dialogue with Saudi liberals, a leading liberal figure refused, saying that
he mistrusted the members, challenging them to demonstrate their
moderation by making statements on women's rights.26' The members'
previous involvement in the denunciations of the women's driving
demonstration in Riyadh in November 1990, also raised questions about
their professed concern for women's rights and made them suspect in
liberal milieus.269 However, these same conservative religious credentials
effectively immunized the members from the charges of being "Western-
ized secularists," which the Saudi religious establishment normally hurls
at any critics of the regime. The very fact of the members' impeccable
standing in conservative religious circles seems to have emboldened them
to speak out; they knew that the royal family could not deal too roughly
with them without risking the alienation of essential elements of its own
traditional power base among conservative elements in Saudi society. 270
Some of the Committee's stated objectives replicated the concerns
that had been expressed earlier by other critics of the Saudi regime. The
Committee stated that its objectives were to fight oppression and injustice
and to secure the release of political prisoners. 27' According to one report,
the new Committee called for human rights, democracy, and the right of
men and women to vote, and it spoke of the need to end corruption in the
royal family.272 According to another report it also demanded an end to
the Kingdom's strong ties to the United States, 273 ties that had been
266. See F.B.I.S. (NES-93-093), May 17, 1993, at 38.
267. See Saudi Rights Groups Says It is Not Out to Stir Trouble, Reuter Library Report,
June 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
268. See Kathy Evans, Saudi Rights Group Seeks Dialogue with Opposition As Police
Question Leaders, GUARDIAN, May 17, 1993, at 8.
269. See Mamoun Fandy, New Crackdown on Rights in Riyadh Must Stop, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 21, 1993, at 18.
270. See Graham & Colvin, supra note 259, at 18.
271. F.B.I.S. (NES-93-093), May 17, 1993, at 38.
272. Kathy Evans, Fundamental Difficulties, GUARDIAN, May 15, 1993, at 27.
273. Id.
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strengthened during the Gulf War to the displeasure of Saudi conserva-
tives. Further, it demanded changes in the judicial system and the labor
laws, and called for elections like those that had been held in Kuwait and
Yemen.274 It reportedly called on Saudi citizens to report any kind of
injustice or discrimination. 275 The call for elections by these religious
conservatives presented an interesting contrast to King Fahd's statement,
in 1992, which ruled out free elections on the pretext that they were not
suited to the traditional Arab societies of the Gulf.276 These Saudi sub-
jects, although archconservatives, obviously did not share his views.
Moreover, the decision of the Committee members to voice their con-
cerns, not merely in terms of religious precepts but also in terms of
human rights and democracy, indicated the extent to which conservative
religious milieus recognized the popular resonance of such concepts and
their awareness of the frustrations felt by Saudi citizens, who had wit-
nessed free elections in Kuwait (October 1992) and in Yemen (April
1993).7 7
That Shi'i, liberal Saudis, and Saudi women had been restive was
already well known; with the emergence of the demands by the new
Committee, it appeared that, even in conservative Wahhabi circles,
dissatisfaction with Saudi autocracy was growing. To ensure that the
impact of this dissent from the official construct of Islam was minimized,
the Committee had to be throttled in its infancy.
In Iran, just as in Saudi Arabia, criticisms of the government's human
rights policies by independent individuals and NGOs have been sup-
pressed, regardless of where the critics figured in the local political
spectrum and regardless of whether they were secular or claimed Islamic
authority for their views.278 One liberal, who is committed to working
within an Islamic framework and who has stood up to the post-revolu-
tionary clerical regime and consistently supported human rights, is Mehdi
274. Fandy, supra note 269.
275. Id.
276. See Youssef Ibrahim, Saudi King Rules Out Free Election, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1992, at A6.
277. The Saudi Government itself was showing nervousness about the appeal and
potentially destabilizing impact of the democratic model in neighboring Yemen. See Eric
Watkins, Success of Yemeni elections prompts worries for Saudis, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 1993,
at 4.
278. A prime victim of the regime's repression of dissent has been a leftist movement
promoting a Marxist-influenced version of Islam. For an account of this leftist movement, see
ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, THE IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN (1989). Spokespersons for the mojahedin
have been vigorous in their denunciations of the regime's human rights record and its
reactionary construct of Islam. See, e.g., SECRETARIAT OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE
OF IRAN, HUMAN RIGHTS BETRAYED: GALINDO POHL'S IRAN REPORT UNDER SCRUTINY (1990).
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Bazargan.279 In 1961, Bazargan had been one of the founders of the
Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), a party that campaigned for human
rights and democracy using Islamic references. 20 After the 1979 revolu-
tion, Bazargan served briefly as Iran's first Prime Minister, before
running afoul of the conservative clerics who were consolidating their
control over the government and Iran's political life. Bazargan and
members of the LMI, to which Iran's clerical regime has refused to
accord legal recognition, subsequently suffered persecution when their
demands for human rights and democratic freedoms put them at odds
with the regime's fundamentalist policies.281 Despite the dangers, their
protests continued. Twenty-one associates of Bazargan were arrested and
nine were imprisoned in June 1990 after ninety liberals signed a petition
criticizing governmental repression and demanding respect for the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Iranian Constitution.282 Such calls for the
government to abide by its own, supposedly "Islamic," rights principles
were necessarily regarded as subversive, because the regime's rights
philosophy did not allow for citizens using any rights principles, whether
Islamic or otherwise, to hold it accountable or to attempt to constrain its
repression.
It seemed that only Bazargan's advanced age (eighty-six) and great
moral authority stood between him and the fate that had befallen his
fellow dissidents. To discourage further appeals for adherence to human
rights norms, the regime also dissolved the Association to Defend the
Freedom and Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation in June 1990. This
association, which had been established to promote human rights and the
rule of law, included members who had also been involved in sending the
1990 letter.283 Eight of them were pardoned in April 1992284 after their
imprisonment had aroused the concern of the international human rights
community and prompted calls for their release.285
279. For a general account of his career, see H.E. CHEHABI, IRANIAN POLITICS AND
RELIGIOUS MODERNISM: THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN UNDER THE SHAH AND
KHOMEINI (1990).
280. See id. at 156-60.
281. See id. at 278-304.
282. See Freedom Movement of Iran, IBC USA, Nov. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Iran File; Iran: Political Dissidents, Held for Over a Year, Are Reportedly Sentenced,
NEWS FROM MIDDLE E. WATCH, Sept. 3, 1991 [hereinafter Iran: Political Dissidents].
283. See Iran: Political Dissidents, supra note 282.
284. See Iran: Eight Associates of Former Prime Minister Pardoned by Ayatollah
Khamenei, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., May 15, 1992, at 24.
285. See, e.g., ALl ARDALAN, LAWYERS COMMITTEE RELEASE, ACTION UPDATE: ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN (Sept. 1991).
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Although Iran was nominally a democracy, in actuality, no parties
challenging the official Islamic ideology and attendant rights policies
were allowed to contest elections. In the June 11, 1993, presidential
elections, in which President Rafsanjani's reelection was a foregone
conclusion, Bazargan's movement did not even try to field a candidate.286
Bazargan continued to speak out, lamenting that all dissenting voices had
been silenced, all opposition eliminated, and that the regime controlled all
the media. He complained of the lack of freedom of assembly and
association, which made it impossible to create a party.287 In Bazargan's
view, a revolution that had sought to establish freedom, independence,
and justice based upon Islam had been betrayed by Iran's clerics.288 The
expression of discordant opinions by such a devout Muslim and respected
human rights advocate undermined the Iranian government's pretensions
to be merely following the dictates of Islam in its rights policies.
Just before the onset of the Vienna Conference, the Iranian Parliament
decided to establish a human rights committee. It was officially "no-
ngovernmental." However, with five out of the seventeen members of the
Executive Council from the Parliament and with Sa'id Raja'i Khorasani
as the head, the independence of the Committee was doubtful. 289 Raja'i
Khorasani is Iran's former U.N. ambassador and a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Parliament. Indeed, this Committee appeared
to be a thinly disguised governmental human rights organ designed to
polish the regime's image in the area of human rights. In setting up such
a Committee, Iran was acting like other countries that have been eager to
improve their international images after criticisms by NGOs. Realizing
that NGOs have more credibility in the human rights fora than do
governmental spokespersons, a number of countries have found it ex-
pedient to set up human rights organizations that superficially resemble
NGOs but that actually function as instruments of government propaganda.29°
286. See Charles Richards, Mullahs Look Askance as the Iranians Look to the West,
INDEPENDENT, June 20, 1993, at 11.
287. Mouna Naim, Iran: Election Presidentielle, LE MONDE, June 10, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, Le Monde file.
288. Richards, supra note 286.
289. See Feuilherade, supra note 27. Raja'i Khorasani's statement indicating his antipathy
to international human rights norms is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 19-20.
290. As these have proliferated, they have come to be known among authentic human
rights advocates as "GONGOs," an acronym for "governmental non-governmental organiza-
tions." An example of a GONGO is the Sudan Human Rights Association that was set up
after the fundamentalist Bashir regime seized power in 1989. This entity replaced an
independent organization by the same name, whose members were forced to flee to foreign
exiles, and had as its mission "protecting the reputation of the Sudan, fending off attacks on
the Sudanese government and way of life by the western media and western organizations,
and refuting unfounded allegations concerning the Sudan." See Sudan: Sudanese Human
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In short, both Iran and Saudi Arabia had repressed dissident voices
calling for greater democratic freedoms and the recognition of human
rights, voices that did not proclaim that Islamic culture was an impedi-
ment to such aspirations. These dissident voices were echoing the de-
mands for enhanced human rights set forth by NGOs throughout the
Middle East, demands that had to be suppressed lest they discredit the
authority of the official constructs of Islamic rights on which both
regimes relied to legitimize their opposition to international rights norms.
Thus, Iran and Saudi Arabia both attended the June 1993 World Con-
ference on Human Rights with full awareness that they were representing
only one side of a contested issue.
B. Universality versus Cultural Relativism at the Second World
Conference on Human Rights
The Twenty-first Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held
in Karachi, Pakistan, in April 1993, and issued a resolution in anticipation
of the upcoming World Conference on Human Rights.29' OIC foreign
ministers reconfirmed the position on human rights that they had previ-
ously endorsed in the Cairo Declaration, hailing "the contribution that can
be made to the World Conference by Islamic countries on the basis of the
valuable guidelines" contained in the Cairo Declaration. 92 It also reaf-
firmed its commitment to these guidelines and those in the OIC Charter
and the U.N. Charter.293 However, there was no affirmation of any
commitment to the principles set forth in the International Bill of Human
Rights, a significant omission.
This OIC conference expressed itself ambiguously on the question of
the universality of.human rights, referring to universality at various points
but at the same time maintaining that "while human rights are universal
in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting, taking into account the
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds and the principal
legal systems., 294 The strategy indicated a preference for avoiding a direct
challenge to universality via the endorsement of a qualified universality,
one that would have to be adjusted to accommodate various cultural,
religious, and other factors. The position adopted on the rights of women
reveals that the OIC foreign ministers meant to give priority to "cultural
Rights Organizations, NEWS FROM ArR. WATCH, Nov. 4, 1991, at 6.
291. See Contribution of the OIC, supra note 69, at 1.
292. Id. at 11.
293. Id. at 12.
294. Id.
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and religious" factors over human rights, because they reaffirmed the
OIC's "strong commitment in accordance with article 6 of the 'Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam' to the promotion and protection
of the rights of women., 295 In reality, the Declaration made no commit-
ment to the promotion and protection of women's rights. One recalls that
article 6 of the Declaration had not advanced women's rights beyond
what they had been in medieval versions of shari'a law and had offered
nothing approaching the guarantees of women's rights afforded by
international law; 296 only article 13 made an advance in women's rights
by prohibiting discrimination in pay. Thus, the statement that women's
rights were to be promoted and protected in accordance with article 6 of
the Cairo Declaration was tantamount to an announcement that the OIC
was repudiating the rights that women enjoyed under international human
rights conventions.
Given the determination on the part of a number of developing
country delegations to challenge the principle of the universality of
human rights, it was natural that the second World Conference on Human
Rights, which was held in Vienna in June 1993, should become preoc-
cupied with that topic. Among the proponents of the universality of
human rights were U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who
rejected various Asian and Middle Eastern States' challenges to the
universality of human rights, asserting that "[w]e cannot let cultural
relativism become the last refuge of repression., '29' The U.N. Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian Copt, also endorsed the
universality of human rights.29
It was to be expected that Iran would play a prominent role in the
debate on the universality of human rights. The Iranian delegation
represented a regime that had been in the forefront of those attacking the
universality of human rights and seeking to forestall the development of
a more effective rights enforcement machinery. However, Iran was far
from alone; its associates in this endeavor included countries as diverse
as China, Cuba, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Syria, Indonesia, Pakistan,
and Yemen.299 All of the countries that joined in fighting against univer-
295. Id. at 14.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
297. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary With Culture, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1993, at 5.
298. Isabelle Vichniac, M. Boutros-Ghali difend les principes de l'universaliti des droits
de l'homme et de leur garantie internationale, LE MONDE, June 16, 1993, at 5.
299. See Roger Thurow, U.N. Conference Plagued by Demands That Rights Must Bow to
National Goals, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1993, at 7. Already at the final preparatory meeting for
the Vienna Conference, Syria and Yemen attempted to block a paper stating that human rights
[Vol. 15:307
Universal versus Islamic Human Rights
sality had human rights records that were, to say the least, spotty; many
had been guilty of egregious violations of human rights. It was therefore
in their political interest to find rationales for asserting the nonapplicabili-
ty of international rights norms.
Having posited that "Western" human rights concepts "differ fun-
damentally from those prevalent elsewhere in Islamic, Confucian, Hindu
or Buddhist cultures," 3" Huntington might be said to have foreseen that
the Western propagation of human rights meant "the emergence of a
dynamic of conflict" that would pit "the West against the rest,"301 thereby
anticipating some aspects of the antirights coalition that appeared at the
Vienna Conference.3 2 Indeed, in a subsequent article, he argued that the
confrontation between "the West" and "a coalition of Islamic and Con-
fucian States rejecting Western universalism" at the Vienna Human
Rights Conference confirmed the accuracy of his paradigm of a "clash of
civilizations. "303 However, Huntington seems not to have scrutinized
critically the relevant Saudi and Iranian statements, apparently taking their
self-serving claims at face value. He also ignored the significance of what
transpired at the Conference below the level of the official delegations,
and failed to consider the real basis for Iran's alliance with China.
As already noted, Iran's government did claim to be speaking on
behalf of Islam, although in reality it represented only an unusual
Twelver Shi'i model of theocratic rule, the popularity of which it was
unwilling to put to the test in free elections.3° In contrast, few govern-
ments in the world could be less qualified to claim to speak on behalf of
Asian religion and culture than the Communist Chinese regime, which
had only come to power in 1949. Adherents of atheist Marxist-Leninist
ideology, an ideology borrowed from German and Russian ideologues,
the Chinese Communists have repressed both Asian and Western reli-
gions. 315 Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, the
Communist regime encouraged violent and destructive rampages that
damaged many aspects of China's cultural heritage. Despite some recent
were universal. Their obstructionism prevented the completion of the draft declaration before
the Conference. Mark Clayton, Rights Controversy Clouds U.N. Conference, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 10, 1993, at 7.
300. Huntington, The Islamic-Confucian Connection, supra note 11, at 19.
301. Id. (quoting Kishore Mahbubani).
302. Of course, other aspects were not explained, such as why Cuba's position was not
distinguishable from China's "Confucian" one or why the Dalai Lama, one of the most eminent
Asian Buddhist leaders, emerged as one of the most forceful spokespersons for universality. See
infra text accompanying notes 326-29.
303. Huntington, If Not Civilizations, What?, supra note 2, at 188.
304. See supra text accompanying note 286.
305. See FREDERIC KAPLAN ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA TODAY 268-70 (1979).
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signs of liberalization, religion continues to be repressed, and in 1992 the
Minister of Public Security labelled religion as one of the six hostile
forces that could undermine the government.3 6 In addition to persecuting
believers in China, after its 1949-50 takeover of Tibet, China ravaged
Tibetan Buddhist culture, razing thousands of temples and monasteries
and persecuting and killing Buddhist monks and nuns. 307 Because the
Chinese Communists' record made them singularly ill-qualified to
represent Asian religion or civilization or to claim that fidelity to Asian
culture mandated their opposition to universal human rights,3°8 they chose
the strategy of appealing to national sovereignty. Like other Communist
States in the past, China elected to portray human rights issues as pertain-
ing to its internal affairs, asserting "the right of each country to formulate
its own policies on human rights protection. '' 309 According to the Chinese
statement at the Vienna Conference: "[T]here are no absolute individual
rights and freedoms, except those prescribed by and within the framework
of law. Nobody shall place his own rights and interests above those of the
state. '31 Through their cooperation in opposing the universality of rights,
Iran and China showed that appeals to culture and religion, on the one
hand, and to national sovereignty, on the other, were equally serviceable
and, in practice, interchangeable for countries sharing the same political
goal - finding ways to discredit external criticisms of shaky human
rights records. The radically opposed policies of the two countries on
religious matters indicated that religion was not the crucial variable in
306. See Loretta Tofani, China's Catholic Voices Rising: Though hounded by government,
an underground church thrives, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 28, 1993, at Al.
307. See PRADYUMNA P. KARAN, THE CHANGING FACE OF TIBET 70-71 (1976); Robert
Adams, Tibet: Brutal Chinese Policies Crush Local Buddhist Culture, Inter Press Service, May
12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD file; Fox Butterfield, Tibet's Days of
Despair and China's Harsh Response, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1989, at A3; Daniel Southerland,
Tibetan Monasteries Choked by China, Monk Declares; Buddhist Education Being Restricted,
Leader Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993, at GIl. In addition, the Chinese treatment of
Tibetan Buddhism is reviewed in reports issued by Asia Watch and in the China sections of
the annual reports of Amnesty International. See also JOHN AVEDON, IN EXILE IN THE LAND
OF SNOWS (1984); DAVID PATT, A STRANGE LIBERATION: TIBETAN LIVES IN CHINESE HANDS
(1992); GEORGE PATTERSON, REQUIEM FOR TIBET (1990).
308. Although implausible, it was not impossible for the Chinese government to try to
exploit a cultural defense. Thus, after the Vienna Conference, Wu Jianmin, a foreign ministry
spokesman, sought to defend China's human rights record by asserting that the conflict with
the West represented a cultural misunderstanding, asserting that Asians give "greater emphasis
to the rights of the people than privileges of a few." See Daniel Williams, Chinese Leader
Plays to Audience at Home; Jian, Who May Succeed Deng, Varies Little From Script, WASH.
POST, Nov, 21, 1993, at A34.
309. Matthew D'Ancona, China Leads Asian Challenge to the Principle of Universal
Human Rights, TIMES [London], June 17, 1993, at 13.
310. Id.
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shaping their human rights policies, and this raised doubts as to whether
Huntington's "Confucian-Islamic connection ' 311 was not something of a
misnomer.
Once the Conference was in session, there was a noteworthy speech
by Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal, who headed Saudi Arabia's
delegation. He offered a ringing endorsement of the Cairo Declaration,
claiming that Islamic law was "a comprehensive system for universal
human rights," meant not as moral exhortations but as "legislative
orders," and contained "all the legal texts necessary for ensuring their
implementation and enforcement, while combining them with implicit
duties. ,3 2 The source of human rights in Islam was the Creator of the
* universe, according to the Saudi foreign minister, and, in Saudi Arabia,
laws gave the State the primary responsibility for the protection of human
rights in accordance with Islamic law.313 He asserted that Saudi Arabia
had been in the forefront of the OIC members that "ratified" the Cairo
Declaration,1 4 considering that it provided:
a proper foundation for positive and practical international coopera-
tion, and which would flow into the main stream [sic] of universal
support for human rights and freedoms, coming as an expression of
the will of over one billion people which gives it a truly universal
character by any measure. While the principles and objectives upon
which human rights are founded are of a universal nature their
application requires consideration for the diversity of societies,
taking into account their various historical, cultural, and religious
backgrounds and legal systems.315
That is, following the line taken by the OIC foreign ministers in April,
the Prince offered support for a qualified universality - as did the
Iranian representative at the Conference.316 These delegations thus sought
311. See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, supra note 2, at 45-48. It should be
noted that Huntington is inconsistent in his usage of the term; sometimes Huntington phrases
it as the "Islamic-Confucian" connection, other times as the "Confucian-Islamic" connection.
312. Islam Guarantees Human Rights, Says Saud, RIYADH DAILY, June 17, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Saudi File.
313. Id.
314. This was an odd choice of words, since the Declaration is not a treaty.
315. Id. The language resembles some of the wording in the statement emanating from the
OIC conference in April, 1993. See supra text accompanying note 294.
316. The latter asserted that human rights were universal and not subject to cultural
relativism, but argued that "drawing from the richness and experience of all cultures, and
particularly those based on divine religions, which have throughout history provided the
primary source and inspiration for ... human rights, would only logically serve to enrich
human rights concepts." See Dr. H.E. Mohammad-Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister and
Head of Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement before the World Conference
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to disguise their real position, which was tantamount to rejecting the
fundamental premises and core values of the international principles.
They apparently feared that, if they candidly admitted the extent of their
opposition to human rights, they would be courting international op-
probrium. Instead, they took pains to associate their position with one that
a Muslim who was truly supportive of human rights might legitimately
put forward - that cross-cultural differences might need to be taken into
account in fine-tuning human rights standards and their interpretation. 3 7
At no point did the Saudi representative offer any candid acknowledge-
ment of the vast gulf that separated the rights and freedoms set forth in
the International Bill of Human Rights and the eviscerated "Islamic"
counterparts that had been set forth in the Cairo Declaration or in the still
flimsier rights in the Saudi Basic Law. Thus, like many other proponents
of Islamic versions of human rights, he wanted to have it both ways: to
maintain that Islamic culture warranted a culturally distinctive approach
to rights, thereby providing a pretext for deviating from international
norms, and to present Islamic versions of human rights as if they were
basically consonant with the formulations found in international law.
The Saudi foreign minister seemed to be making the case for inter-
national acceptance of Islamic human rights as a plausible and legitimate
alternative to the human rights protections afforded under international
law, an alternative that expressed the will and the cultural aspirations of
all the world's Muslims. In presenting this Islamic model as efficacious,
he chose to ignore the fact that Saudi Arabia and other OIC States were
not carrying out programs that would ensure protections even for the
minimal rights that it afforded. On the contrary, they referred to Islamic
human rights exclusively in situations when they needed rationales for
denying internationally protected rights, as when they sought to rational-
ize according women second class status or executing apostates from
Islam. Moreover, he was speaking as if a definitive and efficacious
Islamic model of human rights were embodied in the Cairo Declaration,
on Human Rights 2 (June 18, 1993) (transcript available through the Permanent Mission to the
United Nations of the Islamic Republic of Iran).
317. Calling for taking into account differing cultural traditions does not necessarily mean
that one is seeking to dismantle the protections afforded under international law. Thus, for
example, the prominent Sudanese scholar and proponent of human rights, Abdullahi An-Na'im,
now the executive director of Africa Watch, sees certain Western biases in current interpreta-
tions of international human rights principles. For his argument that amputating the hand of a
thief, when applied to Muslims, should not necessarily be deemed to violate the prohibition of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, see Abdullahi An-Na'im, Toward a
Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning
of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROss-CUL-
TURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 82, at 19-43.
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when, in reality, there had been no consensus supporting the Cairo
Declaration on the part of the world's more than one billion Muslims,
who had never been consulted regarding their views on human rights.
In fact, the Saudi delegation did not receive much public backing
from other Muslim delegations for its position. Although the Cairo
Declaration had been endorsed at the OIC Foreign Ministers' Conference
the previous April, at the Vienna Conference, it turned out that many
Muslim countries were unwilling to go on the record as supporting the
Cairo Declaration in lieu of the rights provided under international law.318
Ultimately, the declaration that emerged from the Conference did not
expressly endorse cultural relativism. Instead the declaration reaffirmed
the universal nature of rights and freedoms, but included a notation of the
significance of regional particularities and required that historical, cul-
tural, and religious backgrounds should be borne in mind." 9 The Con-
ference did little to strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to protect these rights,
a proposal to set up the office of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights having been abandoned due to pressures from hostile developing
country governments.32° This. final declaration might have afforded
stronger protections for rights had the attending NGOs not been barred
from participating in its drafting.
There were essentially two conferences in Vienna; one involved the
official delegations and the other involved the approximately 1,500 NGOs
in attendance.32' In this setting, the genuine human rights activists often
found themselves at odds with the official delegations, which were
engaged in serving and protecting governmental interests. Over their
protests, the NGOs were excluded from the process of drafting the final
declaration, a process that was also closed to media observation.322
Allowing NGO input could have made the document more representative
318. See Liesl Graz, Human Rights: The Vienna Declaration, MIDDLE E. INT'L, July 9,
1993, at 14.
319. See Michael Posner, Reflections on the Vienna Conference, AMERICAN SOC'Y OF
INT'L L. NEWSLETTER, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 19-20.
The Iranian delegation indicated that it would accept the principle of universality in the
final declaration of the Conference, albeit with the reservation that the law of God would
override any international law. See Graz, supra note 318. Other delegations may not have
appreciated the devastating consequences that the Iranian reservation would entail.
320. See Christopher Reardon, U.N. Conference Sustains Universal Nature of Rights,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 28, 1993, at 2.
321. A report on how the Conference appeared from the NGO's perspective is provided
in Upstairs, Downstairs: While Governments Squabbled, The World's Human Rights Com-
munity Went to Work, AMNESTY ACTION, Summer 1993, at 1.
322. See Pamela Bone, Austria: Rights Conference a Sham, Amnesty, AGE (Melbourne),
June 23, 1993, and John West, Amnesty Chief Slams U.N. Rights Conference, Reuter Library
Report, June 30, 1993, both available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
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of the views of persons on the receiving end of governmental human
rights policies. Had that been the case, the text might have included a
denunciation of the exploitation of culture as a rationale for rights
violations. 23 As it was, the NGOs had to resort to the media to vent their
dissatisfaction with the Conference.
Pierre Sane, the Senegalese President of Amnesty International, one
of the most prestigious of the attending NGOs, was able to press his
views outside the Conference. He criticized the exclusion of the NGOs
from the drafting of the final declaration of the Conference and also
condemned the efforts that had been made to dilute human rights.324 In
an article that appeared at the same time as the Conference, Sane pro-
nounced that genuine differences between cultures were being misused to
justify violations of rights by authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia's
and maintained that the arguments did not stand up to the fact that
"people living in the Middle East and Asia are demanding that their
rights be respected. 325
Sane's views were echoed in remarks made by the Dalai Lama in a
speech to the NGOs' section of the Conference after he had been barred,
at China's behest, from addressing the official delegations. As the
Conference facilities were arranged, the section allotted to the NGOs was
physically separated from that of the governmental delegations - an apt
physical representation of the philosophical gulf dividing the governmen-
tal and NGO perspectives. The Dalai Lama, a winner of the Nobel Peace
Prize and the most influential leader of Tibetan Buddhism, received an
enthusiastic reception from the attending NGOs. He criticized China's
position that developing countries could not be bound by Western notions
of human rights, maintaining that the majority of Asians did not agree
with China's position326 - criticism that received support from China's
own dissidents. 327 From this Buddhist monk from one of the countries of
323. See the discussion of the comments of Dorothy Thomas of Human Rights Watch, one
of the attending NGOs, infra text accompanying notes 427-28.
324. See Bone, supra note 322.
325. Pierre Sane, Human Rights and the Clash of Cultures, 10 NEW PERSP. Q. 27 (1993).
326. Raymond Whitaker, Vienna Gives Dalai Lama a Hero's Welcome, INDEPENDENT,
June 16, 1993, at 12.
327. For example, Chinese prodemocracy advocates living in exile in the United States
denounced the decision to bar the Dalai Lama from speaking at the Conference, saying that
they shared his commitment to universality. Sarah Shard, Outlook for World Human Rights
Conference Stormy, Agence France Presse, June 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ALLWLD File. One of China's most famous dissidents, Wei Jingsheng, had in 1992, specifi-
cally attacked Deng Xiaoping's human rights policy, which he characterized as one of allowing
"different countries to use different standards," and asserted that it played into the hands of
"fascist" and "Nazi" thinkers who wanted the world to believe that "concepts of human rights
of white people in the West should not be applied to the Chinese and other 'inferior' nationali-
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the world that had been least affected by Westernization, the NGOs heard
that it was "the inherent nature of all human beings to yearn for freedom,
equality, and dignity," and that it was not only the right of "the global
human family to protest when our brothers and sisters are being treated
brutally, but it is also our duty to do whatever we can to help them. 328
In an interview after the Conference, the Dalai Lama took aim at cultural
relativism, noting that people in positions of power were usually the ones
who said that human rights are culturally determined - not ordinary
citizens.329 None of the spokespersons for the governments that fought
against the universality of human rights enjoyed a fraction of the authori-
ty possessed by the Dalai Lama to represent a nonWestern people or to
speak on behalf of its religion and culture. The Dalai Lama's prompt
dismissal of the cultural relativist argument demonstrates the hollowness
of the thesis that international human rights are incompatible with Asian
civilization.
C. Western Visions of a Monolithic "Islam:" Orientalist Stereotyping
and Cultural Relativism
"Who the hell are they to judge how other countries should behave?
Different peoples and cultures respect different rights - why should
America be able to impose its own values on the rest of the world?
330
These were the acerbic comments of Wilfred Thesiger, a famous British
explorer of the wilder regions of Arabia, the Sudan, Abyssinia, and the
Iraqi marshes, upon hearing a BBC World Service broadcast about what
a later newspaper report called "a United Nations committee on human
rights" in Saudi Arabia in May 1993. This radio news report was received
by Thesiger in Kenya, where he was living in a village in a house made
of cow dung, lamenting the passing of traditional life and decrying
Western influences, which were encroaching on his haven. 33' To Thesiger,
the notion of human rights intruding into Saudi Arabia was offensive.
Like the members of the Saudi establishment who had condemned the
founders of the new human rights Committee, Thesiger viewed human
ties." See Patrick E. Tyler, A Dissident's Letter From Prison To Beijing Will Appear in China,
N.Y. TIMs, Oct. 24, 1993, at A8.
328. Whitaker, supra note 326, at 12.
329. Kevin Griffen, Dalai Lama: He's Utterly Unpretentious in Nature, VANCOUVER SUN,
June 28, 1993, at A8.
330. See Simon Courtauld, The Last Great Explorer, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, May 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
331. On the mindset of the great explorer in this stage of his life, see Christian Tyler, The
Savage in the Three-piece Suit, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at XXIV.
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rights activism in the Saudi context as alien and unnatural and, therefore,
necessarily attributable to foreign initiatives. In actuality, the broadcast,
which seems to have been about the indigenous Saudi human rights
Committee discussed supra,332 and not about "a United Nations commit-
tee," gave no indication that the United States had been involved, or that
it was seeking to impose its values on Saudi Arabians.333 However, like
many Saudis, Thesiger automatically associated any calls for human
rights with "Americans," whom he confessed to disliking,334 and with
U.S. interference in the internal affairs of nations with dissimilar cultures.
The possibility that there could be an indigenous Saudi human rights
movement, that Arab Muslims could choose to adopt political values that
had in the past been associated with Western culture, did not seem to
have occurred to Thesiger.
Thesiger's attitude toward human rights in Saudi Arabia is an apt
example of one facet of Orientalism, the Western mindset that posits a
fundamental difference between the essential natures of "Oriental" culture
(meaning Middle Eastern/Islamic culture) and Western culture, a mindset
that appears to determine Huntington's approach. Thesiger's view is a
heavily romanticized variant of Orientalism. In a recent article, Rhoda
Howard calls persons who accord primacy to cultural values over interna-
tional human rights "cultural absolutists," and she caustically characteriz-
es such romanticizing of the unsullied primitive as follows:
Absolutists' defense of indigenous cultures against universalized
human rights is to a large extent a consequence of their concern that
human rights will encourage the emergence of an individualized,
atomistic, and competitive social world. Absolutists idealize the third
world community, which exemplifies for Western culture the primi-
tive arcadia we have lost, even as the third world displays some of
the worst human rights abuses of early modernization .... [T]he
contemporary primitives of third world societies are not permitted
to be attracted to, to adopt or advocate, individualist ideals of
personal autonomy or human rights. Those individuals from the third
world who do express such ideas are quickly dismissed as
332. See supra text accompanying notes 259-78.
333. The only U.S. connection was the briefing of U.S. diplomats in the Riyadh Embassy
by the leader of the human rights committee. See Saudi Arabia; Human rights committee
member: U.S. diplomats informed of committee's activities, BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, May 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
334. See Courtauld, supra note 330.
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"Westernized;" that is, as unauthentic, offending our view of the
psychological role they play for us.335
A widely discussed critique of the Orientalist mindset and the
accompanying scholarship has been presented by Edward Said,336 who
attacks Orientalism for impeding recognition of the common human
experience shared by East and West. Said's focus is less on the roman-
ticized vision of traditional Arab culture that had entranced explorers like
Thesiger than on the pejorative view of "the Orient" purveyed by certain
Western scholars of the Middle East and Islam, whom Said sees as being
in league with Western colonialism and neoimperialism. According to
Said, because of misplaced emphasis on Islam as the central determinant
of what occurs in Oriental societies, Orientalists have obscured the
diversity and complexity of Muslims' experiences.337 Said proposes that
"'the Orient' is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there
are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically 'different' inhabitants
who can be properly defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or
racial essence proper to that geographical space is ... a highly debatable
idea. ' 338 Huntington's assumption that one can generalize about a
monolithic "Islamic civilization" rests on a similar and equally debatable
construct of "Islam." It is not surprising that Huntington and other
nonspecialists continue to fail to grasp the perils in overstating the role
of Islam and the uniformity of Islamic culture. Despite Said's powerful
335. Rhoda Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HuM, RTS.
Q. 315, 329 (1993) [hereinafter Howard, Cultural Absolutism].
336. See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). He has recently updated his
criticism of the Western overemphasis on Islam to explain developments in the Arab world. See
Edward Said, The Phony Islamic Threat, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 21, 1993, at 62. A Christian
Palestinian American who has long lived in the United States but retains ties to the Arab world,
Said has both an internal and external perspective on developments in Arab societies and
culture, which may in part account for his greater awareness of the complexity of "the Orient"
than Western observers like Huntington display.
337. Said complains that for Arabists and scholars of Islam:
[T]here are still such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche.
Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use
texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian
society. Islam, or a seventh-century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is
assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences
of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics. Cliches about how Muslims
(or Mohammedans, as they are still sometimes called) behave are bandied about with
a nonchalance no one would risk in talking about blacks or Jews. At best, the
Muslim is a "native informant" for the Orientalist.
SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra, at 336. The cliches about Islamic civilization in Huntington's
writing suggest that he has unquestioningly accepted Orientalist perspectives.
338. Id. at 322.
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critique of Orientalism, quintessentially Orientalist works continue to be
published by influential scholars.339
Said's own perspective on these matters has been subjected to
criticism by Professor Sadiq al-'Azm. Like Said, al-'Azm has decried the
assumption that the differences between Western and "Oriental" societies
are "emanations from a certain enduring Oriental (or Islamic) cultural,
psychic, or racial essence ... bearing identifiable fundamental and
unchanging attributes.' 340 However, unlike Said, who characterizes the
Orientalist stereotypes perpetuated by the West as a form of Western
neocolonialism, al-'Azm emphasizes that Western Orientalism is mirrored
by Muslims' own "Orientalism in reverse." He believes that some
Muslims have a tendency to exaggerate the influence of Islam, treating
it as the prime factor in shaping Middle Eastern culture,341 which he finds
"no less reactionary, mystifying, ahistorical, and anti-human" than its
Orientalist counterpart.342 The phenomenon of Orientalism in reverse
manifests itself in the constructs of Islamic human rights advocated by
countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Orientalist stereotyping and manifestations of Orientalism in reverse
would be less likely to shape Westerners' perceptions of Muslims and the
cultures in which they live but for the reinforcement they receive from
powerful cultural relativist currents. Cultural relativism posits that culture
is the source of validity of rules and that, since cultures vary, rules that
are valid within one culture will not necessarily be valid in others. Thus,
cultural relativists elevate tolerance to a paramount value and reject the
legitimacy of external critiques of culturally-based practices.343 Where
human rights are concerned, cultural relativists are inclined to claim that
pressing for the universality of human rights in their international for-
mulations involves a failure to respect the diversity of cultures. 3" In
339. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE
IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989), critically appraised in Ann E. Mayer, Islam Inside and Out, 22
J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 89 (1991). The book posits a monolithic and static Islamic culture,
replete with archaisms, that dominates societies where Muslims live, determining Muslims'
attitudes and conduct and setting "Islamic society" apart from all its counterparts in the West.
340. Sadiq Jalal al-'Azm, Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse, in FORBIDDEN
AGENDAS: INTOLERANCE AND DEFIANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 349, 367 (John Rothschild
comp., 1984) [hereinafter al-'Azm, Orientalism]. Less accessible but valuable analyses of
related problems can be found in MOHAMMED ARKOUN, POUR UNE CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON
ISLAMIQUE (1984).
341. al-'Azm, Orientalism, supra note 340, at 371-72.
342. Id. at 376.
343. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The
Search for Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 345, 353 (1991).
344. For general discussions of the issues in dispute between cultural relativists and
universalists regarding human rights, see id.; see also JACK DONELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN
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particular, partisans of cultural relativism charge that Western critiques of
human rights practices in nonWestern cultures are based on an
ethnocentric assumption of the superiority of Western philosophical and
moral values, which are embedded in international human rights stan-
dards, so that such critiques constitute a form of cultural imperialism. 45
Westerners who adopt a cultural relativist stance on human rights
may do so with the laudable intention of showing sensitivity to and
respect for cultural differences and of avoiding ethnocentricity in their use
of Western-derived rights principles to evaluate nonWestern cultures.
However, in their attempts to show appropriate respect for cultural
differences, Westerners may go overboard; they may exaggerate the
extent to which modern civil and political rights are tied to Western
culture,346 accept constructs of nonWestern cultures that inflate the role
that culture actually plays in shaping attitudes towards human rights, and
minimize the diversity of views that will normally exist within all but the
smallest cultural units.347 With regard to this latter tendency, it has been
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989).
345. See, e.g., ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSAL-
ISM VERSUS RELATIVISM, 47, 77, 86, 139-40 (1990).
346. This is not the place to enter into a review of the literature about how distinctively
"Western" international human rights norms really are, but it should at least be noted that
doubts have been raised about whether human rights are in fact as ineluctably tied to Western
culture as cultural relativists generally seem to presume.
Rhoda Howard, who has examined human rights issues in Africa, has stressed that human
rights principles address universal problems facing all societies due to the adoption of the
nation State, and argues that:
Human rights are a modern concept now universally applicable in principle because
of the social evolution of the entire world toward state societies. The concept of
human rights springs from modern human thought about the nature of justice; it does
not spring from an anthropologically based consensus about the values, needs, or
desires of human beings.
Howard, Dignity, supra note 82, at 81.
She has also argued: "A far stronger case can be made that human rights are not the
dominant Western cultural tradition than that they are. The Western philosophical and cultural
traditions of social justice include not only liberalism, but also communism, corporatism,
racism, and fascism." Howard, Cultural Absolutism, supra note 335, at 335.
Whether there is a philosophical linkage to Western natural rights theory or Western
theology and metaphysics has been deftly challenged in a provocative essay by the Norwegian
philosopher Tore Lindholm. Based on a penetrating analysis of the UDHR, Lindholm has
proposed that the Declaration should be seen as a political, sociological, and historical
interpretation of the peculiar situation of world society in the aftermath of World War II and
that it and its rights concepts derive from "an exercise in 'situated' geopolitical rationality." See
Tore Lindholm, Prospects for Research on the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights: The
Cases of Liberalism and Marxism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A
QUEST FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 82, at 397.
347. In this connection, Donoho has observed that within one society there are usually
diverse social groups with competing interests and values and that one of the serious problems
of cultural relativism is its failure to explain to which one of the groupings within a society one
should refer to in deciding what a society's human rights values are. Donoho, supra note 343,
at 381 n.138.
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noted that cultural relativists tend to totalize the concept of culture, as if
wanting to believe that there must be a single, uniform dominant culture
within any given society. 34 Moreover, they may rely on "misleading
generalizations, stereotypes, and abstractions, thereby reifying their own
conceptions about the societies they describe. ' '349 The result is a tendency
to posit a priori cultural uniformity and to disregard empirical evidence
of diversity.
Where Islam is concerned, the Western inclination to totalize a
nonWestern culture seems especially strong, although even a moment's
reflection should prompt doubts about whether well over a billion people
dwelling in dissimilar social and economic circumstances in countries
ranging from Morocco to Indonesia, all of which are undergoing the
disruptive process of modernization, would be likely to constitute a
meaningful unit or share a common cultural perspective that would
warrant lumping them all together under the rubric of "Islam" or "Islamic
civilization." This totalizing of "Islam" is linked to Orientalist stereotyp-
ing. Indeed, despite the relatively benign motivations that may underlie
cultural relativists' insistence that international human rights norms
should not be applied to Muslim countries, the cultural relativists' stance
has the same corollary as the Orientalists' vision of an inherently back-
ward and static Orient; since international human rights are not part of
Islamic culture, an inferior standard of rights is normal and sufficient
where Muslims are concerned.
Sadiq al-'Azm's work is a valuable corrective to Orientalist stereo-
types and cultural relativist excesses. His erudite, detailed analysis of the
scandal involving The Satanic Verses, a prime example of "Islam" being
invoked against rights and freedom, is especially instructive. Al-'Azm
demonstrates fascinating parallels between Salman Rushdie's work and
that of Western authors like Rabelais, Voltaire, and James Joyce, and he
lays out the political and social issues that Rushdie explored and the
political motivations of both the governments that condemned Rushdie
and the individuals who stood by him.350 He explains why he believes
that Rushdie is merely expressing a broader socio-historical crisis of
Muslim societies, raising issues that persons desperate to defend aspects
348. See Patrick Macklen, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of
Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1343 (1993).
349. Donoho, supra note 343, at 349 n.14.
350. al-'Azm, Importance of Being Earnest, supra note 113. For a variety of "readings"
of the Rushdie affair, see INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, May/June 1989.
351. al-'Azm, Importance of Being Earnest, supra note 113, at 41.
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of a threatened status quo cannot allow to be critically debated.352 Al-
'Azm complains of "the all too evident tendency of western critics and
commentators to depoliticize Rushdie's fiction (and predicament)," '353
noting that the Western history of repression of analogous writing tends
to be forgotten.354 Al-'Azm, who has himself been charged with apostasy
for his critique of Islamic religious thought,355 has reflected on the pattern
of governmental denunciations of authors as apostates and blasphemers
because their work threatens received opinions and vested interests. 6
After reviewing the history of condemnations of works by Middle Eastern
authors who represent a wide range of different positions along the
political spectrum, all of whom suffered the same fate of being labelled
an apostate or blasphemer, al-'Azm asserts that "every one of these affairs
had far more to do with the affairs of state than the affairs of faith. '357 In
short, he insists that patterns of governmental censorship in the Middle
East are politically, not religiously, motivated, even in cases like Salman
Rushdie's, where Khomeini's decree, calling for his execution as an
apostate might suggest that the banning of his book had been motivated
by religious criteria.
As al-'Azm reminds the reader, Arab intellectuals had at great risk
spoken out in vigorous defense of Rushdie,358 and others have since
recorded their expressions of support. 359 Having hoped for a strong
352. See id. at 47-48.
353. Id. at 36. Writing from a different perspective, the author has pointed out how
Khomeini's 1989 fatwa had more to do with politics than religious requirements, the ruling
calling for Rushdie's murder deviating from principles of Islamic law in various respects.
Khomeini also had political reasons in 1989 for trying to position himself at the forefront of
Muslims calling for Rushdie's death. His acceptance of the 1988 ceasefire ending Iran's long
war with its neighbor Iraq had damaged his credentials as the leader of militant Islam.
Moreover, The Satanic Verses poked fun at Khomeini in the guise of a reactionary Imam
opposed to rights and progress. See Ann E. Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1015, 1050-51 n.118 (1991).
354. al-'Azm, Importance of Being Earnest, supra note 113, at 43-44.
355. See id. at 36.
356. See id. at 30-34.
357. Id. at 34. Even where the condemnations of apostates come from nongovernmental
sources, there may be State complicity in the general patterns of intolerance and censorship that
correlate with outbreaks of fundamentalist violence against intellectuals and artists. Thus, Farag
Fuda, one of the most prominent victims of fundamentalism, before his June 1992 assassination
had denounced the Egyptian government for policies that led to a situation where "people pay
with their lives because they express a differing opinion." See Farag Foda [sic), A Murdered
Writer's Prophesy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at A27.
358. al-'Azm, Importance of Being Earnest, supra note 113, at 35.
359. Many of the most distinguished cultural figures from the Arab world have contributed
to a volume honoring Rushdie and expressed their dedication to precisely those liberal values
that Huntington has deemed incompatible with "Islamic civilization." See Alan Riding, Muslim
Thinkers Rally for Rushdie, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993, at C17.
Winter 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
showing of Western solidarity, al-'Azm laments the tepid support that
Rushdie has been afforded by the Western intelligentsia.W He notes the
failure of Sweden's Academy of Letters to support Rushdie, pointing out
that the Academy (which awards the Nobel Prize for literature) has a
history of demonstrating its solidarity with dissident authors in the former
U.S.S.R and Eastern Bloc States. Al-'Azm complains that the parallels
between Rushdie's predicament and the literary dissidents in those former
Communist countries elude many Western observers:
Perhaps the political unconscious looms here much larger than one
would initially have suspected. Perhaps the deep-seated and silent
assumption in the West remains that Muslims are simply not worthy
of serious dissidents, do not deserve them, and are ultimately
incapable of producing them; for, in the final analysis, it is the
theocracy of the Ayatollahs that becomes them.36'
According to al-'Azm, because of Westerners' stereotypes about what is
natural in Islamic culture, they tend to delegitimize the political protests
of Muslim dissidents, presuming that "[s]uch practices as religious
tolerance, democracy, the right of free speech and all that goes with them
are really Western values, which other adjacent cultures (especially
Muslim societies and cultures) find alien, repelling and generally an-
tithetical to their most authentic values .... ,362 Given these presump-
tions, Westerners may condescendingly think of other human beings "as
eternally sealed within their own cultural totalities and/or permanently
condemned to live their lives within the confines of their 'most authentic'
systems of beliefs and values. 363 The kind of Orientalist thinking that al-
'Azm decries means that Muslims' dissent winds up being characterized,
not only by reactionary forces in their own societies, but also by
Westerners as a betrayal of their culture and religion, which Westerners
may presume is necessarily supposed to be static.3 4
In discussing Arab dissent, al-'Azm mentions the case of Mahmud
360. Not all Arab and Muslim writers share this opinion, some complaining that the West
supports Rushdie but not the "Arab Rushdies" who are being killed, just as the West shows
indifference to the suffering of Bosnian Muslims. See id.
361. al-'Azm, Inmportance of Being Earnest, supra note 113, at 2.
362. Id. at 42.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., id. at 2-4. As Edward Said indicates in a discussion of Orientalists like
H.A.R. Gibb and after quoting Gibb, who was impressed by "the aversion of the Muslims from
the thought processes of rationalism," the Orientalist mindset is one ill-disposed to accept the
specter of "Orientals" coming to terms with the modern world: "If Islam is flawed from the
start by virtue of its permanent disabilities, the Orientalist will find himself opposing any
Islamic attempts to reform Islam." SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 336; at 106.
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Muhammad Taha, the progressive modernist thinker, who pressed for
Islamic reform and respect for human rights. He was executed in January
1985 as an apostate for his outspoken criticism of the fundamentalist
policies followed by Jaafar al-Nimeiri's military dictatorship in the Sudan.
Nimeiri personally ordered the public hanging of the seventy-six year old
religious leader.365 Al-'Azm's thesis that Muslim dissidents are not taken
seriously in the West is confirmed by the cordial White House reception
that President Reagan accorded to Nimeiri during his 1985 visit to
Washington" 6 - hardly the reception Nimeiri could have expected had
he only two months previously ordered the execution of a prominent
Christian or Jewish religious leader for his beliefs. As it turned out,
Nimeiri's brutal version of Islamization, while acceptable to his U.S.
allies, was less palatable to his own people; his overthrow in April 1985,
after mass demonstrations by disaffected Sudanese, was enthusiastically
celebrated. 67 Taha's execution was subsequently memorialized when the
date of his death was selected for the annual commemoration of Arab
Human Rights Day.
Al-'Azm's observations were recently echoed by two Egyptian-born
intellectuals. Speaking on behalf of the person whom they aptly - and
poignantly - label "the stranded individual of the South," they observe
the Western tendency to look from afar at "the non-European societies of
the South as culturally homogeneous entities based on consistent value
systems - Islam, Confucianism, and Hinduism. In general, they are
viewed as hostile to the modern ideals of individual liberty and democra-
cy," so that Muslims supporting secular and liberal values are seen as part
of marginal, fringe groups.36 Far from concurring with Huntington's
opinion that-Western support for human rights encourages the growth of
fundamentalism, like al-'Azm, they look for solidarity and call on the
West to support groups defending the democratic option against Islamic
fundamentalism, arguing that "the most important need in the coming
years for the individual in the South is for the solidarity of democratic,
humanistic and universalist currents in both the North and the South. 369
365. al-'Azm, Importance of Being Earnest, supra note 113, at 34 n.17. This case is
examined in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Islamic Law of Apostasy and Its Modern
Applicability, A Case from the Sudan, 16 RELIGION 197 (1986).
366. Mark Whitaker et al., A Strongman's Fall, NEWSWEEK, April 15, 1985, at 73. Not
only was Nimeiri warmly received as a trusted ally, but also the United States granted him $67
million in new economic assistance. See Gerald M. Boyd, U.S. Releasing $67 million for
Sudan, N.Y. TIMEs, April 2, 1985, at AS.
367. See Whitaker, supra note 366, at 73.
368. Hussein, supra note 12, at 41.
369. Id.
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These authors would find scant signs of the solidarity that they hoped
for in a recent essay by Richard Falk. Falk's essay embodies the double
standards Westerners employ in analyzing Western dissidents and their
Muslim counterparts. 37' Hailing the liberty of expression in the West371
and the production of subversive samizdat in the Eastern Bloc, 372 Falk
maintains that the cultural preparation for freedom of expression "is
definitely not present at this time in the Muslim world, 373 and that "the
problems of repressiveness should not be superciliously posited in
nonWestern cultures such as Islam, whose interests can then be ignored
as unworthy of concern. 374 Ironically, after treating "Islam" as a cultural
totality, Falk labels liberal support for Rushdie in the West as
"Orientalism," involving negative Western stereotyping of Islam375 -
apparently unaware that his own vision of Islamic culture as a monolithic,
static entity, incapable of accommodating rights and freedoms, incor-
porates Orientalist stereotypes. As so frequently happens, in Falk's case,
the Westerner who observes the clash between an individual Muslim
challenging limits on rights and freedoms that are being imposed in the
name of "Islam" ultimately sides with the persons and institutions
demanding compliance with a retrograde, intolerant version of Islamic
orthodoxy.376 Oblivious to the merits of the civil and political rights
claims being put forward by the individual, the Westerner, who would
otherwise rarely be inclined to privilege arguments put forward by
repressive, undemocratic regimes, becomes the advocate of the interests
of "Islam," a reified construct severed from the aspirations, feelings, and
interests of its individual adherents. Whether this is the byproduct of
Orientalist proclivities or a misguided application of the principles of
cultural relativism, the result is the same: "the stranded individual of the
South" is denied the sympathy and solidarity that Westerners routinely
accord dissidents and persons demanding respect for human rights who
hail from what Huntington would call "kin-countries. 377
370. See Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 82, at 44.
371. Id. at 57.
372. Id. at 60.
373. Id. at 58.
374. Id. at 59.
375. Id.
376. A telling example of this occurred in the case of "Nada," the Saudi Arabian asylum-
seeker whose unsympathetic reception by Canadian immigration officials is described below.
See infra text accompanying notes 394-416.
377. Rhoda Howard has noted this tendency among Westerners who adopt what she calls
a "cultural absolutist" approach where developing country societies are concerned. Putting
herself in the place of Westerners who care more for the preservation of the community than
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D. The Dissent of Iranian and Saudi Women: Political
Protest or Cultural Treason?
The clashes of the Iranian and Saudi regimes with nonconforming
Iranian and Saudi women illustrate the groundlessness of the assumptions
made by Western cultural relativists and proponents of Orientalism that
a unitary Islamic culture divides Muslim societies from the West. As has
been shown, the Cairo Declaration, supported by both Iran and Saudi
Arabia, for the most part neglected the issue of women's rights, failing
to provide for equality in rights or equal protection of the law regardless
of gender.37 The Saudi Basic Law did not even deem the issue of
women's rights deserving of notice.379 If one accepts these governmental
constructs of Islamic teachings pertaining to rights as definitive statements
of Islamic precepts, one would not expect there to be indigenous conflicts
or protests over women being denied rights. However, Iranian and Saudi
women continue to resist and struggle against discriminatory policies and
laws, illustrating the need to venture beyond official assertions and to
investigate the attitudes of Muslims who are on the receiving end of such
policies."' 0
In Iran and Saudi Arabia, the drastic curbs that are imposed on
women's rights are officially justified as mandated by Islamic culture and
religion. Public manifestations of rejection of the officially-approved
constructs of culture and religion are therefore embarrassing, as they
expose the fallaciousness of the regimes' claims to act pursuant to the
dictates of indigenous cultural models. If Muslim women protest, if they
publicly reject the authority of the governmental constructs of Islam, the
constructs become less convincing. Logically, if authentic cultural norms
for vindicating the rights of individuals in developing countries, she writes: "While we value
intellectual independence in our own tradition, we refuse it to intellectuals in others; they are
supposed to be conservative exemplars, not radical challengers, of their own traditional values."
Howard, Cultural Absolutism, supra note 335, at 329.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
379. See supra text preceding note 231.
380. Donoho has noted the general imprudence of allowing governments wide discretion
in defining acceptable state practice in the area of rights and that:
[r]elativism clearly has a tremendous capacity to serve as the rhetorical justification
for repressive practices by ruling elites. The fact that relativism is most often
supported by repressive regimes ... is ample grounds for a healthy skepticism
regarding vague claims of cultural or ideological necessity for deviations from the
specific requirements of human rights norms.
Donoho, supra note 343, at 380. If skepticism is generally warranted about the good faith of
regimes that deny human rights pursuant to official constructs of culture, a high degree of
skepticism becomes essential where the groups that are being denied rights are ones excluded
from the governing elites, as women are in both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
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were actually involved, one would expect them to enjoy automatic
authority among Muslims and not to depend on positive laws or harsh
police enforcement tactics to obtain compliance. The more obvious the
need to rely on legal sanctions and police measures to enforce what are
officially described as "cultural" norms, the more the legal regimes
repressing women begin to resemble regimes of apartheid, in which the
State establishes and maintains the domination of one group and the
systematic oppression of another.
To date, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have resorted to stringent laws
and aggressive policing in hopes of cowing women into, at least, an
outward submission to the constraints placed on their freedoms. However,
they have been placed on the defensive when forced to explain why they
need to resort to such measures to compel conformity with what are
supposed to be indigenous cultural norms. In attempts to discredit
manifestations of women's dissent from the regimes' policies, both have
tried to disassociate the women involved from the local culture, charging
that their protests are products of Western conspiracies or that the women
involved are "Westernized. '381 On occasion, the regimes have even found
it expedient to deny that they were resorting to coercion to get women to
submit - despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.382
In Iran, after the exodus of perhaps two million Iranians, including
much of the country's educated elite, and after fourteen years of fun-
damentalist propaganda and vigorous repression, arrests, floggings, and
executions, the clerical regime has not succeeded in eradicating noncon-
formity and resistance to its official construct of Islamic culture.383 The
problems of enforcing compliance with the much-resented requirements
that women should wear either the chador, or veil, or other approved
381. For example, this was the approach taken by the Saudi Minister of the Interior in
attempting to discredit the women who participated in the Riyadh driving demonstration in
November, 1990. See Khalid Nazir, Women's Demo was a Stupid Act, Says Naif, Middle East
News Network, Nov. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File. See also
the condemnations of the women in the Riyadh driving protest by Saudi conservatives and the
mutawwa, in Judith Caesar, Big Saudi Brother, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 1991, at 18.
For a typical charge that there was a Western conspiracy to corrupt Iranian women by
propagating Western culture, put forward by President Rafsanjani, see F.B.I.S. (NES-90-004),
Jan. 7, 1991, at 51.
This echoed the militant perspective that Ali Khamene'i had articulated earlier before his
elevation tofaqih, when he had railed against corruption and immorality (meaning in context
freedom for women) as being propagated by Western colonialist powers as part of a plot
against the Islamic revolution. Iranian President Calls for an End to Recent Demonstrations,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 25, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB file.
382. See infra text accompanying notes 391, 398-400.
383. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 286, at 11.
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Islamic dress continue.38 4 In June 1993 a new crackdown was started,
involving arrests of hundreds of women deemed to be in violation of the
dress requirements - often with confiscations of the cars they were
driving or in which they were riding,38 5 with flogging penalties imposed
on offenders.386
By July 1993 the Iranian government had decided to mobilizethe
military strength of the basij forces that had originally been mobilized to
fight in the Iran-Iraq war to combat "cultural corruption," meaning signs
of Western influence or deviations from the official construct of Islamic
morality. To fight the war against "the enemy within," the basijis were
to be given regular military training.387 This policy of resorting to force
to crush nonconformity was not new. In 1985, then President Khamene'i
denounced laxity in the observance of Islamic dress and demanded that
the Public Prosecutor's office, the Ministry of the Interior, and other
relevant officials prosecute immorality, indecency, and acts contrary to
public chastity. 388 This was followed by an announcement by the Ministry
of the Interior that law enforcement forces would be employed to fight
corruption and vice. 389 To remind women of. the consequences of not
wearing the concealing chador, a circular Was published saying that
women who appeared in public "without wearing a religious veil" would
be punished with up to seventy-four lashes.390 To stop laxity in Islamic
dress among government employees, the circular ordered ministries -and
government departments to execute strictly the orders for observance of
Islamic dress. 39' Although the evidence was overwhelming that the regime
had long employed force to compel Iranian women to comply with the
requirement that they wear hijab, or Islamic dress, the Iranian government
recently felt compelled to deny that its Islamic dress requirements were
384. For background on the variety of Iranians' perspectives regarding the post-revolu-
tionary veiling requirement, see the essays and statements included in IN THE SHADOW OF
ISLAM: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN IRAN (Azar Tabari & Nahid Yeganeh eds., 1982) and
Anne Betteridge, To Veil or Not to Veil: A Matter of Protest or Policy, in WOMEN AND
REVOLUTION IN IRAN (Guity Nashat ed., 1983).
385. See Crackdown on Improperly Dressed Women is "Duty": Rafsanjani, Agence France
Presse, June 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File. •
386. See It's the Whip for Breaking Islamic Dress Code, Agence France Presse, June 24,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File; Iran: Victims of Human Rights
Violations, supra note 136, at 7-8.
387. See Chris Hedges, Mobilizing'Against Pop Music and Other Horrors, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1993, at A4.
388. Iranian President Calls for an End to Recent Demonstrations, BBC Summary of





Michigan Journal of International Law
being imposed by force on resisting Iranian women. In February 1993, in
response to a critical U.N. report on Iran's human rights record, which
included negative evaluations of its discriminatory treatment of women,39
the Iranian government asserted that its dress requirements and personal
status laws affecting women were part of religion and, as such, were
willingly accepted by Iranians. Iran's response thus posited a uniform
Islamic culture:
Considering the fact that the majority of the Iranian people are
Muslim, the holy Islamic codes form the basic guidelines for the
laws.... [Women] freely accept regulations regarding marriage and
the limitation of the rights and duties of both men and women,
based on such Islamic criteria .... The legal philosophy of the
observation [sic] of "Hijab" for women and men in an Islamic
society is fully credible and within the context of conventional
international laws. Therefore, since more than 95 per cent of people
in Iran are Muslim and thereby follow the laws prevailing upon [sic]
an Islamic society, all follow and support the appropriate laws and
regulations on the rights of society .... Although some political
groups believe that women should observe "Hijab" entirely and have
criticized the Government for not responding to this matter, until
now there have been no confrontations with females who do not
observe the "Hijab" properly. 3
Several things are noteworthy in this statement, which reveals the
regime's uneasiness with international scrutiny of its discriminatory laws
and the forcible imposition of its veiling requirements. Faced with
charges that criminal sanctions for noncompliance with Islamic dress
requirements were violations of international human rights norms, the
regime felt obliged to dissimulate, denying its own policies and pretend-
ing that Iranians as Muslims were all voluntarily complying with these
requirements. The contrast between the regime's domestic policy of
aggressive denunciation of women's nonconformity, accompanied by
criminal sanctions for violations, and its representation to the United
Nations that all Iranian Muslims willingly adhered to the same version of
Islamic morality, shows that the regime appreciated that the protracted
pattern of women's resistance to its Islamic dress requirements exposed
their lack of authority - the kind of authority that genuine cultural
norms would naturally possess. Furthermore, despite the fact that the
392. See Final Report, supra note 26, at 37-38.
393. U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 7, 8, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/1993/41/Add.1 (1993).
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dress requirements were theoretically based on Islamic law, as of 1993
the regime did not appear to feel comfortable asserting that the religious
derivation of the official requirements for Islamic dress would justify
breaching international law. Instead, it tried to present these dress require-
ments as congruent with international norms. This indicates that, even in
the minds of Iran's clerical leaders, there was diminished confidence that
appeals to cultural particularism could provide adequate defenses for
violations of international law. In an effort to make the dress require-
ments appear less discriminatory, the regime argued that Islamic dress
rules applied to men, as well, even though the record demonstrates that
the regime's preoccupation has been with forcing women to wear the
hijab.394
Western cultural relativist and Orientalist perspectives dovetail with
the constructs of Islamic culture employed by governments and incline
Westerners to delegitimize Muslims' rejection of these constructs when
the latter appeal to international human rights norms. The case of "Nada,"
the fictitious name of an actual Saudi Arabian woman in her twenties
who sought political refugee status in Canada in 1991, exemplifies how
the plight of the Muslim dissident may be depoliticized in Western eyes.
Although Nada articulately condemned Saudi policies depriving women
of rights and freedoms, she found it difficult to persuade Canadian
officials to take her plight seriously or to convince them that a Saudi
woman was entitled to question the official Saudi norms for female
conduct.
According to Nada's account, she had been persecuted in Saudi
Arabia for refusing to wear the required veil and for protesting against the
Kingdom's sexist laws.395 When Nada went about with her face unveiled
(she always concealed her body with a tent-like covering), she was stoned
and spat upon, and people hissed and yelled obscenities. She had to
navigate the streets carefully to avoid encountering the mutawwa'in, the
religious police, who, had they caught her, would have beaten her with
their bamboo sticks for being immodestly dressed. She was not allowed
to drive, to travel without the consent of a male relative, or to study her
preferred subject, physical education, and was forced instead to study
nursing, a field deemed open to women.396
394. Since the revolution, it has been regarded as "un-lslamic" for men to wear ties or
unconventional clothing. Since Iranian men can otherwise dress in Western garb, their freedom
to wear what they choose is not substantially curbed. Thus, an Iranian male dressed in an
Armani suit is wearing "Islamic dress;" a woman wearing a black chador who allows a stray
lock of her hair to show, is not.
395. See Julie Wheelwright, One Giant Step for Women in Search of Asylum, GUARDIAN,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 11.
396. See Jacquie Miller, A Saudi Arabian Woman, Seeking to Escape her Country's
Restrictive Laws, has been Denied Asylum in Canada, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 4, 1992, at Al.
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After Nada had at last managed to escape to Montreal from Saudi
Arabia in the company of a male relative, she claimed refugee status
upon her arrival, telling Canadian immigration officials that, if she were
forced to return home, she might be arrested and tortured by the Saudi
religious police. Far from showing sympathy for her complaint, the
Canadian officials merely laughed at her.397 These Westerners considered
the notion that an Arab Muslim woman could legitimately express
attitudes that were associated with Western culture as ludicrous - exactly
as it was deemed outrageous by defenders of Saudi orthodoxy.
As truculent and aggressive as the Saudi regime has been in its
treatment of dissident women domestically, 39 it was embarrassed when
Nada made her charges in full view of the Canadian public. By and large,
it seemed reluctant to comment, but in one response to this cause c6lbre
it sought to minimize the perception that nonconforming women were
exposed to harsh treatment in Saudi Arabia; a Saudi representative in
Ottawa stated blandly that he did not think it was "dangerous" for Nada
to live in Saudi Arabia and that not all Saudi women wore veils. 399 In
reality, as the spokesperson must have known, not only were women
subject to beatings by the mutawwa'in for nonconformity with the Saudi
version of Islamic morality, but they might also be arrested and tortured
as well.A Like Iran, Saudi Arabia apparently deemed it damaging to
admit that its official Islamic morality was enforced by forceful police
measures, including torture.
Under then prevailing Canadian standards, which resembled standards
commonly in use elsewhere in the West and which are derived from the
U.N. Convention on Refugees,"' to qualify for asylum, it is necessary to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, or membership in a particular social group or political
opinion. 2 Since persecution for reasons of gender is not included in the
397. See Wheelwright, supra note 395, at 11.
398. See, e.g., the response to the women in the Riyadh driving protest of November,
1990. Protests won't be tolerated: Naif, Middle East News Network, Nov. 19, 1990, available
in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, Saudi file; Nazir, supra note 381, at 9.
399. Canada to Consider Asylum for Women Fleeing Discrimination, GUARDIAN, Feb. 3,
1993, at 8.
400. See SHAME OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD, supra note 90, at 80-81.
401. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 150, as modified by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. On the general subject of the problematic nature of the cur-
rent international requirements for establishing refugee status, which allow officials eager to
limit the number of asylum-seekers various routes for denying refugee status, see JAMES
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991).
402. The Protocol defines a refugee as any person who: "owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
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list of categories for which a persecuted individual might claim asylum,
Nada could not advance her claim by asserting that she was a victim of
gender-based discrimination. Instead, she tried to persuade Canadian
officials to see her as a political dissident.43 She wrote that, for her,
being trapped in Saudi Arabia was like death and indicated that she
wanted to regain her dignity and personal integrity. However, her belief
in gender equality was not deemed by Canadian officials to rank as a
"political opinion" 4 that would qualify her for refugee status. The
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board refused to grant Nada asylum,
concluding that she should "comply with the laws of general application
she criticises" and "show consideration for the feelings of her father,"
who was opposed to her liberal ideas.4 5 To avoid being returned to Saudi
Arabia, Nada went into hiding. After receiving the backing of human
rights organizations and women's groups, she was finally given permis-
sion in February 1993 to remain in Canada on humanitarian grounds.40
Meanwhile, Bernard Valcourt, the Canadian Minister of Employment and
Immigration, had announced that he did not think that Canada should
"unilaterally try to impose its values on the rest of the world," and also
indicated that he would not recognize gender-based persecution as a basis
for asylum. 7 For the Minister of Employment and Immigration, allowing
Nada to claim refugee status and the freedoms afforded under Canadian
law was seen as the unjustifiable extension of Canadian values to a
person properly subject to Saudi laws.408
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country .... Protocol, supra
note 401, art. 1, 2.
403. Her lawyer argued that Nada was persecuted in Saudi Arabia because of her political
beliefs, her feminism, and her social group: women. She made a separate claim that Nada's
minority religion - presumably Shi'ism - also exposed her to discrimination. See Miller,
supra note 396, at Al.
404. See Jessica Neuwirty, A Test of Canada's Gender Equality, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 18, 1992, at 18.
405. See Wheelwright, supra note 395, at 11.
406. See Miller, supra note 396, at AI.
407. See Judy Steed, Refugee Board Chief Knows Racism First Hand, TORONTO STAR,
Feb. 28, 1993, at B5.
408. Although the reaction of Canadian officialdom is what one would have expected from
persons influenced by Orientalist stereotypes, it would not be at all surprising if these
perceptions of the matter had been encouraged by Saudi Arabia's diplomats in Canada. One
can also not rule out the possibility that the rejection of Nada's claim was for reasons of
expediency - in hopes of avoiding setting a precedent that would encourage the flight of other
Muslim women to Canada to claim refugee status, a prospect that was becoming more likely
as the strength of Islamic fundamentalism kept growing. See, e.g., Charles Trueheart, Canada
Opens Doors to Refugee Claims Based on Gender, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1993, at A17.
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In addition to the sexist bias displayed by the Canadian officials,
Orientalist stereotyping played a role in prompting them to dismiss
Nada's claim so cavalierly. In this regard, Nada's situation is similar to
the plight of Salman Rushdie. In both cases, Westerners have assumed
that Islam has extraterritorial reach; as Muslims, both Rushdie and Nada
were deemed to remain beholden to Islamic criteria, even when physically
present on the territory of Western nations. The Board's ruling reflected
the implicit notion that, however out of keeping Islamic norms might be
with the freedoms to which Canadian women were accustomed, no valid
objections to them could be raised on the part of a Saudi woman.
The rejection of Nada's asylum claim correlates with the way West-
ern cultural relativists posit the nature of the tie between the individual
and culture in nonWestern societies and their failure to think through the
implications of the advent of the nation State for the rights of the individ-
ual. As Rhoda Howard has noted, their expectation is that the nonWestern
individual should renounce her human rights for the greater good of the
collectivity and that:
This renunciation is costless to her because her identity is merged
with that of the group, so that human fights on an individual basis
would seem not only irrelevant, but laughable. She is merged with
her family and society in an organic oneness that fulfills both her
creative and her social needs. And of course, since in this rendering
she either does not live in a state or class society or is untouched by
the state's or the ruling class' political and economic interests, she
is entirely without need for the classic civil and political rights.4
In an article offering her own perspective on how she had been
treated "as a Muslim and an Arab woman," Nada characterizes her own
situation as one of political oppression.4t ° She reacts to the sexism and
Orientalist stereotypes she encountered in Canada, insisting on the
commonality of women's experiences of male oppression. She states that
women around the world are suffering, and governments are using all
their powers "not to develop but to repress their people."' t ' When, she
asks, will women be taken seriously? Nada maintains that the Canadian
Minister of Employment and Immigration missed the point when he
argued that Canada should not intervene and impose its cultural values on
Saudi Arabia:
409. Howard, Cultural Absolutism, supra note 335, at 332.
410. See A Serious Step Toward Accepting Female Refugees, OrrAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 11,
1993, at A13 [hereinafter A Serious Step].
411. Id.
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The discrimination and repression I lived with in Saudi Arabia
had political and not cultural roots.
When governments impose a certain set of beliefs on individu-
als, through propaganda, violence or torture, we are dealing not with
culture but rather with political expediency.
The claim that such practices are cultural is dangerous, if not
racist.
When a woman walks down the street in Saudi Arabia without
a veil and the Mutawwi'in (religious police) flog her, this is not
cultural, it's political. Who gave permission to the Mutawwi'in? The
government.412 They fear that women will try to change things, and
they'll lose their political power....
The status of women in the Middle East is deteriorating, not
because of Islam as some claim, but because of political oppression.
Islam is being manipulated. In the Middle East, as everywhere
else, men would do anything to preserve their power and authori-
ty.4
13
In Saudi Arabia, the veil is just a form of oppression, a way for
men to say they have power over women....
In the Middle East, men have chosen to exploit Islam for their
own interests, not out of piety or fear of Allah. But elsewhere men
have used other religions or ideologies to achieve personal political
gains.
Women are repressed everywhere around the world, no matter
what the religions, no matter what the culture.41 4
Having confronted both Saudi and Western constructs of the way Arab
Muslim women should behave, Nada sees herself as a woman fighting the
same political battle as other women, a battle in which any religion or
ideology might be manipulated by men to achieve the goal of subor-
dinating women. Ultimately, she concludes that "women's oppression
ha[s] less to do with Islam than with men's power.
' 41 5
412. Claims that the mutawwa'in function as agents of the government in their policing
of women have been made by others, as well. See, e.g., Caesar, supra note 381.
413. In this regard, Nada's perspective resembled that of other Muslim feminists, who are
unimpressed by the Islamic rationales exploited for their repression. A prominent example is
Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan feminist, who has written extensively on the plight of the Muslim
woman seeking emancipation. In her view, the Islamic tradition, when stripped of the
distortions imposed by self-interested male interpreters of the sacred, is itself consonant with
feminism, allowing Muslim women "the quest for dignity, democracy, and human rights, for
full participation in the political and social affairs of our country." MERNISSI, supra note 48,
at viii. Mernissi insists that "if women's rights are a problem for some modern Muslim men,
it is neither because of the Koran nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because
those rights conflict with the interests of a male elite." Id. at ix.
414. A Serious Step, supra note 410, at A13.
415. Wheelwright, supra note 395, at 11.
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Nada also questions the Canadian government's expression of concern
for Saudi cultural integrity." 6 That a government would dispose of an
asylum claim by a claimant already on its soil in the name of avoiding
the damage to the cultural integrity of a foreign country does seem
improbable. Why, after all, should one nation State see the culture of
another nation State as being affected by its decision?
The attitude of Canadian officialdom on the need. to respect Saudi
sovereignty and culture may have been influenced by Canada's dealings
with the native Indian nations on Canadian territory, which did present
issues of respect for cultural differences in relation to Indian sovereignty.
Such issues were being raised in contemporaneous lawsuits involving
Indians' claims that Indian or part-Indian children should be kept by
Indian families and that ones who had been adopted by nonlndian parents
living in mainstream Canadian culture should be returned to Indian
reservations," 7 as well as in the Thomas case, discussed infra. To the
extent that Canadian officials perceived Islam as a culture that placed its
adherents in a separate community bounded by distinctive values at odds
with Canadian rights and freedoms, Nada may have been perceived as
falling in the same category as an Indian child who had strayed off her
tribal reserve and whose appeal to Canadian rights protections had to be
balanced against the claims of the collectivity to which she properly
belonged, the latter being conceived of as something like an Indian
nation.
The government of Canada is legally bound to respect the cultural
differences of its native peoples, even where this entails violations of
Canada's own constitutional norms. 8 Canada cannot apply Canadian
constitutional rights provisions to Indians in ways that abrogate or
derogate from "any aboriginal, treaty, or other rights or freedoms that
pertain to aboriginal peoples of Canada., 419 As benign as this notion of
respect for cultural difference might seem, Canada's duty to respect
Indian culture can entail awkward conflicts when Indians themselves step
forward, as some do, to demand the same rights as other Canadian
416. A Serious Step, supra note 410, at A13.
417. See, e.g., Adrienne Tanner, Who Gets Baby David? Two Different Worlds Tugging
at Indian Boy, GAZETTE (Montreal), Aug. 19, 1993, at Al; Wendy Dudley, Native Bands
Recognized as Individual Governments, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 2, 1993, at A2; Minister
Promises to Trim Incidents of Removing Children from Families, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 4,
1992, at A7.
418. See Allan McChesney, Aboriginal Communities, Aboriginal Rights, and the Human
Rights System in Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR
CONSENSUS, supra note 82, at 232.
419. Macklein, supra note 348, at 1324.
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citizens against the norms of their own culture.420 Nonetheless, Canada's
concern for preserving the cultural integrity of its indigenous Indian
peoples and its policy of refraining from applying Canadian constitutional
rights norms to members of Indian nations are arguably appropriate
because Canada has incurred special responsibilities by encroaching on
Indian civilization to the point that the very survival of the latter has been
placed in jeopardy. In contrast, whether the restraints on freedom man-
dated by Saudi Wahhabism will survive in Arabia does not in any way
depend on Canadian asylum policies. Moreover, with regard to its duty
to respect the culture of Indian nations, Canada is dealing with groups
within which all members are more likely to share the same cultural
values than are the citizens of any modern nation State, including Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, the analogy between Saudi Arabia and an Indian
nation is far from perfect. The justifications for according primacy to
preserving the collective culture over protecting the rights of the in-
dividual are much stronger in the case of Canada's dealings with its
Indian nations.
As it happened, an important case that tested how to deal with the
clash between collective rights asserted on behalf of an Indian nation and
the individual rights asserted by an Indian had been decided by the
British Columbian Supreme Court during February 1992, precisely in the
period in which the controversy about Nada's asylum claim was grow-
ing.42' In that case, David Thomas, a Coast Salish Indian who lived off
the reservation, sued other Salish who had forcibly abducted him to the
Salish reservation, where they subjected him against his will for four days
to the initiation ceremonies needed to become a spirit dancer. When
Thomas sued for assault and battery and false imprisonment, the defen-
dants defended on the grounds that ruling for the plaintiff would deny the
collective aboriginal rights of the Salish nation. The Court ruled against
the defendants, deciding that:
While the plaintiff may have special rights and status in Canada as
an Indian, the "original" rights and freedoms he enjoys can be no
420. See, e.g., Howard, Dignity, supra note 82, at 84 and the discussion of Thomas v.
Norris, infra in text accompanying notes 421-23.
As McChesney notes regarding the nonapplication of Canadian rights norms to Indians:
"This is problematic from an individual rights perspective, because sometimes Native leaders
are thought to carry out discriminatory practises." McChesney, supra note 418, at 232.
Such discrimination might place Indian women at a disadvantage. In 1991-92, some
Indian women's organizations worried about sexism in the Indian nations, had wanted to secure
legal guarantees that would protect the rights and freedoms of individuals in the Indian nations.
See Thomas Isaac, Individual versus Collective Rights: Aboriginal People and the Significance
of Thomas v. Norris, 21 MAN. L. J. 618, 627-28 (1992).
421. See Thomas v. Norris, [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 139 (B.C.S.C.).
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less [sic] than those enjoyed by fellow citizens, Indian and non-
Indian alike. He lives in a free society and his rights are inviolable.
He is free to believe in, and to practise [sic], any religion or tradi-
tion, if he chooses to do so. He cannot be coerced or forced to
participate in one by any group purporting to exercise its collective
rights in doing so. His freedoms and rights are not subject to the
collective rights of the aboriginal nation to which he belongs.
422
The Thomas decision stands in marked contrast to the decision in
Nada's case, where, although the reasons for showing concern for
preserving the integrity of the nonCanadian culture involved were much
weaker, the immigration authorities originally accorded priority to the
claims of the collectivity over the rights of the individual. The Canadian
immigration authorities seemed disinclined to conceptualize Nada as an
individual like Thomas, one endowed with the freedom to believe in or
practice any religion or tradition of her choice. They were therefore
prepared to deport her, even though shipping Nada back to Saudi Arabia
would have been likely to result in deprivations of rights and freedoms
more pervasive and far more protracted than the four days' ordeal
suffered by Thomas.423 Orientalist stereotyping and the prevailing pattern
of trivializing the plight of Muslim dissidents may have influenced
Canadian officials to believe that a Saudi woman's opposition to Islamic
rules that would permanently deprive her of rights and freedoms should
be accorded less weight than a Salish Indian's objections to being an
unwilling participant in a spirit dancing initiation rite.
The controversy over Nada's plight continued and prompted a
rethinking of Canadian asylum standards. In March 1993, Canada's
Immigration and Refugee Board introduced new guidelines to address the
plight of women who claimed refugee status on the grounds of gender-
based persecution stemming from their failure to obey laws or religious
customs that discriminated against women. 424 The guidelines were
introduced under the leadership of the new head of the board, Nurjehan
422. Isaac, supra note 420, at 623.
423. Among other things, Thomas was denied food and forced to walk naked in a creek,
and he was carried by assailants who bit him and dug fingers into his stomach. See Macklem,
supra note 348, at 1343.
424. Peggy Curran, Ottawa Eases Way for Women Seeking Refugee Status, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Mar. 10, 1993, at At. Practices that would be included in the new category of
gender-based persecution are: bride-burning in India; genital mutilation of young girls in the
Sudan; and the stoning or decapitation of women who commit adultery or fail to obey the
dictates of Islamic fundamentalism. Id. The guidelines stipulate: "The religious precepts, social
traditions or cultural norms which women may be accused of violating can range from choosing
their own spouses instead of accepting an arranged marriage to such matters as the wearing of
makeup, the visibility or length of hair, or type of clothing a woman chooses to wear." Id.
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Mawani, a Muslim woman who had grown up in Kenya, where she had
experienced both the racism of British colonialism and her brother's
transformation during his studies in London into an activist committed to
Kenya's struggle for independence.425 Unlike Valcourt, the Canadian
Minister who had acted as though granting Nada's claim was tantamount
to imposing Canadian values on Saudi Arabia, Mawani, with her roots in
a Muslim community in Africa and with first hand experience of life
under British colonialism, rejected the notion that judging Nada's case by
the norms of international human rights entailed cultural imperialism. She
asserted: "This is not simply a matter of imposing Western standards on
other countries. It is a matter of respecting internationally accepted human
rights standards. 426
Nada's assessment, that appeals to religion and culture are merely
covers for political oppression and that women around the world are
fighting the same battle, coincides with the views articulated by Dorothy
Thomas, a representative of Human Rights Watch, after her experience
of interacting with women's delegations from around the world during the
1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. In response to an inter-
viewer's remark that persons opposing the universality of human rights
were claiming that it meant an attack on their cultures and religions,
Thomas acknowledged that cultural relativism had been the most con-
tentious issue at the Vienna Conference and stated that culture was being
used to justify abuses of human rights and abuses of women's rights in
particular.427 However, according to her, women campaigning for their
rights denied that the question of women's rights was a cultural issue:
Women from every single culture and every part of the world are
standing up and saying we won't accept cultural justification for
abuses against us anymore. We are human, we have a right to have
our human rights protected, and the world community must respond
to that call and throw out any attempts to justify abuse on the
grounds of culture ...42
425. See Steed, supra note 407, at B5.
426. Id. In the wake of the Canadian reforms, there were pressures for reform of U.S.
asylum standards, which also did not recognize gender-based persecution as a basis for claiming
refugee status. See Deborah Sontag, Asking for Asylum in U.S., Women Tread New Territory,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at Al.
427. Interview with Dorothy Thomas, Human Rights Watch, Women Succeed in Pressing
for Rights Hearing at Vienna, CNN television broadcast, June 22, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
428. Id.
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In sum, seen from the ground up, from the perspective of women
from all cultures who are being denied internationally guaranteed human
rights, the appeals to Orientalist stereotypes of Islamic culture to rational-
ize deviations from the international norms are not special; they are
simply one component of a general pattern of self-serving constructs of
culture being exploited by men for their own political advantage. The
women's groups were not interested in being drawn into the quarrels
about the universality of human rights that had preoccupied the official
delegations at the Vienna Conference. Unimpeded and unimpressed by
any "clash of civilizations," the groups representing women from around
the world had discovered that they shared the common goal of seeing
human rights universally implemented and the willingness to work in
concert toward the realization of that goal.
CONCLUSION
Attempts are being made to convince the world that there exists a
distinctive, Islamic "civilizational" approach to human rights questions
that differs from the Western approach, so that international human rights
standards are inappropriately applied where Islamic culture prevails. It is
also argued that human rights have little resonance among Muslims:
governments of Muslim countries and Islamic fundamentalists argue that
international standards of human rights are Western and in conflict with
Islamic culture. In the West, certain scholars also promote such views,
perhaps encouraged or confused by Muslim assertions of Islamic par-
ticularism or by ingrained Orientalist stereotypes and cultural relativist
proclivities. Thus, in Huntington's sweeping generalizations about
"Islamic civilization," Islamic values are portrayed as inimical to human
rights and democratic freedoms, and attempts to propagate "Western"
human rights ideals in "Islamic culture" are dismissed as misguided
endeavors, ones necessarily associated with cultural imperialism and
doomed in any case to be counterproductive. Meanwhile, governments of
Muslim countries make statements and endorse positions that seem to
bear out Huntington's thesis. Recently propounded constructs of Islamic
human rights, which diverge widely from international standards and
effectively curtail or repudiate human rights and democratic freedoms,
suggest that Western values, like human rights and democracy, must
inevitably clash with Islamic values. Protests by some Muslims over
Western calls for the universal application of international human rights
also seem to confirm Huntington's claim that promotion of universality
only provokes cross-cultural tensions.
However, as this article has attempted to demonstrate, the constructs
of Islamic rights in the civil and political sphere, that one finds in
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schemes like the Cairo Declaration and the Saudi Basic Law, are designed
to shore up the political interests of those promoting them and have only
a tenuous connection to Islamic culture. They borrow extensively from
Western rights models and mine the Islamic heritage only very selectively
- shutting out the enlightened, modem perspectives of Muslims who are
supportive of human rights. The features of Islamic human rights schemes
sometimes clash with Islamic principles or set forth rules that represent
nothing more than the authors' own policy preferences or political
agendas. Although they purport to reinstate Islamic doctrine, they are not
truly Islamic, either in stating principles that rest on uncontested authority
in the Islamic heritage of the past, or in enjoying the general endorsement
of Muslims as definitive contemporary formulations of rights principles.
In reality, the world's Muslims have never been .consulted about what
rights they would like to have or about whether they truly prefer to be
governed by so called "Islamic" rights norms that fall far below the
protections guaranteed to nonMuslims under international law, The failure
of governments to resort to the democratic process to test their citizens'
real feelings on such matters suggests that they have qualms lest their
citizens' freely expressed preferences should demonstrate that the official
constructs lack popular support.
Although nongovernmental forces such as Islamic fundamentalist
movements oppose international human rights, where Muslims indepen-
dent of governments have spoken out, it has frequently been to assert -
often at enormous personal risk or professional cost - the universality
of human rights and to express their aspirations to enjoy the rights
established under international law. The vigorous efforts by governments
in countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to suppress independent
human rights advocacy and to silence Muslims who have dared to
criticize their official rights policies indicate that they surmise that human
rights ideals resonate all too potently among their citizenry and that the
Islamic rationales they offer for denying them are not convincing.
In reality, as more skeptical observers often conclude, the invocations
of "Islam" by countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to justify their
opposition to the universality of rights is not an authentic, "civilizational"
response to rights issues. Despite Huntington's uncritical assessment to
the contrary, the real clash is not so much a clash of Western rights
concepts with "Islamic civilization," as a clash between undemocratic
governments of some Muslim countries and the Muslims they rule - a
conflict between the opponents and proponents of rights and freedom. In
this conflict, Huntington and other Western adherents of cultural relativ-
ism or Orientalism effectively array themselves on the side of the undem-
ocratic governments, whose retrograde concepts of "Islamic human
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rights" they are prepared to accept as authoritative. Meanwhile, Western
supporters of universality who take the trouble to inform themselves
about the actual reactions of Muslims on the receiving end of governmen-
tal rights policies are establishing that, at the grassroots level, they have
many Muslim allies.
In these circumstances, one is drawn to the point of view encapsu-
lated in the remarks made by the Dalai Lama after his warm welcome by
the NGOs at the Vienna Human Rights Conference. In his speech, this
quintessentially Asian religious figure focused on individual human
beings, the intended beneficiaries of international human rights, and
offered this assessment: "As far as human rights are concerned, whether
Easterner, or Westerner, Southerner, or Northerner, white or black or
yellow - no matter - all individual human beings have the same rights
from birth to death. We are all the same. ' 429
429. Griffen, supra note 329, at A8.
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